Ethics and Extraterrestrials

2020 ◽  
pp. 197-208
Author(s):  
Adam Potthast
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Extraterrestrial Life ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Ethical Obligations

This chapter examines how classical ethical theory might apply to the kind of alien life humans are most likely to encounter: nonrational, nonsentient life. Humans are unlikely to have basic ethical obligations to extraterrestrial life because it is very unlikely that extraterrestrial life could have moral status, by the lights of leading moral theories. Furthermore, even if extraterrestrial life did have moral status, consistency with moral practices on Earth would suggest that humans have very few basic ethical obligations to this life. However, it does not follow that humans could treat extraterrestrial life in any matter human beings see fit, because extraterrestrial life may require protection as humans follow through on basic ethical obligations to themselves. In sum, humans would not have ethical obligations to such life per se but the obligations people clearly do have to their fellow humans entail that people cherish, promote, and protect extraterrestrial life.

scholarly journals Designing AI with Rights, Consciousness, Self-Respect, and Freedom

2020 ◽  
pp. 459-479
Author(s):  
Eric Schwitzgebel ◽  
Mara Garza
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Consideration ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Ethical Design ◽  
Rights Consciousness ◽  
Substantial Uncertainty

This chapter proposes four policies of ethical design of human-grade AI. Two of the policies are precautionary. Given substantial uncertainty both about ethical theory and about the conditions under which AI would have conscious experiences, the chapter argues that we should be cautious in our handling of cases where different moral theories or different theories of consciousness would produce very different ethical recommendations. The other two policies concern respect and freedom. The chapter argues that if we design AI that deserves moral consideration equivalent to that of human beings, then AI should be designed with self-respect and with the freedom to explore values other than those we might impose.

Dehumanization and Mentalizing Animals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Phenomenal States

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.

In defence of newborns: a response to Kingma

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2021-107318
Author(s):  
Nicholas Colgrove
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Term Newborn ◽  
Moral Personhood ◽  
Previous Argument ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
What Matters

Recently, I argued that subjects inside of artificial wombs—termed ‘gestatelings’ by Romanis—share the same legal and moral status as newborns (neonates). Gestatelings, on my view, are persons in both a legal and moral sense. Kingma challenges these claims. Specifically, Kingma argues that my previous argument is invalid, as it equivocates on the term ‘newborn’. Kingma concludes that questions about the legal and moral status of gestatelings remain ‘unanswered’. I am grateful to Kingma for raising potential concerns with the view I have presented. In this essay, however, I argue that (most) of Kingma’s objections are unpersuasive. First, my original argument does not equivocate on terms like ‘newborn’ or ‘neonate’. The terms denote human beings that have been born recently; that is what matters to the argument. Charges of equivocation, I suspect, rest on a confusion between the denotation and connotations of ‘newborn’ (or ‘neonate’). Next, I show that, contra Kingma, it is clear that—under current law in the USA and UK—gestatelings would count as legal persons. Moral personhood is more difficult. On that subject, Kingma’s criticisms have merit. In response, however, I show that my original claim—that gestatelings should count as moral persons—remains true on several (common) philosophical accounts of personhood. Regarding those accounts that imply gestatelings are not moral persons, I argue that advocates face a troubling dilemma. I conclude that regardless of which view of moral personhood one adopts, questions about the moral status of gestatelings are not ‘unanswered’.

Artificial gametes, the unnatural and the artefactual

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 404-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Smajdor ◽  
Daniela Cutas ◽  
Tuija Takala
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Fertility Treatments ◽  
Important Impact ◽  
Moral Relationship ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Artificial Gametes

In debates on the ethics of artificial gametes, concepts of naturalness have been used in a number of different ways. Some have argued that the unnaturalness of artificial gametes means that it is unacceptable to use them in fertility treatments. Others have suggested that artificial gametes are no less natural than many other tissues or processes in common medical use. We suggest that establishing the naturalness or unnaturalness of artificial gametes is unlikely to provide easy answers as to the acceptability of using them in fertility medicine. However, we also suggest that we should be cautious about repudiating any relationship between nature and moral evaluation. The property of being natural or man-made may not per se tell us anything about an entity’s moral status, but it has an important impact on the moral relationship between the creator and the created organism.

