scholarly journals How ‘making the world in its own liberal image’ made the West less liberal

2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1353-1375
Author(s):  
Benjamin Miller

Abstract How did the attempt to make the world more liberal end up making the West less liberal? Following the end of the Cold War the US tried to promote liberalism in various parts of the world. This promotion took place under the liberal belief in its universality. A few of these attempts succeeded, most notably the integration of China into the global economy. Many other liberalizing endeavours failed, notably democracy-promotion in China, Russia and the Middle East. Yet, both the successes and the failures resulted in the rise of illiberal elements in the West as reflected in Brexit and Trumpism. The article shows how the outcomes of the attempts at liberalization—both the failures and the successes—generated these populist forces. The Chinese economic success took place at least partly because of the US-led integration of China into the international order. Yet, this success produced adverse economic effects in the West. Such outcomes led to the rise of economic populism. The American liberal interventions in the Middle East affected the rise of terrorism and of Muslim migration to the West. These developments influenced the rise of cultural populism in the West, which advances resentment of foreigners, migrants and minorities.

Author(s):  
Noor Mohammad Osmani ◽  
Tawfique Al-Mubarak

Samuel Huntington (1927-2008) claimed that there would be seven eight civilizations ruling over the world in the coming centuries, thus resulting a possible clash among them. The West faces the greatest challenge from the Islamic civilization, as he claimed. Beginning from the Cold-War, the Western civilization became dominant in reality over other cultures creating an invisible division between the West and the rest. The main purpose of this research is to examine the perceived clash between the Western and Islamic Civilization and the criteria that lead a civilization to precede others. The research would conduct a comprehensive review of available literatures from both Islamic and Western perspectives, analyze historical facts and data and provide a critical evaluation. This paper argues that there is no such a strong reason that should lead to any clash between the West and Islam; rather, there are many good reasons that may lead to a peaceful coexistence and cultural tolerance among civilizations


Author(s):  
Daniel Deudney

The end of the Cold War left the USA as uncontested hegemon and shaper of the globalization and international order. Yet the international order has been unintentionally but repeatedly shaken by American interventionism and affronts to both allies and rivals. This is particularly the case in the Middle East as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the nuclear negotiations with Iran show. Therefore, the once unquestioned authority and power of the USA have been challenged at home as well as abroad. By bringing disorder rather than order to the world, US behavior in these conflicts has also caused domestic exhaustion and division. This, in turn, has led to a more restrained and as of late isolationist foreign policy from the USA, leaving the role as shaper of the international order increasingly to others.


Author(s):  
Jude Woodward

This book has considered the US decision to ‘pivot’ to Asia aiming to preserve its global primacy by containing China. Seeking to boost US influence among China’s neighbours, while painting China as a dangerous revisionist power and regional aggressor, its policy has parallels with the Cold War. But when the US embarked on its confrontation with the USSR it was at the height of its economic power. Today in courting Asian allies it has had little to offer but the power of its military machine. So while the US has made some progress in re-building its influence in the affairs of the region, it has been far from enough to stall China’s rise or to convince other Asian countries to break with China. Moreover on-going distractions in the Middle East, domestic opposition to the TPP, and other troubles mean it has not even been able to concentrate its resources on China, undermining confidence in the seriousness of its turn to Asia. As a result the US has failed to drive a decisive wedge between China and any neighbours apart from Japan and not been able to inflect its increased presence in the region into a more substantive advantage.


Author(s):  
Beverley Hooper

From the early 1970s, the US-China relationship was central to diplomatic reporting, with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s visit to Peking in October 1971, President Nixon’s historic visit in February 1972, and the establishment the following year of small liaison offices in Peking and Washington. Following each of Kissinger’s further visits in 1973 and 1974, senior diplomats virtually queued up at the liaison office to find out what progress, if any, had been made towards the normalization of US-China relations. Peking’s diplomats, like some of their colleagues elsewhere in the world, did not always see eye-to-eye with their foreign ministries. There was little chance of their becoming overly attached to Communist China, as the Japanologists and Arabists were sometimes accused of doing for Japan and Arab countries. At the same time, living and breathing the PRC led some diplomats to regard Chinese Communism as being rather more nuanced—and the government somewhat less belligerent—than the Cold War images portrayed in the West, particularly the United States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-266
Author(s):  
Öner Buçukcu

