The Consequences of Military Rule: Juntas Versus Strongmen

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Geddes
Keyword(s):  
Personal Control ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Economic Decision Making ◽  
Regular Army ◽  
The Military

During the 20th century, seizures of power led by military officers became the most common means of imposing new dictatorships. The consequences of military rule have varied, however, depending on how widely power has been shared within the military-led government. Most military-led dictatorships begin as relatively collegial, but the dictator’s position in collegial military regimes is inherently unstable. His closest collaborators command troops and weapons with which they could, if they are dissatisfied with his policy choices, oust him without ending the regime. This vulnerability to ouster by close allies both constrains the dictator to consult with other officers in order to keep them satisfied and gives him reasons to try to protect himself from coup plots. Common means of protection include taking personal control of the internal security police, in order to spy on officers as well as civilian opponents, and creating paramilitary forces recruited from personal loyalists. Dictators build new paramilitary forces to defend themselves from attempted coups staged by the regular army. A military dictator who can withstand coup attempts need not consult with other officers and can concentrate great power in his hands. Military dictators who have to share power with other high-ranking officers (juntas) behave differently than military rulers who have concentrated power in their own hands (strongmen). These differences affect the well-being of citizens, the belligerence of international policy, the likelihood of regime collapse, how military rule ends when it finally does, and whether it is followed by democracy or a new dictatorship. In comparison to junta rule, strongman rule tends to result in erratic economic decision-making and high rates of corruption. Strongmen also behave more aggressively toward their neighbors than do juntas. Nevertheless, regimes led by strongmen last longer, on average, than do juntas. When faced with widespread opposition, juntas tend to negotiate a return to the barracks, while strongmen often must be overthrown by force. Negotiated transitions tend to end in democratization, but forced regime ousters often result in new dictatorships.

Variations among North African Military Regimes

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-78
Author(s):  
Federico Battera
Keyword(s):  
Political Development ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
North African ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Military

This article explores the differences between two North African military regimes—Egypt and Algeria—which have been selected due to the continuity of military dominance of the political systems. Still, variations have marked their political development. In particular, the Algerian army’s approach to civilian institutions changed after a civilian president was chosen in 1999. This was not the case in Egypt after the demise of the Hosni Mubarak regime of 2011. Other important variations are to be found in the way power has been distributed among the military apparatuses themselves. In the case of Egypt, a principle of collegiality has been generally preserved within a body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is absent in the case of Algeria, where conflicts between military opposed factions are more likely to arise in case of crisis. How differences generally impact the stability of military rule in these two cases is the main contribution of this paper.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

Territorial Threats and Military Dictatorships

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
External Threat ◽  
Military Institution ◽  
New Research ◽  
State Centralization ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

Many scholars consider the military dictatorship a distinct authoritarian regime type, pointing to the singular patterns of domestic and international behaviors displayed by military regimes. Existing studies show that compared with civilian dictatorships, military dictatorships commit more human rights abuses, are more prone to civil war, and engage in more belligerent behaviors against other countries. Despite their coercive capacity, rulers of military dictatorships tend to have shorter tenures than rulers of non-military dictatorships. Additionally, military dictatorships more quickly and peacefully transition to democracy than their non-military counterparts and frequently negotiate their withdrawal from power. Given the distinct natures of military dictatorships, research on military dictatorships and coups has resurged since 2000. A great body of new research utilizing new theories, data, and methods has added to the existing scholarship on military rule and coups, which saw considerable growth in the 1970s. Most studies tend to focus on domestic issues and pay relatively little attention to the relationship between international factors and military rule. However, a growing body of studies investigates how international factors, such as economic globalization, international military assistance, reactions from the international community, and external threat environments, affect military rule. One particularly interesting research topics in this regard is the relationship between external territorial threats and military rule. Territorial issues are more salient to domestic societies than other issues, producing significant ramifications for domestic politics through militarization and state centralization. Militaries play a pivotal role in militarization and state centralization, both of which are by-products of external territorial threats. Thus, external territorial threats produce permissive structural conditions that not only prohibit democratization but also encourage military dictatorships to emerge and persist. Moreover, if territorial threats affect the presence of military dictatorships, they are more likely to affect collegial military rule, characterized by the rule of a military institution, rather than military strongman rule, characterized by the rule by a military personalist dictator. This is because territorial threats make the military more internally unified and cohesive, which helps the military rule as an institution. Existing studies provide a fair amount of empirical evidence consistent with this claim. External territorial threats are found to increase the likelihood of military regimes, particularly collegial military regimes, as well as the likelihood of military coups. The same is not true of non-territorial threats. This indicates that the type of external threat, rather than the mere presence of an external threat, matters.

