Part IV Separation of Powers, Ch.18 Executive

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dam Shubhankar
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Discretionary Powers

This chapter examines the place and role of the executive within India’s constitutional scheme. It begins with an overview of the office of the President of India and the Governor that heads each State, before turning to a discussion of the council of ministers, the role of the Prime Minister and the chief ministers, and their terms of office. It then considers the principal offices that comprise the executive, along with their appointments, powers, and functions, and the relationship between the formal and real heads of the executive. It also outlines the powers and functions of the executive and the range of discretionary powers vested in the President and Governors, as well as their effect, if any, on parliamentary credentials.

3. Governmental Structure

2021 ◽  
pp. 73-112
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Governmental Function ◽  
Us Constitution ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
Internal Procedures

This chapter examines the internal composition, internal powers, and internal procedures of the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council of Ministers. It begins by looking at the role of the separation-of-powers principle in the European Union. Unlike the US Constitution, the EU Treaties do not discuss each institution within the context of one governmental function. Instead, each institution has ‘its’ article in the Treaty on European Union, whose first section then describes the combination of governmental functions in which it partakes. The European Treaties have thus ‘set up a system for distributing powers among different [Union] institutions’. And it is this conception of the separation-of-powers principle that informs Article 13(2) TEU. The provision is thus known as the principle of interinstitutional balance.

scholarly journals Who Gets the Top Jobs? The Role of Family Background and Networks in Recent Graduates’ Access to High-status Professions

2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-515 ◽  
Author(s):  
LINDSEY MACMILLAN ◽  
CLAIRE TYLER ◽  
ANNA VIGNOLES
Keyword(s):  
Private School ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Family Background ◽  
High Status ◽  
Additional Advantage ◽  
Early Access ◽  
University Selection ◽  
Recent Graduates ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThere is currently debate in policy circles about access to ‘the upper echelons of power’ (Sir John Major, ex Prime Minister, 2013). This research explores the relationship between family background and early access to top occupations. We find that privately educated graduates are a third more likely to enter into high-status occupations than state educated graduates from similarly affluent families and neighbourhoods, largely due to differences in educational attainment and university selection. We find that although the use of networks cannot account for the private school advantage, they provide an additional advantage and this varies by the type of top occupation that the graduate enters.

II Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 Powers and Conflicts

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barsotti Vittoria ◽  
Carozza Paolo G ◽  
Cartabia Marta ◽  
Simoncini Andrea
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Reciprocal Relations ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Principal Lines

By presenting the Court’s principal lines of case law regarding the allocation of powers in the Italian constitutional system, this chapter explores the constitutionally regulated relationships among the President, Executive, Parliament, and Judiciary. It reveals that rather than a “separation of powers” in the conventional sense of contemporary constitutional models, the Italian system is best described as instituting a set of reciprocal “relations of powers” with the Constitutional Court as the “judge of powers” that maintains and guarantees these interrelationships of constitutional actors. The chapter explores this role of the Constitutional Court in its relations with both Parliament and the President of the Republic, as well as the Court’s regulation of the relationship between the President and the Executive.

Part IV Independent Constitutional Institutions, 16 Separation of Powers and the Position of the Public Prosecutor in Francophone Africa

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adjolohoun Horace ◽  
Fombad Charles M
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Public Prosecutor ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Francophone Africa ◽  
The Public ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
Institutional Status ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines the role of public prosecutors in Francophone Africa. Most of Francophone Africa inherited and has maintained the French civil law tradition which confers on the public prosecutor constitutional and institutional status of dependence on, and limited independence from, the executive and judiciary. It is a delicate balance which tilted more in favour of dependence than independence before the 1990s, during the long era of dictatorship that followed independence. The chapter discusses the historical origins of the public prosecutor in France and its adoption in Francophone Africa; the functions of the public prosecutor and his status vis-à-vis the other branches of government. It points out that the relationship of dependence on the executive and judiciary has largely remained unchanged and poses challenges not only to the good administration of justice but also the entrenchment of a culture of constitutional democracy. A number of reforms are suggested.

The Myth of Judicial Independence

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike McConville ◽  
Luke Marsh
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Material Point ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Home Office ◽  
Democratic Polity ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This book on the criminal justice system is uniquely positioned to examine judicial claims to independence, the politics of the judiciary, the rule of law, and the role of the executive in the context of a democratic polity. The authors have mined the British government’s archival vaults to assemble records including official (previously classified) Home Office files and present a ground-breaking narrative. By tracking the relationship between senior judges and the Home Office from the end of the nineteenth century to the modern day, revelations concerning the politics of the judiciary and the separation of powers are unearthed. The book argues that the claims of the senior judiciary to be independent of the executive are invalidated by historical records and the theory and practice of the separation of powers (the ‘Westminster Model’) deeply flawed. Rather, at every material point, civil servants compromised the role of the senior judiciary’s decision-making. Moreover, with the passive endorsement of senior judges, the executive repeatedly misled Parliament as to the authorship and provenance of fundamental rules governing the relationship of the individual to the state in relation to police powers of arrest, detention, and questioning. The book also explores the past and continuing impact of all this to former colonial territories and traces the close liaison between key members of the senior judiciary and the state in reconfiguring the modern criminal process in a way which weakens defence lawyers, pressurizes defendants into pleading guilty, and undermines cardinal adversarial protections.

