The Underside of the Law: Judicial Review and the Prison Disciplinary System

1993 ◽  
Vol 46 (Part 2) ◽  
pp. 23-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Loughlin
Author(s):  
О. В. Бойко

The scientific article identifies the peculiarities of appealing the decisions, actions or omissions of public administration subjects on the provision of public services at the stage of initiation and preparation for judicial review of an administrative case. The author substantiates the feasibility of improving the legal regulation of the procedure for holding a preliminary hearing before the court hearing of the case. In particular, it is considered expedient to set the terms of the preparatory meeting from the moment of receipt of the administrative claim, as well as to determine the cases when the parties are not reconciled.It is established that the preliminary stage of the court hearing often ends with the conclusion of the preliminary proceedings and the appointment of the case to trial in the field of public services. This is not against the law. However, it should be borne in mind that in accordance with Art. 121 of the CAS of Ukraine such a decision is delivered by the consequences of preparatory proceedings, not the previous court hearing. Obviously, preparatory proceedings are not limited to, and do not always end at, a previous court hearing. Preparation may continue after a preliminary hearing. Therefore, the decision to close the preliminary proceedings and assign the case to trial after the consequences of the previous court hearing can only be made if the judge has taken all the measures necessary to hear the case. If during a previous court hearing in the field of public services, to which all persons involved in the case have arrived, the issues necessary for its consideration have been resolved, then, with the written consent of these persons, a court hearing may be initiated on the same day. In this case, the termination order is also delivered.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

‘Accountability’ is one of the democratic values entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. It is a value recognised throughout the Constitution and imposed upon the law-making organs of state, the Executive, the Judiciary and all public functionaries. This constitutional imperative is given pride of place among the other founding values: equality before the law, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. This study therefore sets out to investigate how the courts have grappled with the interpretation and application of the principle of accountability, the starting point being the relationship between accountability and judicial review. Therefore, in the exercise of its judicial review power, a court may enquire whether the failure of a public functionary to comply with a constitutional duty of accountability renders the decision made illegal, irrational or unreasonable. One of the many facets of the principle of accountability upon which this article dwells is to ascertain how the courts have deployed that expression in making the state and its agencies liable for the delictual wrongs committed against an individual in vindication of a breach of the individual’s constitutional right in the course of performing a public duty. Here, accountability and breach of public duty; the liability of the state for detaining illegal immigrants contrary to the prescripts of the law; the vicarious liability of the state for the criminal acts of the police and other law-enforcement officers (as in police rape cases and misuse of official firearms by police officers), and the liability of the state for delictual conduct in the context of public procurement are discussed. Having carefully analysed the available case law, this article concludes that no public functionary can brush aside the duty of accountability wherever it is imposed without being in breach of a vital constitutional mandate. Further, it is the constitutional duty of the courts, when called upon, to declare such act or conduct an infringement of the Constitution.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 899-930
Author(s):  
Han-Ru Zhou

Abstract Principles form part and parcel of our law and legal discourse, so much so that we seldom think of what they are and what they entail. For centuries they have been invoked daily to interpret and argue about the law. But when it comes to matters of constitutional law, principles are further called upon to perform a perennially controversial function: to help police the boundaries of state action. In most common law jurisdictions with a written constitution, this function of principles runs against the generally accepted view that the exercise of judicial review must ultimately be governed and restricted by the terms of the national constitution. This Article argues that the exercise of judicial review based on principles is not confined to that view, once the relationship between principles and the constitution is unpacked and recontextualized. While the English-language literature on principles over the past half-century has been dominated by a select group of Anglo-American scholars, there is a wealth of untapped insights from other parts of the world. One of the major contributions by continental legal theorists even predates the earliest modern Anglo-American writings on the subject by more than a decade. Overall, the law literature in common law and civil law systems reveals a significant degree of commonalities in the basic characters of principles despite the absence of initial evidence of transsystemic borrowings. The wider conceptual inquiry also displays a shift in the focus of the debate, from the protracted search for a clear-cut distinction between rules and principles towards a redefinition of principles’ relationship with “written” law, be it in the form of a civil code or a constitutional instrument. From this inquiry reemerge “unwritten” principles not deriving from codified or legislated law although they have been used to develop the law. Translated into the constitutional domain, these unwritten principles bear no logical connection with the terms of the constitution. Their main functions cover the entire spectrum from serving as interpretive aids to making law by filling gaps. The theoretical framework fits with an ongoing four-century-old narrative of the evolution of constitutional principles and judicial review across most common law-based systems. Constitutional principles are another area where Anglo-American law and legal discourse is less exceptional and more universal than what many assume. Throughout modern Western history, legal battles have been fought and ensuing developments have been made on the grounds of principles. Our law and jurisprudence remain based on them.


