Intellectual Disability, Criminal Justice, and the Death Penalty

Author(s):  
Cliff Sloan ◽  
Lauryn Fraas

This chapter introduces the reader to key cases analyzing claims of intellectual disability, describes the current clinical definition and diagnosis, and provides an overview of recurring issues in capital litigation. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that individuals with intellectual disability may not be executed. The Court subsequently clarified that current medical standards must be used in assessing claims of intellectual disability in capital cases. The clinical diagnosis requires assessing three factors: (a) deficits in intellectual functioning; (b) deficits in adaptive behavior; and (c) the onset of deficits during the developmental period. Courts must be informed by current medical standards regarding issues that arise, including the standard error of measurement in IQ scores, the problems of offsetting weaknesses in adaptive behavior with perceived strengths, and other clinical topics. The principle that the death penalty must not be imposed on individuals with intellectual disability signals important responsibilities for social work practitioners.

Author(s):  
Sherod Thaxton

The price of capital trials, appeals, and clemency proceedings have skyrocketed since the U.S. Supreme Court lifted its moratorium on the death penalty, but this has not translated to more reliable case outcomes—the rate of serious reversible error and wrongful convictions has steadily increased during the same time period. The overly aggressive use of the death penalty by prosecutors has not only been convincingly linked to these high reversal rates, but may also increase crime, decrease the likelihood of arrests for homicides, and lead to heightened risks of miscarriages of justice for non‐capital defendants. It follows that limiting hawkish prosecutorial decision‐making in potentially capital cases may be particularly effective in reducing the prevalence of error and reducing unnecessary expense. Curbing the virtually unfettered discretion of prosecutors is not a new idea, but extant proposals tend to suffer from shortcomings that are likely to render them impractical or ineffective. Any viable legal intervention must increase prosecutorial accountability for inadequate charge‐screening in capital cases while still permitting prosecutors to retain discretion in seeking the death penalty. This essay describes a reform that consists of two primary components: (1) an advisory (i.e., non‐binding) opinion from a reviewing authority assessing the appropriateness of a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty in a case based on the totality of evidence, and (2) financial and administrative cost-shifting mechanisms capable of disincentivizing prosecutorial overreaching in capital charging.


2010 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 862-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shanhe Jiang ◽  
Eric G. Lambert ◽  
Jin Wang ◽  
Toyoji Saito ◽  
Rebecca Pilot

Author(s):  
Anthony Walsh ◽  
Virginia L. Hatch

This article explores the emotions behind the retributive urge as it applies to the death penalty in the United States. It is argued that the retributive urge is so strong because it engages the most primitive of our emotions, and that these emotions served adaptive purposes over the course of human evolution. Many scholars offended by the retributive instinct insist that we must put emotions aside when discussing the death penalty, even as jurors in death penalty cases, and rely on our rationality. To ask this is to ask what almost all normal people find impossible because the emotions evoked in capital cases (disgust, anger, sympathy for the victim, desire for justice) evolved for the purpose of maintaining group stability and survival by punishing freeloaders. Modern neuroscience has destroyed the traditional notion that rationality and emotion are antagonists. Brain imaging techniques show that they are fully integrated in our brain wiring, and both are engaged in decision making, but when reason and emotion yield conflicting judgments, the latter almost always triumphs. The evolutionary rationales for why emotions conducive to punitive responses for wrongdoers exist are examined.


Psico-USF ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-424
Author(s):  
Priscila Benitez ◽  
Luziane de Fátima Kirchner ◽  
Giovan Willian Ribeiro ◽  
Daniely Ildegardes Brito Tatmatsu

Abstract Intellectual disability (ID) affects the functioning of adaptive behavior and social skills (SS). One way to increase SS can be through parental involvement, as long as parents have sufficient educational social skills (ESS) to favor SS teaching. The objective was to evaluate and compare the ESS of parents of children with and without ID, and to investigate correlations between ESS and age, schooling of the child/parent, and socioeconomic status. Participants included a total of 52 parents of children (26 in each group). Parents responded to the ESS Inventory. The analysis identified that the higher the educational level of the children with ID, the greater the general score and the ability of parents to talk and dialogue with them. The results identified statistically significant differences (p < 0.01) between the ESS repertoire of parents of children with and without ID, suggesting necessary interventions with parents of children with ID, especially for parents with a lower socioeconomic level.