Bureaucrats and the Senegalese Political Process

1971 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
'Ladipo Adamolekun
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
West Africa ◽  
Political Process ◽  
West African ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Military

While independence in West Africa focused academic attention on political parties, the proliferation of military régimes in the late 1960s– by 1970, seven West African countries had experienced military rule — brought two other institutions into prominence: the military and civil bureaucracies. This article seeks to throw some light on the place of the civil bureaucracy in Senegal through a study of the role of bureaucrats in the country's political process.

Building Security through Insecurity: The Nigerian Military and Counter-Violence Campaigns in the Fourth Republic

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Segun Joshua ◽  
Daniel Gberevbie ◽  
Kester Onor
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Human Security ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Fourth Republic ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
The Military

Since independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria has been a victim, at one time or the other, of intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic, religious, and communal conflicts which have undermined the human security of her citizens. Nigeria’s corporate existence had also been threatened by 3 years (1967–1970) civil war which impacted negatively on the well-being of its people. In addition, the inability of the Nigerian Police to cope with the magnitude of the surge of violence in recent years has brought about the idea of involving the military, a core component of traditional security apparatus to deal with internal insecurity. This article is anchored on human security paradigm with reliance on secondary data to analyze the operations of the Nigerian Military in counterviolence campaigns between 1999 and 2017. This article points out that the involvement of the military in internal security has worsened the problem of insecurity due to the military’s unprofessional approach and, at times, deliberate targeting the civilian populace which it is supposed to protect. It, therefore, recommends among others, the need for the Federal Government of Nigeria to urgently review the role of the armed forces in addressing internal security situations in a way that will bring about respect for the rule of engagement in internal security operations and adherence to global best practices.

Regime and Leader Instability Under Two Forms of Military Rule

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim ◽  
Alex M. Kroeger
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Military Regime ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Stylized Facts ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Autocratic Regimes

The finding that military regimes are more fragile than other authoritarian regimes represents one of the few stylized facts in comparative politics. However, the existing literature contains substantial differences in the theoretical explanations for military regime instability and operationalizations of military rule. To assess competing explanations, we examine regime and leader instability after distinguishing between collegial and personalist military rule. We show that regime and leader insecurity characterize only collegial military regimes. Particularly, the fragility of collegial military regimes comes from a heightened likelihood of democratization, not more frequent transitions to alternative autocratic regimes. In addition, leaders of collegial military regimes face higher risks of both regular and irregular turnovers than other autocrats. Also, irregular exits of collegial military leaders tend to occur through reshuffling, rather than regime-changing, coups. The results strongly support theories focusing on military officers’ preference for unity over other explanations.

Bolivia — the struggle continues: an interview with Domitila Barrios de Chungara

Race & Class ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-310
Keyword(s):  
Vice President ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Hunger Strike ◽  
Current Crisis ◽  
Popular Resistance ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Domitila Barrios De Chungara ◽  
Military Control ◽  
The Military ◽  
Siglo Xx

