scholarly journals A new account of rationality and semantics

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 93-109
Author(s):  
Miljana Milojevic

The aim of this paper is to show how a new outlook on human cognitive abilities, and in accordance with this a different view of rationality, can influence semantics and one of the most prominent debates in this field, namely, conflict between Fregeans and non Fregean anti-indiviidualists. This new account of rationality will help us difuse some of the main motivators for Fregean view of semantics and it will help us in justifying non-Fregean anti-individualism but also in eliminating some of the apparent contradictions in Fregean anti-individualism of, e.g. Campbell and Evans. In this attempt of bringing together some of the latest insights into human cognition and semantics I will be dealing mainly with Jessica Brown's outlook on motivation for Fregean sense and Ruth Millikan's embedded view on rationality.

2020 ◽  
Vol 375 (1803) ◽  
pp. 20190495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie Uomini ◽  
Joanna Fairlie ◽  
Russell D. Gray ◽  
Michael Griesser

Traditional attempts to understand the evolution of human cognition compare humans with other primates. This research showed that relative brain size covaries with cognitive skills, while adaptations that buffer the developmental and energetic costs of large brains (e.g. allomaternal care), and ecological or social benefits of cognitive abilities, are critical for their evolution. To understand the drivers of cognitive adaptations, it is profitable to consider distant lineages with convergently evolved cognitions. Here, we examine the facilitators of cognitive evolution in corvid birds, where some species display cultural learning, with an emphasis on family life. We propose that extended parenting (protracted parent–offspring association) is pivotal in the evolution of cognition: it combines critical life-history, social and ecological conditions allowing for the development and maintenance of cognitive skillsets that confer fitness benefits to individuals. This novel hypothesis complements the extended childhood idea by considering the parents' role in juvenile development. Using phylogenetic comparative analyses, we show that corvids have larger body sizes, longer development times, extended parenting and larger relative brain sizes than other passerines. Case studies from two corvid species with different ecologies and social systems highlight the critical role of life-history features on juveniles’ cognitive development: extended parenting provides a safe haven, access to tolerant role models, reliable learning opportunities and food, resulting in higher survival. The benefits of extended juvenile learning periods, over evolutionary time, lead to selection for expanded cognitive skillsets. Similarly, in our ancestors, cooperative breeding and increased group sizes facilitated learning and teaching. Our analyses highlight the critical role of life-history, ecological and social factors that underlie both extended parenting and expanded cognitive skillsets. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals’.


Anthropology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick L. Coolidge ◽  
Thomas Wynn

Cognitive archaeology may be divided into two branches. Evolutionary cognitive archaeology (ECA) is the discipline of prehistoric archaeology that studies the evolution of human cognition. Practitioners are united by a methodological commitment to the idea that archaeological traces of past activity provide access to the minds of the agents responsible. The second branch, ideational cognitive archaeology, encompasses archaeologists who strive to discover the meaning of symbolic system, primarily through the analysis of iconography. This approach differs from ECA in its epistemology, historical roots, and citation universes, and focuses on comparatively recent time periods (after 10,000 years ago). Evolutionary cognitive archaeologists are concerned with the nature of cognition itself, and its evolutionary development from the time of the last common ancestor with chimpanzees to the final ascendancy of modern humans at the end of the Pleistocene. Although ECA methods are primarily archaeological, its theoretical grounding is in the cognitive sciences, including cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience. It is by its nature interdisciplinary. ECA differs from the allied discipline of evolutionary psychology in several important respects. Methodologically, ECA is a macroevolutionary science that studies physical evidence of past human cognition, including archaeological and fossil remains. Evolutionary psychology relies heavily on reverse engineering from controlled experiments on living humans. Theoretically, ECA is more eclectic, drawing on a variety of cognitive and evolutionary models; evolutionary psychology is committed to a neo-Darwinian, selectionist understanding of evolutionary change. The two approaches tend to study different components of human mental life, but are not inherently contradictory. ECA practitioners reconstruct prehistoric activities using well-established archaeological methods and techniques, including morphological analysis of artifacts to identify action sequences and decision patterns, functional analyses (e.g., microwear) to identify use patterns, and spatial patterns within sites to recognize activity loci (e.g., hearths). An increasingly important method is the actualistic recreation of prehistoric technologies to identify features not preserved in the archaeological remains. Neuroarchaeologists enhance such actualistic research by imaging the brains of the participants (most typically using fMRI), an approach that also contributes directly to cognitive science’s understanding of the neural basis of technical cognition. ECA practitioners take two non-mutually exclusive approaches to documenting human cognitive evolution. The first approach enriches the understanding of specific hominin taxa (i.e., Homo sapiens and their direct ancestors since 6 million years ago) by providing accounts of their cognitive life worlds, or by contrasting two taxa with one another. This approach is famously exemplified by attempts to contrast the abilities of Neandertals with those of modern humans. The second approach traces the evolution of specific cognitive abilities from the first appearance of stone tools 3.3 million years ago to the emergence of city-states 5,000 years ago. The range of accessible cognitive abilities is limited by the nature of archaeological remains, but evolutionary cognitive archaeologists have been able to trace developments in spatial cognition, memory, cognitive control, technical expertise, theory of mind, aesthetic cognition, symbolism, language, and numeracy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 367 (1599) ◽  
pp. 2091-2096 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Heyes