Legalism and Humankind

1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-208
Author(s):  
Frank I. Michelman
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Human Good ◽  
Good For ◽  
Normative Argument

Prescriptive political and moral theories contain ideas about what human beings are like and about what, correspondingly, is good for them. Conceptions of human “nature” and corresponding human good enter into normative argument by way of support and justification. Of course, it is logically open for the ratiocinative traffic to run the other way. Strongly held convictions about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of certain social institutions or practices may help condition and shape one's responses to one or another set of propositions about what people are like and what, in consequence, they have reason to value.

scholarly journals Animal Rights: A Philosophical Evaluation

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (Issue 4) ◽  
pp. 119-124
Author(s):  
Innocent Sanga
Keyword(s):  
Animal Rights ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Contemporary World ◽  
General Overview ◽  
Christian Perspective

Animal right is one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary world. A number of scholars have been discussing on whether the animals have rights like human beings or not. Through this debate, their opinions can be put into three groups; those who deny animal moral status, those who give some moral considerations to animals but deny them a fuller moral status, and those who extend rights to animals. This paper then gives a general overview on ‘Do Animals have Rights?’ It gives the meaning of the term “right” and explains whether the term right applies to animals too. It also portrays a drama whereby animals complain against sufferings imposed on them by human beings and a response given by a human being. It is also followed by philosophical debate on animal rights: pro and cons arguments. The Christian perspective is not left out. Finally, the paper ends with critical evaluations and conclusion. In evaluation of the debate on animal rights, the study found that, animals deserve to be treated well based on the argument that they have rights as animals. The main recommendation is that human beings should change their perception concerning animals by respecting animal.

scholarly journals Thought and Language

1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-38
Author(s):  
D. Laplane
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Normal Adult ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Common Experience ◽  
Adult Human ◽  
Per Se

From aphasics' self records, common experience, changes in signification of sentences according to a verbal or non-verbal context, animals and non speaking children performances, it seems possible to get some evidence that thought is distinct from language even though there is a permanent interaction between both in normal adult human beings. Some considerations on formalisation of language suggests that the more formalised it is, the less information it contains. If it is true, it is not reasonable to hope that a formalised language like that used by computers may be a model for thought. Finally, the lack of status of thought, as far as it is a subjective experience and the impossibility of giving it a definition as far as it exceeds language, make it clear that in spite of progress in scientific psychology, thought, per se, is not an object for science.

scholarly journals Do we need an ethics of planetary sustainability?

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Beisbart
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Outer Space ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
The United Nations

Abstract The politics of the United Nations aims at sustainable development (i.e., development that can continue with future generations). Andreas Losch has recently proposed to expand our current notion of sustainability to what he calls ‘planetary sustainability’, and he has urged an ethics of planetary sustainability. This comment article discusses these proposals. The proposed conceptual change is assessed, drawing on desiderata suggested by Carnap. To the extent to which the current notion of sustainability has excluded consideration of outer space, we gain in simplicity. To the extent to which it has been unclear about this issue, we gain in exactness. The proposed concept is fruitful because it points to important considerations, in particular if there are extra-terrestrial beings that share moral status with human beings. But to some extent this fruitfulness requires a clear deviation from the anthropocentric outlook of our current notion of sustainability, and costs regarding similarity arise. As far as an ethics of sustainability is concerned, we certainly need to address ethical issues that arise in relation to outer space. However, the notion of planetary sustainability is not likely to figure prominently in related thoughts because the notion of sustainability is not a key concept in known ethical theories.

Harmony, hierarchy and duty based morality

2002 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Weatherley
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Social Hierarchy ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Social Harmony ◽  
Per Se

This article examines and rejects the perspective that Confucianism was compatible with a notion of rights. In contrast to the established doctrine of human rights which conceives human beings as moral equals, Confucianism was grounded in a philosophy and practice of moral inequality which measured human morality in relation to each person’s position in the familial and social hierarchy. The roots of the Confucian antipathy towards human rights stemmed from the overriding significance attached to the attainment of social harmony since it was this that justified the apparent need for a hierarchical and therefore unequal society. This propensity towards harmony and hierarchy also ran counter to the notion that individuals possessed rights per se. With each person in the hierarchy expected to perform an onerous array of duties, there was little, if any, room for the pursuit of independent or separate interests. Consequently, any understanding that individuals were endowed with “rights” was stifled from the outset.

Aristotle's Wondering Children

Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-81
Author(s):  
Ioannis Alysandratos ◽  
Dimitra Balla ◽  
Despina Konstantinidi ◽  
Panagiotis Thanassas ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Systematic Account ◽  
Imperfect State ◽  
The One ◽  
Shed Light

Wonder is undoubtedly a term that floats around in today’s academic discussion both on ancient philosophy and on philosophy of education. Back in the 4th century B.C., Aristotle underlined the fact that philosophy begins in wonder (θαυμάζειν), without being very specific about the conditions and the effects of its emergence. He focused a great deal on children’s education, emphasizing its fundamental role in human beings’ moral fulfillment, though he never provided a systematic account of children’s moral status. The aim of this paper is to examine, on the one hand, if, to what extent, and under what conditions, Aristotle allows for philosophical wonder to emerge in children’s souls, and, on the other hand, how his approach to education may shed light to the link between wonder and the ultimate moral end, i.e. human flourishing. We will, thus, 1) try to offer a unified outlook of the philosopher’s views on children’s special cognitive and moral state, and 2) illustrate how wonder contributes in overcoming their imperfect state of being.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document