Regime and Leader Instability Under Two Forms of Military Rule

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim ◽  
Alex M. Kroeger
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Military Regime ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Stylized Facts ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Autocratic Regimes

The finding that military regimes are more fragile than other authoritarian regimes represents one of the few stylized facts in comparative politics. However, the existing literature contains substantial differences in the theoretical explanations for military regime instability and operationalizations of military rule. To assess competing explanations, we examine regime and leader instability after distinguishing between collegial and personalist military rule. We show that regime and leader insecurity characterize only collegial military regimes. Particularly, the fragility of collegial military regimes comes from a heightened likelihood of democratization, not more frequent transitions to alternative autocratic regimes. In addition, leaders of collegial military regimes face higher risks of both regular and irregular turnovers than other autocrats. Also, irregular exits of collegial military leaders tend to occur through reshuffling, rather than regime-changing, coups. The results strongly support theories focusing on military officers’ preference for unity over other explanations.

Military Rule in South Korea Revisited: Different Survival Strategies and Different Pathways

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-429
Author(s):  
Bon Sang Koo
Keyword(s):  
Financial Liberalization ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Survival Strategies ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Legislative Branch ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

This paper revisits the military rule in Korea by paying attention, like Korean specialists, to the disconnection in dictatorship but like comparativists, using the tools in comparative studies of modern authoritarian regimes. This paper argues that the differences in the military leaders’ orientations (personalist vs. party-based type) and survival strategies to deal with potential threat sources (key insiders, political opponents, and economic elites) entailed different regime pathways. Examining (a) how to form a ruling group in terms of unity (competing factions vs. a single dominant faction), (b) how to control the legislative branch (directly controlled organization vs. opposition parties indirectly supported by the government), and (c) how to manage capital owners (tight constraints vs. financial liberalization with occasional punishments), this paper provides an explanation as to why only the second military regime was able to open the door to democratization instead of giving way to authoritarian replacement in Korea.

The Consequences of Military Rule: Juntas Versus Strongmen

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Geddes
Keyword(s):  
Personal Control ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Economic Decision Making ◽  
Regular Army ◽  
The Military

During the 20th century, seizures of power led by military officers became the most common means of imposing new dictatorships. The consequences of military rule have varied, however, depending on how widely power has been shared within the military-led government. Most military-led dictatorships begin as relatively collegial, but the dictator’s position in collegial military regimes is inherently unstable. His closest collaborators command troops and weapons with which they could, if they are dissatisfied with his policy choices, oust him without ending the regime. This vulnerability to ouster by close allies both constrains the dictator to consult with other officers in order to keep them satisfied and gives him reasons to try to protect himself from coup plots. Common means of protection include taking personal control of the internal security police, in order to spy on officers as well as civilian opponents, and creating paramilitary forces recruited from personal loyalists. Dictators build new paramilitary forces to defend themselves from attempted coups staged by the regular army. A military dictator who can withstand coup attempts need not consult with other officers and can concentrate great power in his hands. Military dictators who have to share power with other high-ranking officers (juntas) behave differently than military rulers who have concentrated power in their own hands (strongmen). These differences affect the well-being of citizens, the belligerence of international policy, the likelihood of regime collapse, how military rule ends when it finally does, and whether it is followed by democracy or a new dictatorship. In comparison to junta rule, strongman rule tends to result in erratic economic decision-making and high rates of corruption. Strongmen also behave more aggressively toward their neighbors than do juntas. Nevertheless, regimes led by strongmen last longer, on average, than do juntas. When faced with widespread opposition, juntas tend to negotiate a return to the barracks, while strongmen often must be overthrown by force. Negotiated transitions tend to end in democratization, but forced regime ousters often result in new dictatorships.