The United Nations is grounded on the Westphalian state system. Throughout the de-colonizationperiod, the Organization ceased to be peculiar to the West only, and soon became the prevalent model in theentire globe. The Cold War also solidified and institutionalized the Westphalian State as the fundamentalprinciple in international relations. The end of the Cold War, however, along with the collapse of theEastern bloc, the challenges of peace and security in Africa, and the failure of the states in coping withhumanitarian crises increasingly made the three fundamental principles of Westphalian state, namely the“non-interventionism”, “sovereign-equality” and “territoriality” disputable among political scientists. Newapproaches and arguments on the end of the Classical Westphalian state and the emergence of a so-called“New Medieval Age” have widely been circulated. This paper alternatively suggests that, since the end of thecold war, the world politics has gradually and decisively been evolving into a system of states that could becalled Neo-Westphalian.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 26-37
Author(s):  
Sylvester Marumahoko

Election observation is fast emerging as a central tenet of preserving and extending democracy in Africa and other parts of the world. It is also evolving as the flagship of democracy promotion and the best-funded type of democracy-related assistance. Since the end of the Cold War, hundreds of elections held in Africa have been the subject of election observation involving hordes of local, regional, and international observers. The scrutiny comes against the backdrop of the African Union (AU) and membership regional bodies resolving to make election observation a component of all polls conducted in Africa. The article explores the opportunities, challenges, and constraints to election observation in Zimbabwe. The general conclusion of the article is that election observation is crucial for the realisation of democratic polls in Zimbabwe.


Author(s):  
Melvyn P. Leffler

This chapter argues that the West “won” the Cold War because statesmen made systems of democratic capitalism and social democracy work effectively. The challenge for democratic leaders throughout the world was to thwart the appeal of communism and co-opt revolutionary nationalist movements. To do so, they had to reinvent the role of government—not to supplant markets, but to make markets work more effectively and equitably. They avoided intracapitalist conflict, won the support of their own peoples, and created a culture of consumption that engendered the envy of peoples everywhere. In this contest over rival systems of political economy, the role of government was not the problem; it was part of the solution. But it had to be calibrated carefully.


Author(s):  
Joseph Heller

The strategic importance of the Middle East dictated Israel’s fate in the cold war. While the USSR supported the inimical Arab attitude towards Israel, the US limited its support to Israel to economic military aid. The USSR not only regarded the Arabs as a cold war asset, it accused Israel of being part and parcel of western alliances. The turning point in Soviet-Israeli relations was the Czech-Egyptian arms deal (1955) which changed the balance of power. The Suez war exemplified the explosive situation in the region, and Israel’s shaky position vis-a-vis the the Soviet Union. The combination of strategic weakness and constant Arab hatred put Israel continually on the brink of war. The eruption of another war was on the horizon immediately following the Sinai campaign.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-37
Author(s):  
Amadu Sesay ◽  
Charles Ukeje

The end of the cold war has made democratization, and its barest essential component elections, imperative for all nondemocratic forms of government. This is to be expected, given the dismal failure of the socialist alternative even in the first socialist country, the former Soviet Union. The United States, which is not only the foremost democracy in the world but also the only superpower, has been in the vanguard of democracy salesmanship. Africa, the continent with the least democratic space, has not been left out, as witnessed by President Bill Clinton’s unprecedented tour of the continent in March 1998.Understandably, Nigeria, arguably the most important country in Africa, was left out of the tour, since it was then under the obnoxious, undemocratic, and oppressive military regime of the late General Sani Abacha.


Author(s):  
Yacov Livne

Abstract This article focuses on the strategies that Moscow chose during the first decade after World War II to overcome the obstacles created by the West to its entrance into the Middle East. The cases of Israel in 1948 and Egypt in 1955 show two different entry strategies used by Moscow and reflect significant changes in Soviet foreign policy that occurred between Stalin and Khrushchev toward developing countries. In 1948 Stalin chose an indirect and often tacit support of Israel, while in 1955 Khrushchev opted for a more direct approach with Egypt. Khrushchev’s confident tactics presented Moscow with new opportunities in the Middle East and the developing nations but also created long term challenges for the Soviet regime. At the same time, Israel and Egypt successfully maneuvered between Moscow and the West to gain maximum benefits for their national security needs by using both camps of the Cold War.


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