Kant's Doctrine of Virtue

Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

This book is a reader’s guide to Kant’s final work in moral philosophy, The Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals. The guide has five parts plus a conclusion. Part I, “Background,” includes two chapters: 1. “Life and Work” and 2. “Philosophical Background.” Part II, “General Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals,” covers the introduction to the entire work and includes three chapters: 3. “On the Idea of and Necessity for a Metaphysics of Morals,” 4. “Mental Faculties, the Moral Law, and Human Motivation,” and 5. “Preliminary Concepts and Division of the Metaphysics of Morals.” Part III, “Introduction to The Doctrine of Virtue,” includes four chapters covering Kant’s dedicated introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue: 6. “The Doctrine of Virtue as a Doctrine of Ends,” 7. “General Ends that Are Also Duties,” 8. “Radical Evil and the Nature of Virtue,” and 9. “The Science of Ethics.” Part IV, “The Doctrine of Elements,” is devoted to Kant’s system of duties of virtue that represents his normative ethical theory. It contains six chapters: 10. “Perfect Duties to Oneself as an Animal Being,” 11. “Perfect Duties to Oneself Merely as a Moral Being,” 12. Imperfect Duties to Oneself,” 13. “Duties of Love to Other Human Beings,” 14. “The Vices of Hatred and Disrespect,” and 15. “Friendship.” Part V, “The Doctrine of Methods of Ethics and Conclusion,” includes chapter 16 “Moral Education and Practice.” The book’s conclusion reflects on the significance of The Doctrine of Virtue for understanding Kant’s ethics.

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Denis

The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804) exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent history of philosophy and continues to be a dominant approach to ethics, rivaling consequentialism and virtue ethics. Kant’s ethical thought continues to be studied in itself, as a part of his critical system of philosophy, in its historical context, and in relation to particular practical questions. Kant’s writings and lectures display the influence of the Stoics, Rousseau, Crusius, Wolff, Hutcheson, Hume, and others; Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bradley, Greene, Habermas, and Rawls are among the many philosophers whose moral philosophies can be read (in part) as responses to Kant. Salient foundational features of Kant’s ethics include: its a priori method, its conception of the will as autonomous, its categorical imperative, its theory of freedom, and its account of moral motivation. Kant maintained that foundational moral principles must be a priori, not based on observation or experience. Kant takes the moral law to be legislated by the will to itself. Unlike holy beings, human beings experience morality as a constraint upon our wills. For us, the moral law is a categorical imperative. All ethical duties are ultimately grounded in this supreme moral principle. If we are bound to obey the moral law, we must be capable of doing so; Kant holds that, even assuming causal determinism in the phenomenal world, morality reveals our (noumenal) freedom to us. Kant attributes moral worth only to action done from duty (i.e., from respect for the law), not from inclination. Significant aspects of Kant’s fully developed ethical theory include its rich theory of virtue and the virtues, its taxonomy of duties (which include duties to oneself as well as to others), its distinctive conceptions of the highest good and human evil, and its connections with Kant’s philosophies of history, religion, and human nature. Many of Kant’s own discussions of particular duties, virtues, and vices are controversial. For example, Kant appears to condemn all lies as violations of a duty to oneself. This entry focuses on Kant’s ethics rather than Kantian ethics more broadly. Despite that, it includes a number of pieces that apply, extend, or revise Kant’s ethics in some ways, as well as interpretations of Kant’s ethics that some commentators may object stray too far from Kant’s own stated views. Kant’s political philosophy is discussed only peripherally here, save for the section on the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals.


Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

This chapter provides a brief overview of certain elements of Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology that are essential background for understanding certain features of his ethical theory. In particular, it presents Kant’s distinction between the ‘world of sense’ or ‘phenomenal world’ and the ‘world of understanding’ or ‘noumenal world’ as a basis for explaining the limits of theoretical cognition which rules out theoretical cognition and knowledge of God, immortality of the soul, and freedom of the will, yet allows Kant to affirm their reality on moral grounds, needed to explain how the highest good is possible. Of importance for understanding certain claims in his work on virtue is the distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world as it applies to human beings. The chapter concludes with reflections on the relation between Kant’s ethics and his metaphysical and epistemological commitments.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inder Marwah

