Freedom in Kant’s Revolution

2021 ◽  
pp. 66-149
Author(s):  
John Skorupski
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Full Account ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Political Views

This chapter turns to the philosophical revolution of Kant. Starting from what he described as his ‘Copernican’ revolution in epistemology, it examines what he took to be its implications, negative and positive, for metaphysics, ethics, and religion. It examines Kant’s account of freedom as autonomy; his moral theory and its basis in the categorical imperative; his conception of the relation between morality and practical reason; and his ethical views and ideals. His political views are examined in relation to the ideas identified in Chapter I, particularly those of the revolutionary thinker Sieyès. In the concluding section Kant’s critical and hermeneutic stance in metaphysics and ethics is defended. It is argued, however, that while transcendental idealism is a powerful response to the problem of knowledge, it is not required for a full account of freedom, will, and reason.

Internalism, externalism, and transcendental idealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Final Part ◽  
The Mind

Whereas a certain popular (Fregean) interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality makes Husserl into an internalist and methodological solipsist, the aim of Chapter 4 is to show that Husserl’s commitment to transcendental idealism prevents his theory from being either. I first discuss competing interpretations of Husserl’s concept of the noema, and argue that the Fregean interpretation misreads the transcendental character of Husserl’s phenomenology. I next present an interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism that highlights its difference from metaphysical idealism and shows why Husserl’s conception of the mind–world relationship cannot be adequately captured within the internalism–externalism framework. In the final part of the chapter, I discuss how the claim that Husserl is a methodological solipsist fails to engage properly with his account of transcendental intersubjectivity, and how that latter account eventually transforms the very character of the transcendental project.

Nonviolent struggle between norm and technique

2021 ◽  
pp. 175508822110397
Author(s):  
Kyle BT Lambelet
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Max Weber ◽  
Comprehensive Description ◽  
Full Account

Standard stories about the development of the study of nonviolent struggle characterize the maturation of the field as moving from principle to pragmatics, norm to technique. This big story about the field’s development is crystalized in the supposed dichotomy between principled and pragmatic nonviolence; a dichotomy that though common sense for those teaching and researching the repertoires of nonviolent struggle occludes the elision of critical normativity. Through a genealogical retrieval of Gene Sharp’s reading of Max Weber, this article unsettles this story. I argue that the turn to technique in the study of nonviolent struggle is itself a normative turn. Redescribing the turn to technique as itself normative, however, is not enough for a comprehensive description of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle. I develop this insight further by arguing that a recovery of the virtue of prudence, or practical reason, is necessary for a full account of nonviolent struggle.

The Green’s Gambit

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Hale
Keyword(s):  
Ecosystem Services ◽  
Endangered Species ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Endangered Species Act ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

This chapter argues that reasons are underdetermined and often left out of value-based discussions of nature. The chapter offers a rough sketch of Kantian moral theory – particularly the first two formulations of the Categorical Imperative – to suggest that the primary charge of environmentalism ought to be that of encouraging deeper justification of actions. It utilizes the Endangered Species Act, the argument from ecosystem services, and the case of a stolen kidney to suggest that cost-benefit analysis and related methodologies are insufficient for addressing the broad ethical considerations of environmentalists.

Justifying Too Much

2020 ◽  
pp. 419-434
Author(s):  
Bob Brecher
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Long Term Consequences ◽  
Rule Out

In this chapter, I analyze the use and abuse of utilitarianism in the torture debate, arguing that the latter might turn out to be utilitarianism's nemesis. For what the debate lays bare is that, if we are to take utilitarianism seriously, then we must be prepared to torture the alleged terrorist's child, or indeed anyone at all, to prevent the so-called imminent catastrophe. Furthermore, if that conclusion is unpalatable on rule-utilitarian grounds—in terms of the institutional and long-term consequences of such a practice—then those same sorts of consideration rule out torturing the alleged terrorist themselves. That this is systematically obscured by those who would purport to justify interrogational torture by their being highly selective about the consequences they consider, and/or by arbitrarily “modifying” the scope of utilitarianism when it generates inconvenient conclusions, again suggests that utilitarianism may be fundamentally flawed; and that its use to defend interrogational torture shows this. The argument is in four sections: a refutation of the alleged necessity of interrogational torture in “ticking bomb” cases; an analysis of utilitarian proponents' of interrogational torture properly to understand that their utilitarianism cannot accommodate non-utilitarian limits when inconvenient; third, their failure to acknowledge the implications of that for the permissibility of torturing known innocents to force others to divulge information; and, fourth, how these considerations come together to suggest that utilitarianism might not be a moral theory at all.

