Electoral Systems and System Reforms in Latin America

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian F. Crisp ◽  
Patrick Cunha Silva
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Clear Pattern ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Defining System ◽  
The Individual

Electoral systems impose incentives for relationships between parties and relationships within parties. In interparty terms, weak systems encourage many parties to enter and voters to vote sincerely for their most preferred options. Strong systems discourage many parties from entering and encourage voters to think strategically about viability (the likelihood a preferred option will win seats). In intraparty terms, centralized systems empower party leaders and put an emphasis on the party’s shared reputation. Individualistic systems empower individual candidates and members of congress and put an emphasis on their personal reputations. The individual rules examined when defining system incentives include ballot type (can voters choose among copartisans), the level to which votes are pooled before seats are awarded, the number and level at which votes are cast, district magnitude (the number of seats to be decided in a district in a given election), and legal thresholds (predefined vote total barriers to being awarded seats). The electoral systems used to elect lower houses, upper houses (where they exist) and presidents in Latin America are located in a two-dimensional space based on these incentives. In interparty terms, weak systems outnumber strong ones in the region. In intraparty terms, there is a great deal of diversity with centralized systems slightly outnumbering individualistic ones. Instances of electoral reform are captured as changes in incentives or movements in this space. Reforms are frequent but no clear pattern emerges in terms of countries across the region converging toward imposing similar electoral incentives.

Constituency Effects and Legislative Dissent Under Closed-List Proportional Representation

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Party Line ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Unique Dataset

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT PEKKANEN ◽  
BENJAMIN NYBLADE ◽  
ELLIS S. KRAUSS
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Parallel System ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Individual

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

Party Mobilization and Electoral Systems

2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Ignacio Lago ◽  
Sandra Bermúdez ◽  
Marc Guinjoan ◽  
Kelly Rowe ◽  
Pablo Simón
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Data ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Qualitative And Quantitative ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Party Strategies ◽  
Number Of Visits ◽  
Election Studies

How party strategies vary by electoral system remains largely unexplored in election studies. Using qualitative and quantitative data from Spanish national and European elections, we test how party strategies diverge between districted electoral systems and systems using a single national district. We use the number of visits to districts by the party leaders to determine if targeted party strategies are driven by district magnitude, the share of the population entitled to vote in every district, the number of districts or the strength of parties’ local organizations. Our results show that only the frequency of visits to districts by large parties are clearly affected by electoral systems and, more specifically, by the number of districts and district population.

scholarly journals Noniterative Solution of Some Fermat-Weber Location Problems

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuven Chen
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Iterative Process ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
Iterative Solution ◽  
Location Problems ◽  
Weber Problem ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Solution Point ◽  
Individual Demand ◽  
The Individual

The Fermat-Weber problem of optimally locating a service facility in the Euclidean continuous two-dimensional space is usually solved by the iterative process first suggested by Weiszfeld or by later versions thereof. The methods are usually rather efficient, but exceptional problems are described in the literature in which the iterative solution is exceedingly long. These problems are such that the solution either coincides with one of the demand points or nearly coincides with it. We describe a noniterative direct alternative, based on the insight that the gradient components of the individual demand points can be considered as pooling forces with respect to the solution point. It is demonstrated that symmetrical problems can thus be optimally solved with no iterations, in analogy to finding the equilibrium point in statics. These include a well-known ill-conditioned problem and its variants, which can now be easily solved to optimality using geometrical considerations.

Electoral Systems and Constituency Service

2017 ◽  
pp. 344-364
Author(s):  
Brian F. Crisp ◽  
William M. Simoneau
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Widespread Agreement ◽  
Constituency Service

Constituency service, addressing the nonpolicy grievances of constituents or looking out for their nonpolicy interests, provides legislators an opportunity to enhance their personal reputations. Electoral incentives are the primary explanation suggested for the amount of constituency service carried out by representatives. Variation in electoral rules, such as ballot type and district magnitude, can increase personal vote-seeking incentives, increasing the utility of constituency service as a means of winning re-election. In our opinion, measures of constituency service remain underdeveloped, and while there is widespread agreement on electoral incentives as the key determinant of constituency service, the consequences of constituency service remain elusive.

On the Classification of Fractal and Non-Fractal Objects in Two-Dimensional Space

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 1232-1239
Author(s):  
P. M. Pustovoit ◽  
E. G. Yashina ◽  
K. A. Pshenichnyi ◽  
S. V. Grigoriev
Keyword(s):  
Dimensional Space ◽  
Two Dimensional

Political Cleavages and Political Parties

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell J. Dalton
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
New Left ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Cultural Policies ◽  
Policy Choices

This chapter uses the cleavage positions of Candidates to the European Parliament (CEPs) to as representative of their parties’ political positions. Three surveys of CEPs track the evolution of party supply in European party systems. In 1979 parties were primarily aligned along a Left–Right economic cleavage. Gradually new left and Green parties began to compete in elections and crystallized and represented liberal cultural policies. In recent decades new far-right parties arose to represent culturally conservative positions. The cross-cutting cultural cleavage has also prompted many of the established parties to alter their policy positions. In most multiparty systems, political parties now compete in a fully populated two-dimensional space. This increases the supply of policy choices for the voters. The analyses are based on the Candidates to the European Parliament Studies in 1979, 1994, and 2009.

scholarly journals Three-Dimensional Thematic Map Imaging of the Yacht Port on the Example of the Polish National Sailing Centre Marina in Gdańsk

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 7016
Author(s):  
Pawel S. Dabrowski ◽  
Cezary Specht ◽  
Mariusz Specht ◽  
Artur Makar
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Data ◽  
Convex Surface ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
Three Dimensional ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Thematic Maps ◽  
Research Directions ◽  
Future Research Directions ◽  
The Many

The theory of cartographic projections is a tool which can present the convex surface of the Earth on the plane. Of the many types of maps, thematic maps perform an important function due to the wide possibilities of adapting their content to current needs. The limitation of classic maps is their two-dimensional nature. In the era of rapidly growing methods of mass acquisition of spatial data, the use of flat images is often not enough to reveal the level of complexity of certain objects. In this case, it is necessary to use visualization in three-dimensional space. The motivation to conduct the study was the use of cartographic projections methods, spatial transformations, and the possibilities offered by thematic maps to create thematic three-dimensional map imaging (T3DMI). The authors presented a practical verification of the adopted methodology to create a T3DMI visualization of the marina of the National Sailing Centre of the Gdańsk University of Physical Education and Sport (Poland). The profiled characteristics of the object were used to emphasize the key elements of its function. The results confirmed the increase in the interpretative capabilities of the T3DMI method, relative to classic two-dimensional maps. Additionally, the study suggested future research directions of the presented solution.

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