Humans are animals that specialize in thinking and knowing, and our extraordinary cognitive abilities have transformed every aspect of our lives. In contrast to our chimpanzee cousins and Stone Age ancestors, we are complex political, economic, scientific and artistic creatures, living in a vast range of habitats, many of which are our own creation. Research on the evolution of human cognition asks what types of thinking make us such peculiar animals, and how they have been generated by evolutionary processes. New research in this field looks deeper into the evolutionary history of human cognition, and adopts a more multi-disciplinary approach than earlier ‘Evolutionary Psychology’. It is informed by comparisons between humans and a range of primate and non-primate species, and integrates findings from anthropology, archaeology, economics, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, philosophy and psychology. Using these methods, recent research reveals profound commonalities, as well striking differences, between human and non-human minds, and suggests that the evolution of human cognition has been much more gradual and incremental than previously assumed. It accords crucial roles to cultural evolution, techno-social co-evolution and gene–culture co-evolution. These have produced domain-general developmental processes with extraordinary power—power that makes human cognition, and human lives, unique.


Author(s):  
Lambros Malafouris ◽  
Chris Gosden

The study of material culture is changing the way we perceive and study the past, as well as how we understand the process of human becoming. This chapter proposes that a focus on the phenomenon of material engagement provides a productive means to situate and integrate evolutionary, historical, and developmental processes. The material engagement approach brings with it a relational conceptualization of human cognition as profoundly embodied, enacted, extended, and distributed. This conceptualisation opens the way to, on the one hand, reanimate the importance of history and development in the study of human cognitive evolution, and on the other hand, allow a new approach to historical analysis, one in which minds and things play a more central role. Specifically, we explore some of the implications of the view that humans and things coconstitute each other for understanding the processes by which human cognitive abilities develop and change in different cultural and historical contexts.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Baur ◽  
Jean d’Amour ◽  
David Berger

Abstract“The mating mind hypothesis”, originally aimed at explaining human cognition, holds that the socio-sexual environment shapes cognitive abilities among animals. Similarly, general sexual selection theory predicts that mate competition should benefit individuals carrying “good genes” with beneficial pleiotropic effects on general cognitive ability. However, few experimental studies have evaluated these related hypotheses due to difficulties of performing direct tests in most taxa. Here we harnessed the empirical potential of the seed beetle study system to investigate the role of sexual selection and mating system in the evolution of cognition. We evolved replicate lines of beetle under enforced monogamy (eliminating sexual selection) or polygamy for 35 generations and then challenged them to locate and discriminate among mating partners (male assays) or host seeds (female assays). To assess learning, the same beetles performed the task in three consecutive rounds. All lines learned the task, improving both within and between trails. Moreover, polygamous males outperformed monogamous males. However, there were no differences in the rate of learning between males of the two regimes, and polygamous females showed no improvement in host search, and even signs of reduced learning. Hence, while sexual selection was a potent factor that increased cognitive performance in mate search, it did not lead to the general increase in cognitive abilities expected under the “mating mind” hypothesis or general “good genes” theory. Our results highlight sexually antagonistic (balancing) selection as a potential force maintaining genetic variation in cognitive traits.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Coutrot ◽  
R. Silva ◽  
E. Manley ◽  
W. de Cothi ◽  
S. Sami ◽  
...  