1991 ◽  
Vol 12 (x) ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Richard Cicchillo

For Americans, long accustomed to judicial review of the law, the traditional absence of a similar system of constitutional control in France comes as a surprise. Closer examination however, reveals that the French politico-historico-judicial tradition inherited from the Ancien Régime and the Revolution of 1789 is deeply opposed to the development of "government by the judges." Why did the Revolution react against the judiciary? How has the idea of constitutional control evolved in modern France? What are the possible sources of legitimacy for an institution (the Conseil constitutionnel) and a concept (judicial review) cut off from the sanction of tradition? What is the future of the Conseil?


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 080
Author(s):  
Zaka Firma Aditya

Tulisan ini hendak membahas mengenai konsistensi putusan-putusan mahkamah konstitusi dalam pengujian undang-undang berdasarkan asas preseden. MK beberapa kali dipandang tidak konsisten karena kerap mengeluarkan putusan yang bersifat overrulling. Namun, sebenarnya tidak sedikit juga putusan MK yang konsisten mengikuti preseden. Meskipun penggunaan asas preseden hanya dikenal di negara yang menganut tradisi common law, MK ternyata juga menerapkannya. Putusan MK tentang pengujian UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama adalah salah satu bentuk dianutnya asas preseden di MK. Putusan ini secara konsisten menyatakan bahwa UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama tetap konstitusional karena akan terjadi kekosongan hukum apabila UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama diputus inkonstitusional. Dalam perkara tersebut, MK mempertahankan ratio decidendinya terhadap konstitusionalnya UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama karena meskipun MK sadar bahwa UU a quo banyak mengandung kelemahan. Konsistensi standing MK terhadap UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama ini merupakan salah satu bentuk dari dipraktekannya doktrin preseden.This paper will discuss the consistency of the constitutional court decision in the judicial review cases based on the principle of precedent. MK several times deemed inconsistent because often issued a ruling that is overruling. However, there were actually a lot of MK decisions that consistently followed the precedent. Although the use of the precedent principle is only known in common law tradition, the Constitutional Court apparently also applies it. The Constitutional Court’s decision regarding the Blasphemy Prevention Act was one form of the principle of precedent in the Constitutional Court. This decision consistently states that the Blasphemy Prevention Act remains constitutional because a legal vacuum will occur if the Blasphemy Prevention Law was decided to be unconstitutional. In this case, the Court retained its ratio decidendi to the constitutionality of the Blasphemy Prevention Law, even though the Court was aware that the Law contained many weaknesses. The consistency of the Constitutional Court on the judicial review of the Blasphemy Prevention Act is one form of the practice of precedent doctrine.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 452-474
Author(s):  
Priyo Handoko

The study aims to provide a constitutional analysis of judicial review (PK) in civil cases for more than once. The research-based is the decision of the Constitutional Court No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 in which the two judgments provide a different classification between criminal and civil cases. The method used in this research is a normative juridical with a conceptual, legislation, and case approach. The results of the study assert that: first, the opportunity for judicial review (PK) more than once in a criminal case is an effort to uphold justice substantively by the Constitutional Court. Whereas the restriction of judicial review (PK) only once in civil cases is intended to guarantee legal certainty. Secondly, there is rational inconsistency in the arguments of the Constitutional Court which is indicated in Decision No. 108 / PUU-XIV / 2016 and No. 34 / PUU-XI / 2013. Both criminal and civil cases must seek to establish and maintain substantial justice, especially since there is a due process of law principle that requires that everyone can get the same opportunity before the law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
Vianda Karina Ika Putri ◽  
Bambang Winarno ◽  
A. Rachmad Budiono