AbstractKant's ethics has long been bedevilled by a peculiar tension. While his practical philosophy describes the moral obligations incumbent on all free, rational beings, Kant also understands moral anthropology as addressing ‘helps and hindrances’ to our moral advancement. How are we to reconcile Kant'sCriticalaccount of a transcendentally free human will with hisdevelopmentalview of anthropology, history and education as assisting in our collective progress towards moral ends? I argue that Kant in fact distinguishes between theobjectivedetermination of moral principles andsubjectiveprocesses of moral acculturation developing human beings’ receptivity to the moral law. By differentiating subjective and objective dimensions of moral agency, I argue (1) that we better interpret the relationship between Kant's transcendental and anthropological accounts as a division of labour between principles of obligation and principles of volition, and so, as complementary rather than contradictory; and (2) that this counters the view of Kant's ethics as overly formalistic by recognizing his ‘empirical ethics’ as attending to the unsystematizable facets of a properly human moral life.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Milica Smajevic

In the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks, on the basis of the idea of the necessary presumption of freedom, to provide a deduction of the supreme moral principle and to prove its objective validity. Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he explicitly denies the possibility of making such deduction, and by changing methodological assumptions, tries to show that awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason is the basis for the deduction of freedom. In this paper we will argue that a direct contrast between Kant?s two texts clearly shows that a radical shift in his thought has taken place. The purpose of this text is to show that Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with the deduction of the moral law offered in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which led him to change his argumentative course when writing the Second Critique.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-94
Author(s):  
Katarina Majstorovic

The aim of this paper is to emphasize the importance of the problem of moral integrity in Kant's ethical teachings. First, we tried to locate the moral integrity within Kant's original teachings, considering its relationship to the notions of dignity, duty, respect and autonomy. In the wake of further conceptualization of the problem of moral integrity, particularly interesting seemed the issue of threats of moral integrity, which we illustrated. The second part of the paper is concerned with critics to charge that Kant does not provide a satisfactory treatment of the moral integrity of the individual because his insistence on impartiality. In response to critics, we offered a presentation of the main arguments of Barbara Herman, where she is trying to improve the Kantian position. Nevertheless, the focus of argumentation which attempts to defend Kant is on the suggestions made by Henning Jensen. His suggestions call our attention to a little known part of Kant's original text, which explicitly shows the existence of perfect duties to oneself. It is also argued that perfect duty to oneself is at the same time the duty of higher order, determined as the right of humanity in our own person. Jensen manages to find the possibility of establishing moral integrity within Kant's conception and to preserve the essential significance of moral law in Kant's ethics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Apaar Kumar

Abstract Kant interpreters have contrasting views on what Kant takes to be the basis for human dignity. Several commentators have argued that human dignity can be traced back to some feature of human beings. Others contend that humans in themselves lack dignity, but dignity can be attributed to them because the moral law demands respect for humanity. I argue, alternatively, that human dignity in Kant’s system can be seen to be grounded in the reciprocal relationship between the dignity of the moral law and the dignity inherent in the human constitution. The latter includes the dignity of personhood, construed as rational inner purposiveness, and the dignity of giving oneself the law and striving to follow it.


2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann

Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.


2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 540-564
Author(s):  
Phillip Richter

The Applied Ethics debate has not yet sufficiently clarified what application of ethics exactly is. The issue of application is considered to be especially problematic in Kantian ethics or in discourse ethics. This article describes the concept of applying ethics in Kant. In discussing the duty of helping others and the theory of its application in Metaphysics of Morals it is shown that a strict separation of justification and application in ethical theory results in the paradox of imperfect duty. The paradox says that the duty to help others would be fulfilled without ever being fulfilled in action. To overcome the paradox it is necessary to form submaximes of helping, which are not arbitrarily but instructed by a theory of casuistry. This casuistry, if it is considered as a doctrine of application in Kantian ethics, can overcome the paradox of imperfect duty. However, the casuistry can overcome this paradox only if it is understood as a philosophy of prudence, which can be found in Aristotle or Descartes.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-28
Author(s):  
Kyle Curran

This paper is concerned with an ambiguous aspect of Kant’s ethics, namely, how moral change is possible. Kant conceives that change is possible, indeed desirable, without making clear the mechanism by which this change occurs. I conclude that one’s moral development must come about through the autonomous rationality of humanity. This allows for the moral law to be held at all times and for the rejection of immoral sentiments and inclinations. Further, it is constant soulsearching that allows one to keep a check on their maxims, facilitating the development of a moral disposition.


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