Another coup in a country which has known nearly 200 in 155 years of independence might mean nothing. But the coup of 17 July 1980 is probably the most significant in Bolivia's history - as the present regime seeks finally to end the country's fragile democratic structures and place it firmly alongside the regimes of Chile and Argentina. Military rule is being institutionalised on the Chilean model and a new constitution for Bolivia, written by the present junta, is in the offing. Resistance to military rule has a long tradition in Bolivia. In 1953- despite attempts by the military to prevent it - the progressive Movi miento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) was brought to power by a mass mobilisation of peasants and workers. But the MNR moved first towards reformism and then conservatism, paving the way for General Barrientos to be elected vice-president in 1964 and then to take power as leader of a military junta. Military control of the country continued. In 1971, General Hugo Banzer seized power and began one of the longest and most repressive military regimes in the country's history. But in 1978, he was forced to call elections, due to popular resistance and opposition through a hunger strike within the country, and to US pressure and international condemnation of his repressive measures. However, in the last three years, three civilian governments have been elected and each time the military has seized power almost immedia tely. Domitila Barrios de Chungara, leader of the Housewives Committee in the mining centre of Siglo XX and author of Let Me Speak, was at tending the UN Women's Conference in Copenhagen at the time of the latest coup. She immediately began to mobilise international support against the present regime and was consequently branded a traitor and threatened with execution if she returned to her country. Jane McIntosh: Can you tell us something about the current crisis in Bolivia?

The Argentine Process of Demilitarization: 1980–83

1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-238
Author(s):  
Guillermo Makin
Keyword(s):  
Political Development ◽  
Military Regime ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Military

THE FOREIGN ADVENTURISM OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY may have made a few minds more cautious about automatically welcoming the advent of any other future military regime. This point was made more than a decade ago by Stepan in his seminal work on the military in Brazil; what he said then could have been said of most military regimes anywhere:Whatever the future outcome, it is clear that the attraction of military rule – its presumed stability, unity, and ftvity of purpose – has been largely illusory. Even more importantly, the difficulties encountered by the highly professional army of Brazil, with its technocratic civilian allies, illustrate that there can be no apolitical solution to the problems of political development.

U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America: An Assessment

1972 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Baines
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
List Type ◽  
Type Number ◽  
Military Assistance ◽  
Assistance Program ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Assistance Programs ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the nature of the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) to Latin America and the historical development of the Military Assistance Program in the hemisphere. It further analyzes this program with regard to the two major criticisms levelled at it:(1)that Military Assistance Programs have perpetuated “militarism” in the form of military coups and strong-man military regimes; and(2)that Military Assistance Programs have encouraged large military forces where they are not needed.Changes in U.S. policy toward Latin America are noted as they affect MAP—i.e., the shift in U.S. policy from one of fostering hemispheric defense to one of promoting internal security and economic development. Finally, an assessment of the impact of this change in U.S. military assistance policy forms the conclusion of this paper.

scholarly journals The Long Years of Military Rule in Nigeria: A Blessing or a Curse

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
ETEBOM John Monday
Keyword(s):  
High Rate ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
National Unity ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
The North ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
History Of ◽  
Military Institution ◽  
The Military

Nigeria gained her independence in October 1960 after almost six decades of British colonial rule. The country’s journey into nationhood was herald by high hopes and prospects for national unity, peace and development. This was because of its vast human and material resources, and land mass. Nigeria is dominantly made of three prominent regions: the North (Hausa Fulani), the West (Yorubas) and the East (Igbos) with minorities in other regions.The military took over the leadership of the country barely six years into her independence as a nation. The military held sway for twenty nine years out of the ininitial forty years of the country’s post independence history before her return to civil rule in 1999.The county is still been confronted with challenges on all fronts ranging from insecurity and insurgency, economy, political uncertainty, electoral malpractices, high rate of unemployment, poor infrastructure amongst others. Literature have been skewed toward military intervention in politics as the root cause of the challenges bedeviling the country more than two decades after her return to civil rule.The study employed both quantitative and qualitative data. The study analysed the history of military rule in Nigeria and interrogated the crux of the military institution. It further analysed the peculiarities of each of the military regimes. The study also examined the post-military era in the country and concluded with recommendations.

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