What are Fear and Anxiety? Listening to the Brain

Author(s):  
Joseph Ledoux

Imprecise language plagues discussions of “anxiety disorders” and other forms of mental illness. For example, failure to clearly distinguish the constructs “fear” and “anxiety” leads to confused interpretations of findings. Moreover, because both terms are most commonly used to refer to subjective experiences, their use in describing both subjective experiences and behavioral and physiological responses that sometimes, but not always, occur with the experiences, is also problematic. The failure of anxiolytic drug development is due in part to unrealistic expectations generated by imprecise use of the terms fear and anxiety. In order for the science of fear and anxiety to advance, scientists need to pay more attention to their scientific language.

Author(s):  
Jack M. Gorman

Although some functions, like speech and vision, can be linked to single, specific locations in the brain, complex emotions and behaviors usually involve complex interactions among brain regions. As our brains mature, these connections are shaped by our lived experiences. Scientists in basic neuroscience laboratories have traced the pathways and networks necessary for the acquisition, expression, and extinction of one emotion: fear. Brain imaging studies have shown that these same connected brain regions are activated by fear and anxiety in humans. The “fear network” includes the amygdala, hippocampus, and prefrontal cortex. Abnormalities in activity and strength of connections in the fear network are present in children and adults with anxiety disorders and depression. Brain networks that are necessary for other emotions and behaviors have been identified, so that today we look to how our brains are connected to understand our actions and emotions.


Daedalus ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 144 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph E. LeDoux

Traditionally, we define “emotions” as feelings and “feelings” as conscious experiences. Conscious experiences are not readily studied in animals. However, animal research is essential to understanding the brain mechanisms underlying psychological function. So how can we make study mechanisms related to emotion in animals? I argue that our approach to this topic has been flawed and propose a way out of the dilemma: to separate processes that control so-called emotional behavior from the processes that give rise to conscious feelings (these are often assumed to be products of the same brain system). I will use research on fear to explain the way that I and many others have studied fear in the laboratory, and then turn to the deep roots of what is typically called fear behavior (but is more appropriately called defensive behavior). I will illustrate how the processes that control defensive behavior do not necessarily result in conscious feelings in people. I conclude that brain mechanisms that detect and respond to threats non-consciously contribute to, but are not the same as, mechanisms that give rise to conscious feelings of fear. This distinction has important implications for fear and anxiety disorders, since symptoms based on non-conscious and conscious processes may be vulnerable to different factors and subject to different forms of treatment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (14) ◽  
pp. 7287
Author(s):  
Masaki Tanaka ◽  
Shunji Yamada ◽  
Yoshihisa Watanabe

Neuropeptide Y (NPY), an abundant peptide in the central nervous system, is expressed in neurons of various regions throughout the brain. The physiological and behavioral effects of NPY are mainly mediated through Y1, Y2, and Y5 receptor subtypes, which are expressed in regions regulating food intake, fear and anxiety, learning and memory, depression, and posttraumatic stress. In particular, the nucleus accumbens (NAc) has one of the highest NPY concentrations in the brain. In this review, we summarize the role of NPY in the NAc. NPY is expressed principally in medium-sized aspiny neurons, and numerous NPY immunoreactive fibers are observed in the NAc. Alterations in NPY expression under certain conditions through intra-NAc injections of NPY or receptor agonists/antagonists revealed NPY to be involved in the characteristic functions of the NAc, such as alcohol intake and drug addiction. In addition, control of mesolimbic dopaminergic release via NPY receptors may take part in these functions. NPY in the NAc also participates in fat intake and emotional behavior. Accumbal NPY neurons and fibers may exert physiological and pathophysiological actions partly through neuroendocrine mechanisms and the autonomic nervous system.


Biomedicines ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 340
Author(s):  
Lehel Balogh ◽  
Masaru Tanaka ◽  
Nóra Török ◽  
László Vécsei ◽  
Shigeru Taguchi

Psychotherapy is a comprehensive biological treatment modifying complex underlying cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and regulatory responses in the brain, leading patients with mental illness to a new interpretation of the sense of self and others. Psychotherapy is an art of science integrated with psychology and/or philosophy. Neurological sciences study the neurological basis of cognition, memory, and behavior as well as the impact of neurological damage and disease on these functions, and their treatment. Both psychotherapy and neurological sciences deal with the brain; nevertheless, they continue to stay polarized. Existential phenomenological psychotherapy (EPP) has been in the forefront of meaning-centered counseling for almost a century. The phenomenological approach in psychotherapy originated in the works of Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, and Viktor Frankl, and it has been committed to accounting for the existential possibilities and limitations of one’s life. EPP provides philosophically rich interpretations and empowers counseling techniques to assist mentally suffering individuals by finding meaning and purpose to life. The approach has proven to be effective in treating mood and anxiety disorders. This narrative review article demonstrates the development of EPP, the therapeutic methodology, evidence-based accounts of its curative techniques, current understanding of mood and anxiety disorders in neurological sciences, and a possible converging path to translate and integrate meaning-centered psychotherapy and neuroscience, concluding that the EPP may potentially play a synergistic role with the currently prevailing medication-based approaches for the treatment of mood and anxiety disorders.


