Justice is comparative in nature and may have plural impartial
dimensions. Provision of justice, in an ‘ideal sense’, is non-pragmatic
and is therefore impossible to deliver, argues the Nobel Laureate,
Amartya Sen. He divides the existing theories of justice into two
categories: the transcendental institutionalism and the Comparative
School. The transcendental institutionalism, led by eminent
enlightenment philosophers like Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant holds
that a just society can be maintained by ensuring justice in the ‘ideal
sense’. The provision of ‘ideal justice’ is based on the notion of
either right or wrong. To provide justice in the ‘ideal sense’ the
society must enjoy access to ‘just institutions’. John Rawl, the more
recent contributor to transcendental tradition, came up with his theory
of ‘justice as fairness’ in the mid twentieth century. The comparative
school of justice propagated by Adam Smith, Marquis de Condorcet, Carl
Marx and Stuart Mill lays emphasis upon looking at ‘justice’ in a
comparative sense and on the basis of what the society is actually able
to realise.Sen, disagreeing with both the schools of thought, however,
is seen leaning towards the comparative school. The author gives the
example of three children and a single flute to demonstrate how the
‘ideal justice’ and the ‘comparative’ school fail to hold water in
certain situations. Three children—Carla, Anne and Bob, claim their
right to a specific flute on different but competing principles. Carla
manufactured the flute, Anne is the only one among the three who can
play the flute, while Bob is the poorest of the three and does not have
any toy to play with. Sen questions how ‘ideal justice’ may be provided
with the transcendental approach, or how the ‘comparative assessment’
would lead to an impartial and non-arbitrary solution, in the case of
the ‘three children and a flute’. Despite his disagreement with both the
schools of thought, Sen aligns himself with the comparative school.
However he believes that for provision of ‘impartial justice’ competing
principles need not essentially be unique; these could be plural as
well. The plurality of competing principles is the essence of Sen’s
‘idea of Justice’.