No false grounds and topology of argumentation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chenwei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Logical Structure ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Argumentation Framework ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
And Topology ◽  
Grounded Semantics ◽  
The Gettier Problem

Abstract We integrate Dung’s argumentation framework with a topological space to formalize Clark’s no false lemmas theory for solving the Gettier problem and study its logic. Our formalization shows that one of the two notions of knowledge proposed by Clark, justified belief with true grounds, satisfies Stalnaker’s axiom system of belief and knowledge except for the axiom of closure under conjunction. We propose a new notion of knowledge, justified belief with a well-founded chain of true grounds, which further improves on Clark’s two notions of knowledge. We pinpoint a seemingly reasonable condition which makes these three notions of knowledge collapse into the same one and explain why this result looks counter-intuitive. From a technical point of view, our formal analysis driven by the philosophical issues reveals the logical structure of the grounded semantics in Dung’s argumentation theory.

scholarly journals THE NOTHINGNESS OF THE GETTIER PROBLEM

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Tom Eneji Ogar ◽  
Edor J. Edor
Keyword(s):  
Textual Analysis ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Knowledge Claim ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Fourth Condition ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Traditional Account ◽  
The Gettier Problem

This work, “The Nothingness” of the Gettier Problem is an attempt to deconstruct the popularly held view that a fourth condition may be necessary for the Traditional Account of Knowledge otherwise known as JTB. Plato, it was who championed the traditional account of knowledge as justified Belief in response to the agitation of the skeptics notably Georgias and Protagoras. This tripartite account held sway until Edmund Gettier Challenged the position with his article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Since this challenge, scholars have tried to solve what has become known as the Gettier Problem by trying to fashion out a fourth condition to JTB. This work argues that the celebrated Gettier counter-examples in the challenge of the tripartite account is a "nothingness". The traditional account is rather fundamental in knowledge claim, hence any new vista in form of additional information on JTB should not invalidate it. The textual analysis was adopted as a method for this research.

A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem

2005 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 207-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Douven
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Contextual Factors ◽  
Epistemic Luck ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Benign Nature ◽  
Epistemic Duty ◽  
Contextualist Solution ◽  
The Gettier Problem

According to the deontological view on justification, being justified in believing some proposition is a matter of having done one's epistemic duty with respect to that proposition. The present paper argues that, given a proper articulation of the deontological view, it is defensible that knowledge is justified true belief, virtually all epistemologists since Gettier. One important claim to be argued for is that once it is appreciated that it depends on contextual factors whether a person has done her epistemic duty with respect to a given proposition, many so-called Gettier cases, which are supposed to be cases of justified true belief that are not cases of knowledge, will be seen to be not really cases of justified belief after all. A second important claim is that the remaining alleged Gettier cases can be qualified as cases of knowledge. This requires that we countenance a notion of epistemic luck, but the requisite kind of luck is of a quite benign nature.

scholarly journals Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Relevant Notion ◽  
The Gettier Problem

This chapter aims to develop a novel virtue epistemological account of knowledge and justified belief, which gives the view a knowledge first spin. It is virtue epistemological in that it offers accounts of knowledge and justified belief in terms of exercises of epistemic abilities. It has a knowledge first twist because, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the relevant notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know. In addition, this chapter aims to show that the resulting knowledge first virtue epistemology compares favourably with its traditional cousins as it offers an appealing new solution to the Gettier problem.

Defeasible Reasoning and Representation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Lehrer
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
Defeasible Reasoning ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Subject ◽  
False Acceptance ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The Gettier Problem exhibits how our human cognitive fallibility of representation noted by Sellars and Quine always leaves open the possibility of completely justified beliefs being false. True justified belief, Gettier showed us, may result from the deduction of a justified false belief and thus fall short of knowledge. Justification that yields knowledge must not depend essentially on any error in the background system of the subject that defeats or refutes the justification. The justification consists of the capacity to meet objections to defend the target claim on the basis of acceptances, preferences over acceptances, and reasonings with acceptances contained in the background system of the subject. Errors in the system consist of accepting something false, preferring a false acceptance, or unsound reasonings. Knowledge is a kind of coherence based on defensibility of the target claim that is undefeated by errors and irrefutable by corrections of such errors.