Abstract: Electronic policy or e-policy is an insurance contract that happends due to an electronic commercial transactions. But e-policy has been in Indonesia although there is no clear legal framework related to the existence of these e-policy. The purpose of this study are 1) Determine and analyze how the legality of e-policy according to the law in Indonesia. 2) Determine and analyze how the strength of e-policies evidence in the event of a dispute between the parties. Judicial review of electronic policy in the insurance agreement, namely: 1) E-polis as a form of agreement which could be interpreted is not qualify as legitimate e-policy agreement contrary to KUHDagang to be equivalent for sub law. So, insurance agreement can be interpreted is not meet objective conditions of an agreement that could result in the agreement is null and void (Article 1320 of KUHPerdata). 2) The strength of evidence on e-policy will have a strong legal force if the e-policy is made in the form of a deed in writing and acknowledged by both parties entered into an agreement, but if e-policy just softfile that send by email then e-policy does not have the strength of evidence because it was not in accordance with the provisions of Indonesian laws. Keywords: Agreement, E-policy, The Insurance Agreement Abstrak: Polis elektronik atau e-polis merupakan kontrak asuransi yang terjadi akibat suatu transaksi komersial elektronik. Namun e-polis telah berada di Indonesia meski belum ada payung hukum yang jelas terkait adanya e-polis ini. Tujuan Penelitian ini ialah 1) Mengetahui dan menganalisis keabsahan e-polis menurut hukum di Indonesia, 2) Mengetahui dan menganalisis bagaimana kekuatan pembuktian e-polis dalam hal terjadi sengketa antara para pihak. Tinjauan yuridis terhadap polis elektronik dalam perjanjian asuransi, yakni : 1) E-polis sebagai suatu bentuk perjanjian yang dapat diartikan tidak memenuhi syarat sah perjanjian karena e-polis bertentangan dengan KUHDagang yang setara dengan Undang-Undang. Sehingga perjanjian asuransi tersebut dapat diartikan tidak memenuhi syarat objektif suatu perjanjian yang dapat mengakibatkan perjanjian tersebut batal demi hukum (Pasal 1320 KUHPerdata). 2) Kekuatan pembuktian pada e-polis akan memiliki kekuatan hukum yang kuat apabila e-polis dibuat dalam bentuk akta yang tertulis dan diakui oleh kedua belah pihak yang mengadakan perjanjian, namun apabila e-polis tersebut hanya berbentuk softfile yang dikirim melalui email maka e-polis tersebut tidak memiliki kekuatan pembuktian karena tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan-ketentuan hukum positif Indonesia. Kata Kunci : Perjanjian, E-polis, perjanjian asuransi


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 474
Author(s):  
Elisabet . ◽  
Cut Memi

One of the authorities of the Constitutional Court governed by the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 was the examining of laws against the contitution or judicial review. Inside the regulations which governing the implementation of this authority, the Constitutional Court only acts as a negative legislator, namely canceling or reinforcing a norm tested by the Petitioner. But in practice, the Constitutional Court has changed its role to become a positive legislator, who is forming a new legal norm, which is the authority of legislators. The Constitutional Court should not be able to form a new legal norm because there is no legal basis which regulate that. But Constitutional Court can form a new legal norm in some urgent circumstances, relating to Human Rights, and preventing legal vacuum. In addition, the establishment of laws by lawmakers that require a long process and time. This is compelling Constitutional Court to make substitute norm before the law was established by the legislators. In the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 46/PUU-XVI/2016, the Court actually wants to establish a new legal norm, but because the articles in the petitioned have criminal sanctions, and if the Constitutional Court approves the petition, the Constitutional Court has formulated a new criminal act that can only be formed by the lawmaker. Whereas in the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 21/PUU-XII/2014, the Constitutional Court established a new norm because in the article a quo there were no criminal sanctions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 69-71
Author(s):  
Agnė Andrijauskaitė

This chapter reviews administrative procedure and judicial review in Lithuania. The introduction of administrative justice into the Lithuanian legal system happened against the backdrop of Lithuania's 'unflinching' desire to join the European Union and was meant to strengthen the protection of individual rights and administrative accountability. Two cornerstone acts in this regard, the Law on Public Administration and the Law on Administrative Proceedings (APA), were adopted in 1999. Administrative courts were also established in the same year. Article 3 (1) APA spells out the general rule that administrative courts settle disputes arising in the domain of the public administration. All the acts and measures excluded from the competence of administrative courts are listed in Article 18 APA, which establishes the so-called negative competence of administrative courts. Meanwhile, Article 91 (1) (3) APA provides that the impugned administrative decision may be quashed if 'essential procedural rules intended to ensure objective and reasonable adoption of an administrative decision were breached'.


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