14. The International Politics of the Gulf

Author(s):  
Matteo Legrenzi ◽  
F. Gregory Gause

This chapter examines the international politics of the Gulf region, with particular emphasis on the security challenges confronting the Gulf states. It begins with an analysis of the policies of Iraq and Saudi Arabia as well as the United States’s increased involvement, focusing on the issues of regime security, political identity, and balance-of-power politics as they emerged during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 and the Gulf War of 1990–1991, and also from the Saudis’ alliance decisions in the face of those wars and the Iraq War of 2003. It also discusses Iran’s role, its nuclear programme, and relations with the Arab Gulf states and concludes with some remarks on the significance of the negotiations between Iran and the so-called P5+1, along with the ramifications of the Saudi–Iran rivalry for the international politics of the Gulf and the balance of power in the entire region.

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 365-386
Author(s):  
Debbie Abuelghanam ◽  
Naser Tahboub

Much has been written about the relationship between Iran and the Gulf states. This relationship, while extremely complex, historic as well as deep rooted, needs to be revisited, especially in the light of the growing discords. This article investigates the contest over the balance of power in the Middle East which is impacted by state interests, foreign policy, ideology, sectarianism, and geography. There are three questions that need to be asked: (a) What role does Iran play in the Gulf region? (b) What is its relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)? and (c) Is there room for the two regional powers (Iran and Saudi Arabia) in the Gulf region? Iran’s role in the Middle East has expanded exponentially by both diplomatic means as well as by proxy and direct interventions. It has become apparent that while once Saudi Arabia controlled the GCC, due to recent events, the regional group has become trivialized. As Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for power, the Gulf is tension-filled and fraught with the possibility of misperceptions and miscalculations.


Author(s):  
Friedrich Beiderbeck

This chapter examines Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s political vision for Europe, beginning with his views on the Holy Roman Empire and the Peace of Westphalia. It considers how Leibniz viewed Germany’s political and cultural structures and his support for the Reich, along with his thoughts on order, security, and law. It also discusses Leibniz’s modern notion of state and his ideas of territorial power, diplomacy, and international politics; his views on France’s foreign policy under Louis XIV and the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1713/14); and his dispute with Abbé de Saint Pierre over peace and balance of power in Europe. Finally, the chapter looks at Leibniz’s pronouncements on denominational issues and church politics, particularly the presence of Protestants and Catholics in Germany, and his arguments with regards to the House of Hanover and the role played by Great Britain in power politics as a counterbalance to French hegemony.


Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

This chapter summarizes key findings in the proponents of the “theory of the nuclear revolution,” which contend that nuclear weapons are transformative because they greatly reduce the need for countries to engage in intense security competition. It emphasizes that although nuclear weapons are the greatest tools of deterrence ever created, they do not automatically confer national security benefits on their owners, much less guarantee enduring safety from foreign threats. The chapter looks into the unfortunate reality of international politics in the shadow of nuclear weapons, in which countries must still pay close attention to the balance of power, search for ways to change the balance when they find themselves at a disadvantage and contemplate and plan for war in order to protect vital national interests. It explains how fears that tragically drove international politics for centuries still exist and how those fears are justified. The nuclear age remains an age of power politics.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saleem A. Salih Al-Dulaimi ◽  
Mohammad Kamal ◽  
Dalal Mahmoud Elsayed

Iran-Gulf relations are a confusing maze of complexities and contradictions. Iran’s voracious aspirations have been manifest in more than one act and place. The 1979 Revolution created a pervasive atmosphere of anxiety and fear in the Gulf region of that revolution’s ideological expansion into the Gulf states, especially those countries in which Shiites form important parts of their societies. In the Iran-Iraq war 1980, on the other hand, the Arab Gulf states supported Iraq against Iran as it was a proxy war to protect the Arab Gulf states, and Saddam Hussein, nevertheless, ended up occupying Kuwait in 1990. And then the Iranian-Gulf relations took a new turn at the time of both presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, who adopted an open approach to the Gulf countries. However, those relations worsened when Ahmadinejad came to power as he started to export the revolutionary thought to the Gulf countries and extended the Iranian influence to Iraq after 2003, to Syria in the aftermath of the revolution that erupted in Syria in 2011 and to the Gulf Cooperation Council states, especially in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. All this comes at the expense of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which is keen to maintain its influential role in the face of Iranian encroachment in Syria, through the support of the Syrian revolution, which seeks to overthrow Iran's ally in Damascus, Bashar al-Assad. Therefore, this study is trying to find an answer to this question: how has sectarian conflict in Syria impacted the Iranian-Gulf relations?