Factores de éxito en las webs de contenidos audiovisuales. Análisis cualitativo comparado

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susana Fernández-Lores ◽  
Gema Martínez-Navarro ◽  
Diana Gavilán
Keyword(s):  
Success Factors ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Ticket Sales ◽  
Critical Success ◽  
Analysis Technique ◽  
Evolution Of Technology ◽  
Content Recommendation

The evolution of technology and the digital empowerment of society have led to the proliferation of Audiovisual Content Webs (ACWs) where users can share information and experiences, along with other commercial resources. ACWs have led to significant changes in the way users can select and access audiovisual content. The design of these websites combines various features, including a user community, streamed content, ticket sales, and recommendations, among others. Each ACW has a specific profile with respect to the mentioned variables. The aim of this study is to identify the critical success factors for a ACW, i.e., which features and the form they should take to attract followers, thus increasing the capacity to prescribe and broadcast content. Using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), a formal analysis technique that allows the identification of combinations that produce a certain result, a sample of the 12 most representative cinema websites in Spain is analyzed. The results indicate that the incorporation of content recommendation systems and the connection with streaming platforms through which the content can be accessed are key factors in the success of these ACWs. This work contributes academically to the knowledge and explanation of audience behavior in the new audiovisual scenario. From a professional point of view, relevant design suggestions are offered to platform creators. Finally, the limitations of this work are described, and future lines of research are considered. Resumen La evolución de la tecnología y el empoderamiento digital de la sociedad ha dado lugar a la proliferación de webs de contenidos audiovisuales (WCA) donde los usuarios comparten información y experiencias, junto a otros recursos comerciales. Las WCA han provocado cambios significativos en la forma en la que los usuarios pueden seleccionar y acceder a los contenidos audiovisuales. En su diseño, estas webs combinan varias prestaciones: comunidad de usuarios, contenidos en streaming, venta de entradas o recomendaciones, entre otros. Cada WCA presenta un perfil específico respecto a las variables descritas. El objetivo del presente trabajo es identificar los factores críticos de éxito de una WCA, es decir las prestaciones y la forma que deben adoptar para captar seguidores, aumentando con ello capacidad de prescripción y difusión de contenidos. Mediante el análisis cualitativo comparado (QCA), técnica formal de análisis que permite la identificación de combinaciones que producen un determinado resultado, se analiza una muestra de las 12 webs de cine más representativas en España. Los resultados indican que la incorporación de sistemas de recomendación de contenidos y la conexión con plataformas en streaming desde las que poder acceder a los contenidos son factores claves del éxito. El trabajo contribuye académicamente al conocimiento y la explicación de la conducta de la audiencia en el nuevo escenario audiovisual. Desde el punto de vista profesional se ofrecen sugerencias relevantes de diseño para los creadores de plataformas. Por último, se describen las limitaciones del trabajo y se plantean futuras líneas de investigación.

Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Inferential Knowledge ◽  
The Gettier Problem

Contrary to millennial thought, inferential knowledge does seem to arise in certain cases of reasoning to which false premises are evidentially essential. The phenomenon refutes all of the well-known epistemologies that account for inferential knowledge. I offer an explanation of the phenomenon based on a fairly conservative revision to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, and explain why Peter Klein’s proposed solution fails. The explanation put forward here aims at giving us these two highly desirable results: (a) something we have never had and may not have noticed we needed, a defeasibility theory that is compatible with epistemological fallibilism, and, (b) within this revised, fallibilistic version of the defeasibility theory, an explanation of the benign/malignant distinction for false beliefs that completes the defeasibilist resolution of the Gettier Problem.

Sed ubi Socrates currit? On the Gettier Problem before Gettier

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Risto Hilpinen
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Current Belief ◽  
The Future ◽  
Late Nineteenth ◽  
The Gettier Problem ◽  
The Way ◽  
Forward Looking

Medieval philosophers presented Gettier-type objections to the commonly accepted view of knowledge as firmly held true belief, and formulated additional conditions that meet the objections or analyzed knowledge in a way that is immune to the Gettier-type objections. The proposed conditions can be divided into two kinds: backward-looking conditions and forward-looking conditions. The former concern an inquirer’s current belief system and the way the inquirer acquired her beliefs, the latter refer to what the inquirer may come to learn in the future and how she can respond to objections. Some conditions of knowledge proposed in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century epistemology can be regarded as variants of the conditions put forward by medieval authors.

Explaining Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
The State ◽  
Methodological Aspect ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Gettier Problem

This is an edited collection of twenty-three new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the problem, and it also contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier Problem. The volume also includes some skeptical voices according to which the Gettier Problem is not deeply problematic or some of the problems it raises are not genuine philosophical problems.

A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge

Dialogue ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 565-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byeong D. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Practice Model ◽  
Robert Brandom ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Gettier Problem

ABSTRACTRobert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that this account can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously.

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