Part 3 Institutional Control of Constitutionalism, 3.3 The Turkish Constitutional Court as Defender of the Raison d’Etat ?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Can Osman
Keyword(s):  
Power Relations ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Institutional Control ◽  
Democratic Culture ◽  
Islamic World ◽  
Special Place ◽  
Raison D’État ◽  
Turkish Constitution

This chapter examines the power relations creating the Turkish Constitution and the constitutional court, the structure of this court, and judicial precedents it has set. It addresses questions such as: Is it sufficient to base the constitution simply on “power relations,” or if it is also necessary to ensure its democratic legitimacy? Will the constitution and the structure of Turkey's constitutional judiciary, with its special place in the Islamic world regarding societal pluralism and democratic culture, be able to provide a positive comparative law paradigm for countries trying to democratize?

Part 3 Institutional Control of Constitutionalism, 3.1 Models of Institutional Control: The Experience of Islamic Countries

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grote Rainer
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Institutional Control ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Islamic World ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Islamic Countries ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication

This chapter discusses constitutional review in Islamic countries. It covers the basic models of constitutional review; composition of constitutional courts; powers of constitutional courts; and effects of constitutional court decisions. It shows that introduction of constitutional review in the Islamic world has largely been pattered after foreign models, particularly of France (namely in the Maghreb countries and Lebanon), the United States (in Egypt and the Arab peninsula), the United Kingdom (Pakistan, Nigeria, Malaysia), and Germany (Turkey, Indonesia), with modifications to the particular political and cultural contexts of the respective countries. While almost all constitutional review bodies practice some form of constitutional review of legislation or another, most constitutions in the Islamic world still do not provide for access of individuals to constitutional adjudication.

scholarly journals Vots al carrer l’1 d’octubre de 2017 a Catalunya: la ‘fake news’ menys aclarida

Tripodos ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 153-168
Author(s):  
Jordi Serrat
Keyword(s):  
Media Coverage ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Public Television ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Police Intervention ◽  
The Media ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Legal Sense

Catalunya va viure l’1 d’octubre del 2017 un dels moments informatius més importants de la seva història. El Govern català va habilitar, desobeint el Tribunal Constitucional, 2.243 col∙legis electorals per preguntar als ciutadans si estaven a favor o en contra de la inde­pendència de Catalunya. El fet que els principals òrgans dels poders judicial i polític d’Espanya consideressin il∙legal aquest referèndum no va fer desistir els organitzadors. La jornada va estar mar­cada per la gent que va mobilitzar-se per votar i per l’actuació de la policia espanyola que va intervenir amb força. La recerca analitza com un viral de You­Tube, per denunciar irregularitats en la consulta, conté tots els ingredients per considerar-lo la principal fake news d’aquell dia. L’anàlisi es contextualitza amb opinions sobre la cobertura del re­ferèndum de quatre periodistes catalans entrevistats (Crónica Global, El País i Ara). També es confronten els relats de TV3 i TVE, en el Telenotícies i el Tele­diario. Mentre la televisió catalana va presentar l’1-O de manera èpica, per la resistència popular per salvaguardar uns drets que simbolitzaven les urnes enfront les càrregues policials; la televi­sió pública espanyola va emfatitzar que va ser una acció il∙legal, sense garanties democràtiques.   Votes in the Streets on October 1, 2017 in Catalonia: An Example of Covert Fake News On October 1st, 2017 (1-O), Catalonia experienced one of the most important newsworthy moments in its history. The Catalan government set up 2.243 polling stations to conduct a referendum on Catalonia’s independence, thereby disobeying Spain’s Constitutional Court. Although the main bodies of the Spa­nish judiciary and political powers con­sidered the referendum illegal, the orga­nizers persisted. The day was marked by people’s mobilizations, which consisted of defending polling stations and pro­tecting voters from police intervention. With this study, we seek to analyse how a YouTube video, which reported irregu­larities about the referendum and went viral, contains all the ingredients to be considered fake news. The analysis is contextualized with opinions about the media coverage of the referendum by four interviews with Catalan journalists (Crónica Global, El País, Ara). The ac­counts of TV3 (Televisió de Catalunya) and TVE (Televisión Española), in Tele­notícies (TV3’s news) and Telediario(TVE’s news) are also juxtaposed. While the Catalan public television (TV3) pre­sented the 1-O in an epic way, stressing the citizens’ resistance to safeguard the rights as symbolized by the ballot boxes against the Spanish police, the Spanish public television (TVE) emphasised that 1-O was an illegal referendum lacking democratic legitimacy.