The Argentine Process of Demilitarization: 1980–83

1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-238
Author(s):  
Guillermo Makin
Keyword(s):  
Political Development ◽  
Military Regime ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Military

THE FOREIGN ADVENTURISM OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY may have made a few minds more cautious about automatically welcoming the advent of any other future military regime. This point was made more than a decade ago by Stepan in his seminal work on the military in Brazil; what he said then could have been said of most military regimes anywhere:Whatever the future outcome, it is clear that the attraction of military rule – its presumed stability, unity, and ftvity of purpose – has been largely illusory. Even more importantly, the difficulties encountered by the highly professional army of Brazil, with its technocratic civilian allies, illustrate that there can be no apolitical solution to the problems of political development.

Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States

1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 1131-1148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric A. Nordlinger
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Economic Change ◽  
Military Officers ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Marked Influence ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selection Of

When military officers are either sitting in the governmental saddle or have one foot securely in the stirrup, is it likely that such military controlled governments will pursue policies of socio-economic change and reform? What are the officer-politicians' motivations in reacting to the possibilities of such modernizing changes? Under what conditions are their motivations likely to vary? This essay attempts to answer these questions with regard to the contemporary non-western states. And in making the attempt, I believe that the analysis falls squarely within the purview of certain recent changes that are taking place in the study of comparative politics. These changes may be most broadly depicted as a movement away from that aspect of behavioralism that has focused exclusively upon “inputs,” and away from that dimension of “scientism” that has focused upon abstract concepts at the expense of empirical analysis. The change can also be described (in an overly facile manner) as a movement toward the politics in political science and the government in comparative politics.As is evidenced in LaPalombara's call for “parsimony” in the selection of problems, we should choose problems for analysis that are blatantly political and of obvious contemporary relevance. In approximately half of the contemporary non-western states military officers either occupy the topmost seats of government themselves or they have a marked influence upon the civilian incumbents. And when this fact is placed alongside the potential of most contemporary governments to influence the pace and direction of social and economic change, this essay's central concern fulfills LaPalombara's criterion.

The latent characteristics that structure autocratic rule

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Wright
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
Measurement Model ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Ideal Types ◽  
Conflict Initiation ◽  
Autocratic Regimes ◽  
Party Dominance

Abstract Research on autocratic regimes in comparative politics and international relations often uses categorical typologies of autocratic regimes to distinguish among different forms of autocracy. This paper introduces historical data on dozens of features of dictatorships to estimate latent dimensions of autocratic rule. We identify three time-varying dimensions of autocracy that correspond to ideal types proposed in the literature: party dominance, military rule, and personalism. We show that dimensions of autocratic rule are orthogonal to commonly-used measures of democracy–autocracy, and compare these dimensions to existing typologies of autocracies, showing that time-varying information on personalism is unique. We discuss a measurement model of personalism and illustrate the time-varying features of this measure in applied research on conflict initiation and regime collapse.

The Long Shadow of Nigeria’s Military Epochs, 1966–79 and 1983–99

2018 ◽  
pp. 170-188
Author(s):  
Eghosa Osaghae
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Military Regime ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
State Fragility ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Major Factors

Nigeria was a paradigmatic case of military rule that was a defining feature of politics in developing countries between the 1960s and early 1990s. Military rule in Nigeria was symptomatic of state fragility, which provided grounds for coups and self-appointed corrective agendas of successive military governments. Attempts to address fundamental issues of political accommodation and economic development, and enhance the overall promise and potential of military rule were hampered by three major factors. These were the authoritarian and hyper-centralist character of military regimes, partisan character of coups and governments (which led to civil war in 1967–70), and regime-prolongation and self-succession ambitions of military rulers. This chapter discusses the intricacies of military intervention, the nature and legacies of military regime, how they manifested under the different governments, and how and why the changes introduced by them had epochal effects on the country.

scholarly journals Pakistan's Journey to Civilian Rule (1958-70): An Analysis of Ayub Era

2016 ◽  
Vol I (I) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Adil Khan ◽  
Manzoor Ahmad ◽  
Abdul Waheed
Keyword(s):  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
The State ◽  
Military Regime ◽  
Military Dictatorship ◽  
National Crisis ◽  
The Military ◽  
Crises Management ◽  
Key Questions