The Judiciary and the Role of Law

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathew D. McCubbins ◽  
Daniel B. Rodriguez
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
The Political ◽  
Legal Decision ◽  
Dynamic Relationship ◽  
Legal Decision Making ◽  
The Relationship

This article discusses the judiciary and the role of law. It talks about the implications of the approach for issues in statutory interpretation, and then examines the relationship between the legal and political controls of bureaucracy. The last section in the article focuses on the implications for judicial independence within the larger separation-of-powers system. The emerging literature on Positive Political Theory (PPT) further stresses the political nature of legal decision-making and the dynamic relationship among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.

‘Dethroning Politics’: Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Thought of F. A. Hayek

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bellamy
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Popular Participation ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Higher Law ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between liberalism and democracy is notoriously paradoxical. On the one hand, the justification for democratic procedures most commonly rests on liberal assumptions. Standard liberal arguments for democracy range from the importance of consent due to the moral primacy of the individual, to the role of critical argument and the diversity of opinion for the discovery of truth. On the other hand, liberal institutional arrangements, such as the separation of powers and the rule of law, have frequently been interpreted as constraints upon democracy, albeit necessary ones if democracy is not to undermine itself. The paradox arises from the fact that liberalism provides a philosophical basis for regarding democracy as the only valid source of law whilst apparently appealing to some higher law in order to limit democracy itself. This paradox is embodied in the constitutions of most liberal democratic states. For generally these documents contain provisions – such as a bill of rights guaranteeing the freedoms of speech, assembly and association – designed to secure popular participation in the democratic process, alongside others – such as rights not obviously intrinsic to democratic decision making and mechanisms for judicial review – which seek to limit the power of democratic assemblies.

3. Governmental Structure

2021 ◽  
pp. 73-112
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
Governmental Function ◽  
Us Constitution ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Council Of Ministers ◽  
Internal Procedures

This chapter examines the internal composition, internal powers, and internal procedures of the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council of Ministers. It begins by looking at the role of the separation-of-powers principle in the European Union. Unlike the US Constitution, the EU Treaties do not discuss each institution within the context of one governmental function. Instead, each institution has ‘its’ article in the Treaty on European Union, whose first section then describes the combination of governmental functions in which it partakes. The European Treaties have thus ‘set up a system for distributing powers among different [Union] institutions’. And it is this conception of the separation-of-powers principle that informs Article 13(2) TEU. The provision is thus known as the principle of interinstitutional balance.

Organizing Belgian Cabinets : Governments in Turmoil

Res Publica ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 277-305
Author(s):  
Hugo Van Gassel
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Functional Competence ◽  
Internal Organization ◽  
Community Or ◽  
Coalition Partner ◽  
Council Of Ministers

The internal organization of Belgian governments is described. Several ministerial committees for the preparation of governmental decisions have been institutionalized. The ministers and state secretaries who are members are chosen according the functional competence, region or community association, and party or faction affiliation.A core cabinet for general policy, which is chaired by the prime minister, and in which are represented the most important members of each coalition partner, tends to take over the role of the council of ministers on crucial matters as an instrument of collegial decision-making.This trend does not contribute to the consolidation of the prime minister's power.The existing ministerial committees, one for each community or region, developed into governments.The article deals also with the internal organization-charts and party distribution among members of subunits of the Belgian governments from 1972 to 1981.

Local Legitimacy and Tax Policy: Qaids as Part of a Composite State in Colonial Tunisia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Antoine Perrier
Keyword(s):  
North Africa ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Capital City ◽  
Colonial History ◽  
Composite State ◽  
Fiscal Reforms ◽  
Local Actors ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract The colonial history of Tunisia has long been dictated by colonial sources that made the qaid (an official in charge of fiscal attributions), from the viewpoint of the capital city, a local notable and often a prevaricator. This study proposes to reconsider the relationship between government and regional power in the colonial context by drawing on the recent work of Ottoman studies about provincial elites. The article studies the fiscal reforms of the interwar period in a cereal-growing region of Tunisia, relying on sources in Arabic produced by the qaids, namely the administrative correspondence between local authorities, the prime minister, and colonial controllers. This article describes the role of qaids in the negotiation between national law and local specificities and finally highlights the role of decentralization and a local way of thinking about the state in the 1930s. It contributes to colonial history and the history of taxation by highlighting the territorial fractures in North Africa and the agency of local actors under the protectorate.

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