scholarly journals Lembaga Jaminan Fidusia: Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 18/PUU-XVII/2019

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 84
Author(s):  
Ari Wirya Dinata
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Methods ◽  
Power Relations ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Power Relationship ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
The Right ◽  
Legal Subjects ◽  
Legal Consequences

Fiduciary is one of the guarantees where the debtor has the right to control and take advantage of the goods that are used as fiduciary security objects. Article 15 paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of Law Number 42 Year 1999 concerning Fiduciary Guarantee regulates the execution mechanism for fiduciary security objects when the fiduciary giver (debtor) experiences breach of promise to the fiduciary recipient (creditor). So far, the execution mechanism for fiduciary security objects regulated in the Act creates legal uncertainty and harms the debtor's rights. Because it gives too much power to the creditor. The imbalance of power relations between debtors and creditors towards the handling of the problem of breach of contract actually causes an injustice in existing fiduciary institutions. The Constitutional Court, through decision number 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019, tries to return the fiduciary institution to the spirit of equilibrium relations between debtors, creditors, and fair fiduciary guarantees. After the decision of the Constitutional Court Number 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019. Has there been a harmonious power relationship between two legal subjects in fiduciary guarantees. This paper examines the pre and post fiduciary guarantee institutions of the Constitutional Court and analyzes the legal consequences that occur. This paper uses a type of juridical-normative research using primary data and primary, secondary and tertiary legal material. While the analysis method uses qualitative methods

scholarly journals Universalismo y particularismo en el Tribunal Constitucional. Sobre su uso (y abuso) de los precedentes extranjeros

2018 ◽  
pp. 530
Author(s):  
Ángel Aday Jiménez Alemán
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Scholarship ◽  
Accepted Practice

El siguiente trabajo ofrece elementos con los que analizar una práctica pacíficamente aceptada de nuestro Tribunal Constitucional, escasamente aborda por la doctrina española, pero no por ello menos contradictoria: El uso de Derecho comparado, y, específicamente, de precedentes extranjeros. Se realiza un análisis sistemático tanto empírico como teórico de las resoluciones en las que ha sido utilizado como parte de los fundamentos jurídicos.This paper provides elements to analyse the peacefully accepted practice of using comparative law by the Spanish Constitutional Court. This paper is focus on the use of foreign precedents. It is a contradictory practice although still not explored by the Spanish legal scholarship. In this sense, this paper contributes with a systematic empirical and theoretical analysis of the Spanish Court’s decisions where foreign precedents are referenced at the legal groundings

scholarly journals ПОКРЕТАЊЕ ПОСТУПКА НОРМАТИВНЕ КОНТРОЛЕ ПРАВА У РЕПУБЛИЦИ СРБИЈИ

TEME ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1419
Author(s):  
Bálint Pásztor
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Democratic Culture ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Institutional Values ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The One