Killing Times ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 150-184
Author(s):  
David Wills

A different appropriation of the instant takes place in the case of extrajudicial killing by drones. That practice by the U.S., begun in 2002, has remained shrouded in secrecy. However one counts the victims, drone executions outnumber by a huge margin American judicial executions, and the drone penalty thus represents a particular paradigm of the American death penalty: for the most part out of sight and out of mind. It raises in turn questions about American democracy and the deadly criminal conduct of its foreign policy, but also produces a perspective that brings into focus the long series of historical relations between slavery and the death penalty, as well as lynching and the persistence of racism in the application of capital punishment. Furthermore, the sovereign secrecy of drone attacks produces a structural space shared by the U.S. president and the terrorist s/he attacks.


Author(s):  
Edward A. Jr. Purcell

This chapter discusses the variety of types of cases Justice Antonin Scalia heard on the U.S. Supreme Court and notes their variety as well as the fact that in a few areas Scalia took originalist positions that brought results commonly regarded as “liberal,” such as his interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The chapter then turns to the bulk of the cases where he supported “conservative” results. It points out that he used his originalist jurisprudence vigorously to defend certain positions that involved his own most intensely held personal values (those dealing with abortion, gay marriage, the death penalty, and assisted suicide), and it suggests that his originalism may have been designed to justify his views on those issues. The chapter then suggests that the true test of his jurisprudence and methodology lay not in his actions in those cases but rather in the more general run of cases where he applied his jurisprudential principles inconsistently, failed to apply them at all, or actually rejected them. That large and final category of cases constituted the majority of his decisions and opinions, the chapter argues, and it provides the best ground for testing his jurisprudential claims and ultimately identifying the true nature of his jurisprudence and the significance of his judicial career.


Author(s):  
Daniel Pascoe

As with Chapters 3 and 4, the case study on Malaysia begins with a thorough description of the country’s death penalty laws and practice, and Malaysia’s publicly known clemency practice over the period under analysis (1991–2016). Thereafter, for both the Malaysian (Chapter 5) and Indonesian (Chapter 6) cases, the potential explanatory factors for clemency incidence are more complex than for Thailand and Singapore, given these two jurisdictions’ more moderate rates of capital clemency and fluctuating political policies on capital punishment over time. Available statistics suggest that Malaysia’s clemency rate is moderately high, at between 55 and 63 per cent of finalized capital cases. Malaysia is a federal state where pardons are granted by the hereditary rulers or appointed state governors in state-based cases, or by the Malaysian king (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) in federal and security cases, all on the advice of specially constituted Pardons Boards. Chapter 5 presents the following two explanations for Malaysia’s restrictions on death penalty clemency: prosecutorial/judicial discretion and detention without trial in capital cases, and the Federal Attorney-General’s constitutional role on the State and Federal Pardons Boards. As to why Malaysia’s clemency rate has not then fallen to the miniscule level seen in neighbouring Singapore (with both nations closely comparable, as they were once part of the same Federation of Malaya), Chapter 5 points to the relevant paperwork placed before each Pardons Board, the merciful role played by the Malay monarchy, and the impact of excessively long stays on death row before clemency decisions are reached.


2019 ◽  
pp. 293-309
Author(s):  
Karen Postal

Pediatric trauma, medical malpractice, teen criminal cases and capital cases often require explanations of normal and abnormal cognitive development; and almost any case we see as forensic neuropsychologists requires some level of communication about how we assess “premorbid” intellectual or cognitive function. This chapter shares clear, vivid strategies to explain concepts of cognitive development, premorbid intellectual function, and current intellectual abilities. Topics covered include the developing brain, problems that might emerge later in a child’s development, prenatal injuries, and intellectual disability. Because in many forensic contexts, a defendant/plaintiff’s IQ number can have very profound consequences, experts should be prepared when IQ is discussed in court.


Author(s):  
Russell Stetler

This chapter discusses how the theory and practice of mitigation have evolved over more than four decades, thereby helping to define the modern death penalty era in the United States. Prior to 1976, juries generally made death penalty decisions in a unitary proceeding. Juries then had unfettered discretion to impose death sentences, and the results were so arbitrary that in 1972 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down all the existing death penalty statutes. In 1976, the Court approved new statutes that guided jurors’ discretion. The Court required individualized sentencing in which jurors could consider mitigating factors based on the diverse frailties of humankind. This broad definition of what might inspire juries to reject death was elaborated in succeeding decades in a series of decisions relying on the Eighth Amendment. Social workers and other nonlawyers became critical members of multidisciplinary capital defense teams providing effective representation under the Sixth Amendment.


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