2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 115-118
Author(s):  
Turan Kayaoglu

The Persian Gulf region is home to the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (viz., Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia), Iran, and Iraq. Holding over 60 percent of the world’s oil and over 40 percent of its natural gas reserves, the Persian Gulf is central to the global economy. Yet a dominant regional power is lacking; beginning with the British in the late nineteenth century, foreign powers have consistently been meddling in the region. Significant economic, social, cultural, and political changes have transformed the region’s international relations since Britain’s withdrawal in the 1960s. The contributors to this volume, which provides a rich account of this transformation, focus on natural resources, the Iranian-Saudi competition, the interest of major external actors, and political reform. The volume’s main thrust is the centrality of both state and regime security in order to understand the region. The volume’s editor, Mehran Kamrava, notes that the international politics there is essentially that of security politics. He offers four reasons for this: (1) its central role in oil and natural gas production and, increasingly, global finance, (2) the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia over regional leadership, (3) the long-standing American-Iranian conflict, and (4) the instability brought about by intermixing politics and religion. He identifies three poles of power that shape the region’s security dynamics: the American pole; the GCC pole, which is centered on Saudi military and Qatari-UAE financial power; and the Iranian pole, which relies both on military might and soft power. Since the Iranian revolution, the American and the GCC poles have built a resilient alliance that has been driven by both the United States’ growing direct involvement and the GCC’s failure to provide security to its members. The chapters, written by leading regional specialists, further elaborate on the region’s security dynamics. In Chapter 2, J. E. Petersen offers a useful typology of boundary formation. He discusses how the state-building process, historical claims, colonial imposition, and resource competition have shaped state boundaries. As these boundaries remain contested, Petersen details various ongoing problems. In Chapter 3, Fred H. Lawson refines the concepts “security dilemma” and “alliances dilemma” and uses them to explain the arms race in the Gulf since the first Gulf War. Middle East specialists and international relations scholars will find these chapters useful in conceptual refinement ...


Subject Saudi Arabia's Sunni Arab alliance. Significance King Salman bin Abd-al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia held talks in Riyadh with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on March 1. It was the latest in a series of meetings the king has had with the leaders of the kingdom's main Arab allies -- the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), plus Jordan. Since coming to power in January King Salman has prioritised efforts to resolve differences among some of those allies and strengthen coordination in the face of perceived security challenges emanating from the conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, and from Iranian influence in the region. The new king appears to be seeking to put his stamp on the monarchy by restoring Saudi Arabia's traditional leadership of regional policy and security. Impacts The fragile truce between Cairo and Doha is likely to break down. Prospects have improved for greater regional cooperation to help the mainstream Syrian opposition. Saudi proxy intervention in Yemen is likely to escalate, complicating efforts to resolve the stand-off with the Huthis. The UAE and Egypt will step up intervention via proxies in Libya.


Significance The authorities are following up the swift defeat of the amateurish attempt to seize power by a group of junior officers on July 15-16. The would-be coup was violent: at least 290 died, and there were ugly clashes nationwide before the uprising collapsed in the face of rejection by the civilian population and televised appeals by most of the senior military. Impacts The balance of power in Turkey has shifted radically in Erdogan's favour, which may deter Western investors. Turkey's alignment with Saudi Arabia will grow more explicit. Mass trials and possibly even executions will alienate it further from international opinion.


Subject The Gulf 's cybersecurity agenda. Significance Offensive cyber capabilities are technological tools for intruding into external digital networks to delete, steal or manipulate data. All six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar -- are developing these capabilities in the face of multiple threats. Impacts There is currently no indication that the GCC states are preparing cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. GCC states will continue relying on Western and Israel private firms for advanced surveillance tools. Efforts to nationalise the cybersecurity sector will advance slowly. Cyber espionage is almost certainly a fourth, covert GCC goal.


2007 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Kéchichian

The existing regional balance of power in the Persian Gulf is likely to shift after Iran becomes a nuclear state. Conservative Arab Gulf monarchies, which emerged relatively unscathed from previous tectonic changes, are poised to mimic the Iranian program with far-reaching consequences for all concerned. Although major powers may well tolerate a nuclearized Iran, its neighbors face daunting security challenges to protect and promote preferred regional interests, including tested alliances with key Western governments. Saudi Arabia and its smaller Arab Gulf partners will need to exercise savvy policies to prevent a fourth regional war before the first decade of the 21st century is out. They may even have to address intrinsic political and socioeconomic reforms to preserve existing privileges.


Worldview ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Robert K. Olson

It is not a joking matter, but the state of Middle East politics is nothing if not absurd. Which is to say that, to the Westerner at least, the most recent rearrangement of alliances, conflicts, and rivalries follows no readily apparent pattern of loyalty or consistency—either religious or political. The Iran-Iraq war seems to have crystalized the fragmented Arab world into two opposing blocs, those siding with non-Arab Iran and those backing Saddam Hussein. But Libya and Syria, the two most pro-Soviet countries, have sided with anti-Communist, anti-Soviet Khomeini. On the other hand the Imam is opposed by the two anti-Soviet monarchies of lordan and Saudi Arabia and the non-Communist Gulf states led by pro-Soviet Iraq. The two monarchies might be expected to oppose Iran's revolutionary regime but hardly to ally themselves with a regime no less revolutionary in its own way than Iran. Not to put too fine a point on it, it was the 1958 Iraq revolution that murder ed King Faisal II, ruler of Iraq and cousin to King Hussein. We find Sunni Libya, which has sought to embarrass Alawite president of Syria Assad by stirring up opposition among the Sunni majority of Syria, united with Assad to give aid and comfort to the Shiite leader of Iran. Syria and Iraq, which are hostile to each other, are ruled by the two extant leaders of thp Baath or Renaissance party dedicated to the unity of the Arab peoples. We find Soviet-client Iraq allied with the most proAmerican states, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, against the most anti-American state, Iran. Soviet weaponry provides the security of the Arab axis against American weaponry provided to the shah. Meanwhile, Iran credits the U.S. with starting the war, even though Iran is being attacked with Soviet weaponry.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document