The author of the article analyzes the specificities of the normative control of the law, i.e. the procedure of assessing the constitutionality and legality of the law in the Republic of Serbia, with the aim of detecting historical and legal preconditions of the effective functioning of the rule of law. The historical perspective of the development of the constitutional judiciary in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, as well as the analysis of the experiences of various systems of control of constitutionality and legality, open the contextual, scientific-historical and pragmatic dimensions of understanding. The specificity of the system of normative control is reflected in its triplicity, meaning that three institutes are known that characterize different procedural possibilities (to initiate the process of assessing the constitutionality and legality of general acts). The paper is written in order to point out the dichotomy of the proposal and initiative of the procedure of the assessment of constitutionality and legality, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the ex officio procedure. Furthermore, the author wanted to point out the essential and procedural differences between the proposal, the initiative and the constitutional complaint, especially analyzing the purpose of retaining the institute of the initiative in the light of the existence of the constitutional complaint and the fact that the initiative does not imply the automation of the initiation of proceedings. The dilemma that the article opens concerns the possibility that in the case of abolishing the initiative as an institution accessible to all, is it possible to preserve the democratic culture and the participation of citizens, furthermore is it possible to abolish the fundamental institutional values and freedoms of a legal state and the rule of law? The paper opens other issues of importance for the establishment of an effective constitutional architecture that concern: the width of the circle of authorized proposers of normative control before the Constitutional Court; the dual role of the constitutional judiciary: on the one hand protection of the Constitution, constitutionality and legality, on the other hand effective protection of human and minority rights and freedoms.

The Two Modes of Foreign Engagement by the Constitutional Court of Korea

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Soojin Kong
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Rigid Structure ◽  
Foreign Law

Abstract The Constitutional Court of Korea (CCK) has engaged with foreign law and practices in two distinct manners. While the CCK has interacted with foreign constitutional adjudicatory organs outside the courtroom, it has also developed comparative law practices inside the courtroom. This article aims to examine the interaction between the CCK's two modes of foreign engagement. The chronological inquiry, substantiated by the interviews with former and current legal practitioners of the CCK, demonstrates the gap between the CCK's two modes of foreign engagement. The CCK's evolving extrajudicial activities have provided the repositories of information adequate for the deliberation of individual cases. However, the CCK's rigid structure for comparative law practices, which was established in its initial years to learn from traditionally influential jurisdictions, restricts these repositories from being fully utilised inside the courtroom. The CCK's failure to fully incorporate its developments in its extrajudicial activities into comparative law practices disallows the CCK to grasp an evolving picture of foreign constitutional adjudicatory organs.

Democratic constitution-making and unfreezing the Turkish process

2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 473-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Arato
Keyword(s):  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Constituent Power ◽  
Short Article ◽  
The Government ◽  
Turkish Constitution ◽  
Popular Power ◽  
Democratic Constitution ◽  
Strong Claim ◽  
Constitution Making

This short article will seek to explore the causes, and possible solutions, of what seems to be the current freezing of the Turkish constitution-making process that has had some dramatic successes in the 1990s and early 2000s. I make the strong claim that democratic legitimacy or constituent authority should not be reduced either to any mode of power, even popular power, or to mere legality. It is these types of reduction that I find especially troubling in recent Turkish constitutional struggles, where the legal claims of two powers — the government-controlled legislative and the judicial branches — to structure the constitution are not backed by sufficient political legitimacy. In effect these two powers that claim their constituent authorization, rather implausibly in my view, from either the democratic electorate or from an original constituent power, because of their conflict threaten to freeze the constitution-making process that very much needs to be continued and concluded. I end the article by making a suggestion for one possible constitution-making procedure that would be both legitimate and legal.

scholarly journals Lobbying in institutions of European Union

2010 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-384
Author(s):  
Srdjan Korac
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Big Business ◽  
Institutional Control ◽  
Grass Root ◽  
Front Group ◽  
The Eu

The author analyses how big business interests groups influence the both EU legislative and policy making process, and by doing so how they distort pluralistic concept of public policy networking at the supranational level of governance. The enormous financial resources available to multinational corporations provide them the use of 'front group' strategy or the 'third party' strategy, manipulative public relations tactics, and an insider position in the European Commission's consultative fora, which all lead to exclusion of grass root groups. The author concludes that big business influence on the EU decision-makers will have negative effects on democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions, and he thinks that an efficient institutional control over lobbying activities in Brussels is needed.

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