SummaryCountries vary in their geographical and cultural properties. Only a few studies have explored how such variations influence how humans navigate or reason about space [1–7]. We predicted that these variations impact human cognition, resulting in an organized spatial distribution of cognition at a planetary-wide scale. To test this hypothesis we developed a mobile-app-based cognitive task, measuring non-verbal spatial navigation ability in more than 2.5 million people, sampling populations in every nation state. We focused on spatial navigation due to its universal requirement across cultures. Using a clustering approach, we find that navigation ability is clustered into five distinct, yet geographically related, groups of countries. Specifically, the economic wealth of a nation was predictive of the average navigation ability of its inhabitants, and gender inequality was predictive of the size of performance difference between males and females. Thus, cognitive abilities, at least for spatial navigation, are clustered according to economic wealth and gender inequalities globally, which has significant implications for cross-cultural studies and multi-centre clinical trials using cognitive testing.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omer Ashmaig ◽  
Liberty S. Hamilton ◽  
Pradeep Modur ◽  
Robert J. Buchanan ◽  
Alison R. Preston ◽  
...  

Intracranial recordings in epilepsy patients are increasingly utilized to gain insight into the electrophysiological mechanisms of human cognition. There are currently several practical limitations to conducting research with these patients, including patient and researcher availability and the cognitive abilities of patients, which limit the amount of task-related data that can be collected. Prior studies have synchronized clinical audio, video, and neural recordings to understand naturalistic behaviors, but these recordings are centered on the patient to understand their seizure semiology and thus do not capture and synchronize audiovisual stimuli experienced by patients. Here, we describe a platform for cognitive monitoring of neurosurgical patients during their hospitalization that benefits both patients and researchers. We provide the full specifications for this system and describe some example use cases in perception, memory, and sleep research. We provide results obtained from a patient passively watching TV as proof-of-principle for the naturalistic study of cognition. Our system opens up new avenues to collect more data per patient using real-world behaviors, affording new possibilities to conduct longitudinal studies of the electrophysiological basis of human cognition under naturalistic conditions.


2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 420-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie E. Stone

Evolutionary theories of human cognition should refer to specific times in the primate or hominid past. Though alternative accounts of tool manufacture from Wynn's are possible (e.g., frontal lobe function), Wynn demonstrates the power of archaeology to guide cognitive theories. Many cognitive abilities evolved not in the “Pleistocene hunter-gatherer” context, but earlier, in the context of other patterns of social organization and foraging.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 232-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew P. Pase ◽  
Con Stough

Cognitive outcomes are frequently implemented as endpoints in nutrition research. To reduce the number of statistical comparisons it is commonplace for nutrition researchers to combine cognitive test results into a smaller number of broad cognitive abilities. However, there is a clear lack of understanding and consensus as to how best execute this practice. The present paper reviews contemporary models of human cognition and proposes a standardised, evidence-based method for grouping cognitive test data into broader cognitive abilities. Both Carroll's model of human cognitive ability and the Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) model of intelligence provide empirically based taxonomies of human cognition. These models provide a cognitive ‘map’ that can be used to guide the handling and analysis of cognitive outcomes in nutrition research. Making use of a valid cognitive nomenclature can provide the field of clinical nutrition with a common cognitive language enabling efficient comparisons of cognitive outcomes across studies. This will make it easier for researchers, policymakers and readers to interpret and compare cognitive outcomes for different interventions. Using an empirically derived cognitive nomenclature to guide the creation of cognitive composite scores will ensure that cognitive endpoints are theoretically valid and meaningful. This will increase the generalisability of trial results to the general population. The present review also discusses how the CHC model of cognition can also guide the synthesis of cognitive outcomes in systematic reviews and meta-analysis.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Martin Paul Gray

<p>The discovery of cave paintings made by our Upper Paleolithic ancestors in Western Europe was an astonishing find – so astonishing, that they were originally believed to have been fakes. However, as more sites were uncovered, their authenticity was confirmed. But how could these people, who at the time of the discovery were believed to be merely dumb brutes, create such beautiful and naturalistic representations? And an even more difficult question to answer was, why? In this thesis I examine the phenomenon of Paleolithic cave art and what it might be able to tell us about the minds of the Cro-Magnon artists who produced it. I survey the paintings that have so far been discovered, as well as the processes involved in creating them. I also discuss and critique a selection of the many theories that have attempted to explain the motivation behind this radically different type of human behaviour. But due to the lack of hard evidence, none of these theories are ever likely to be fully substantiated. So a more promising line of investigation I take is to appraise the cognitive abilities Cro-Magnons would have needed to produce the paintings – and this then allows me to consider whether cave art was indicating any new cognitive development. I therefore highlight one of the effects that creating cave paintings had: it allowed information from the brain to be stored in the environment. But the manner in which this form of epistemic engineering might enhance human cognition is a hotly debated subject. I examine two theories: the extended mind hypothesis, and the theory of niche construction. In concluding this thesis, I argue that cave art seems more like an example of epistemic niche construction than a constituent of an extended mind.</p>


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