Pakistan, since its inception, has passed through several phases of transitions to civilian rule and authoritarian reversals. Similar to the pattern of transition between civilian rule and dictatorship, there is a pattern of change within authoritarian Regimes that could be observed in all the three experiences of transition in Pakistan. This paper identifies the pattern of change from military dictatorship to civilian rule from 1958 to 1970. The key questions addressed in this paper are: firstly, how the military regime consolidated its grip on power after the October 1958 coup? Secondly, how early cracks appeared in the military's control over power and matured with the passage of time, resulting in a national crisis? Thirdly, how failure in crises management led to the transition to civilian rule, as well as, the disintegration of the state.

Variations among North African Military Regimes

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-78
Author(s):  
Federico Battera
Keyword(s):  
Political Development ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
North African ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Military

This article explores the differences between two North African military regimes—Egypt and Algeria—which have been selected due to the continuity of military dominance of the political systems. Still, variations have marked their political development. In particular, the Algerian army’s approach to civilian institutions changed after a civilian president was chosen in 1999. This was not the case in Egypt after the demise of the Hosni Mubarak regime of 2011. Other important variations are to be found in the way power has been distributed among the military apparatuses themselves. In the case of Egypt, a principle of collegiality has been generally preserved within a body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is absent in the case of Algeria, where conflicts between military opposed factions are more likely to arise in case of crisis. How differences generally impact the stability of military rule in these two cases is the main contribution of this paper.

Explaining Budgetary Trends in Military Regimes

1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 287-296
Author(s):  
Gil Shidlo
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Conventional Literature ◽  
The Military ◽  
Economic Considerations ◽  
Western Democracies

The conventional literature on the military generally believes that military, non-competitive regimes have a tendency to spend more for national-security purposes and less on welfare provision. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate why do Argentina and Brazil, military non-competitive regimes, have tendencies similar to those of Western democracies where the state’s economic expansion extends beyond that required by strictly economic considerations? In contrast to the rational-comprehensive or ‘technocratic’ model which is often assumed to predominate in bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes an analysis of social and economic policies in Brazil and Argentina highlights the essentially political nature of the policy process in non-democratic regimes.

Conquering and coercing: Nonviolent anti-regime protests and the pathways to democracy

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
pp. 650-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim ◽  
Alex M Kroeger
Keyword(s):  
Indirect Effects ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Direct And Indirect Effects ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Leadership Change ◽  
Autocratic Regimes ◽  
Leader Survival ◽  
Empirical Analyses

Recent research finds an association between nonviolent protests and democratic transitions. However, existing scholarship either does not specify the pathways through which nonviolent protests bring about democratization or conduct systematic empirical analyses demonstrating that the specified pathways are operative. This article proposes four pathways through which nonviolent anti-regime protests encourage democratic transitions, emphasizing their ability to directly conquer or indirectly coerce such transitions. Most simply, they can conquer democratic reforms by directly overthrowing authoritarian regimes and installing democracies. They can also coerce democratic reforms through three additional pathways. Nonviolent anti-regime protests can coerce incumbent elites into democratic reforms by threatening the survival of authoritarian regimes. They also increase the likelihood of elite splits, which promote negotiated democratic reforms. Finally, they encourage leadership change within the existing authoritarian regime. Following leadership change, nonviolent movements remain mobilized and are able to coerce democratic concessions from the regime’s new leaders. Our within-regime analyses provide robust empirical support for each pathway. We show that nonviolent anti-regime protests conquer democratic reforms by ousting autocratic regimes and replacing them with democracies. Nonviolent anti-regime protests also coerce elites into democratic reforms by threatening regime and leader survival. These findings highlight the importance of protest goals and tactics and also that nonviolent anti-regime protests have both direct and indirect effects on democratization.

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