Author(s):  
Roz Shafran ◽  
Stanley Rachman ◽  
Maureen Whittal ◽  
Adam Radomsky ◽  
Anna Coughtrey

Author(s):  
Philip S. Murphy ◽  
Neel Patel ◽  
Timothy J. McCarthy

Pharmaceutical research and development requires a systematic interrogation of a candidate molecule through clinical studies. To ensure resources are spent on only the most promising molecules, early clinical studies must understand fundamental attributes of the drug candidate, including exposure at the target site, target binding and pharmacological response in disease. Molecular imaging has the potential to quantitatively characterize these properties in small, efficient clinical studies. Specific benefits of molecular imaging in this setting (compared to blood and tissue sampling) include non-invasiveness and the ability to survey the whole body temporally. These methods have been adopted primarily for neuroscience drug development, catalysed by the inability to access the brain compartment by other means. If we believe molecular imaging is a technology platform able to underpin clinical drug development, why is it not adopted further to enable earlier decisions? This article considers current drug development needs, progress towards integration of molecular imaging into studies, current impediments and proposed models to broaden use and increase impact. This article is part of the themed issue ‘Challenges for chemistry in molecular imaging’.


2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Madeira Fortes ◽  
Lucas Albrechet-Souza ◽  
Mailton Vasconcelos ◽  
Bruna Maria Ascoli ◽  
Ana Paula Menegolla ◽  
...  

Abstract Introduction: Agonistic behaviors help to ensure survival, provide advantage in competition, and communicate social status. The resident-intruder paradigm, an animal model based on male intraspecific confrontations, can be an ethologically relevant tool to investigate the neurobiology of aggressive behavior. Objectives: To examine behavioral and neurobiological mechanisms of aggressive behavior in male Swiss mice exposed to repeated confrontations in the resident intruder paradigm. Methods: Behavioral analysis was performed in association with measurements of plasma corticosterone of mice repeatedly exposed to a potential rival nearby, but inaccessible (social instigation), or to 10 sessions of social instigation followed by direct aggressive encounters. Moreover, corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) and brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BNDF) were measured in the brain of these animals. Control mice were exposed to neither social instigation nor aggressive confrontations. Results: Mice exposed to aggressive confrontations exhibited a similar pattern of species-typical aggressive and non-aggressive behaviors on the first and the last session. Moreover, in contrast to social instigation only, repeated aggressive confrontations promoted an increase in plasma corticosterone. After 10 aggressive confrontation sessions, mice presented a non-significant trend toward reducing hippocampal levels of CRF, which inversely correlated with plasma corticosterone levels. Conversely, repeated sessions of social instigation or aggressive confrontation did not alter BDNF concentrations at the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus. Conclusion: Exposure to repeated episodes of aggressive encounters did not promote habituation over time. Additionally, CRF seems to be involved in physiological responses to social stressors.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. S. Kendler ◽  
J. Campbell

Jaspers famously argued that psychiatry has two distinct ways of knowing about psychiatric illness: explanation – which utilizes natural sciences, and objective and empirical methods; and understanding – which reflects our subjective, empathic appreciation of our patients' experiences. He saw a clear division between these two approaches and considered a number of psychotic symptoms to be fundamentally un-understandable. We here argue for an updating of Jasper's view that includes the possibility, due to advances in neuroscience and neuropsychology, for explanation-aided understanding. We describe two scientific explanatory models for kinds of psychotic symptoms deemed un-understandable by Jaspers that illustrate this process. The first describes how dysfunction of the brain dopamine salience system may produce ideas of reference. The second demonstrates that symptoms of made-actions may be caused by abnormalities in the feed-forward motor control system. Both of these models begin at a biological level describing pathological brain processes in neuroscience language but then utilize neuropsychology to ‘translate’ from brain dysfunction into the mental. Both models break down the pathological pathways into individual subjective elements (particularly misattributing meaning to environmental stimuli and having body parts moved by others) that are understandable because they are common to nearly all of us. The neuropsychology provides hypotheses about the functional and physiological structures underlying familiar subjective experiences. Analyses of disorders of those structures thus provide a scaffold for expanding our empathic understanding of the subjective experiences of those suffering from psychiatric illness.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document