Attention and Blindness: Objectivity and Contingency in Moral Perception

2002 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 319-346
Author(s):  
Rebecca Kukla
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Perceptual Skills ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Crucial Component ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral perception, as the term is used in moral theory, is the perception of normatively contoured objects and states of affairs, where that perception enables us to engage in practical reason and judgment concerning these particulars. The idea that our capacity for moral perception is a crucial component of our capacity for moral reasoning and agency finds its most explicit origin in Aristotle, for whom virtue begins with the quality of perception. The focus on moral perception within moral theory has made a comeback in the last few decades, especially in the hands of self-proclaimed neo-Aristotelians such as John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Nancy Sherman. For these writers, our perceptual capacities are not static, and the laborious honing of our perceptual skills is a crucial moral task. On this picture, as Nancy Sherman puts it, “How to see becomes as much a matter of inquiry as what to do.”Moral particularists—including but not restricted to the neo-Aristotelians—have emphasized the centrality of moral perception to moral agency and judgment, as a corrective to moral theories that treat deliberation in terms of universal principles as the privileged keystone of moral agency.

scholarly journals “The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism”

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 476
Author(s):  
Daniel Dal Monte Dal Monte
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Major Part ◽  
Careful Analysis ◽  
Transcendental Idealism

This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant’s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected.

scholarly journals Framing Humanity by Framing Nature: John Maxwell Coetzee's Disgrace in the Context of Kant's Theory of Morality // Encuadrar a la humanidad encuadrando a la naturaleza: Desgracia de Coetzee en el contexto de la teoría moral de Kant

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-150
Author(s):  
Kamil Michta
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
The Third ◽  
Formula Of Humanity ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Kantian Philosophy

The essay discusses the correlation between Immanuel Kant’s ethics, especially his views on human duties toward animals, and John Maxwell Coetzee's literary depiction of man’s struggle to rediscover the meaning of humanity by tending unwanted animal corpses. Hence, it firstly concentrates on the key issues concerning Kant's moral philosophy, placing particular emphasis on the third formula of his categorical imperative, the so-called formula of humanity as an end in itself, and on elucidating the thinker's contention that good treatment of animals, that is, as if they were moral agents, improves in humans the propensity to treat other people well. The essay argues that the manner in which people treat animals, approached from the Kantian perspective, partakes in the duty to improve their own morality and, thus, their humanity. After examining Kant's outlook on animals, the essay discusses Coetzee's 1999 novel Disgrace. In particular it scrutinizes the figure of an aging literature professor, David Lurie, who, having been expelled from his university for sexual abuse, moves to the country. Here he engages in putting down unwanted animals and also in taking personal care for incinerating their bodies with decency and respect. Adopting the perspective of Kantian philosophy, the essay argues that Lurie's concern for animal corpses, despite its apparent pointlessness, can be seen as indicating the renewal of his humanity. In a sense, then, it is nature (unwanted animals and their corpses) that makes Lurie rediscover his humanity. The essay concludes by maintaining that Disgrace, when coupled with Kant's moral theory, is a novel conveying the (Kantian) idea that the manner in which people frame nature, that is, how they relate to it, is formative of the manner in which they frame their own humanity. Resumen   Este ensayo analiza la correlación existente entre la ética de Immanuel Kant, especialmente sus opiniones sobre las obligaciones de los seres humanos hacia los animales, y la descripción literaria que hace John Maxwell Coetzee de la lucha de un hombre por redescubrir el significado de su humanidad ocupándose de cadáveres de animales no deseados. Se centra, por ello, en su primera parte en los temas clave de la filosofía moral de Kant, haciendo especial hincapié en la tercera formulación de su imperativo categórico, es decir, la llamada formulación de la humanidad como un fin en sí misma, y en la elucidación de la controversia kantiana de que el buen trato dado a los animales, o sea, el hecho de tratarlos como si fueran agentes morales, mejora la propensión del ser humano a tratar bien a las demás personas. El ensayo sostiene que la manera en que la gente trata a los animales, examinada desde una perspectiva kantiana, contribuye al deber de mejorar su propia moralidad y, con ello, su humanidad. Tras la parte dedicada al punto de vista kantiano sobre los animales, el ensayo examina la novela Desgracia de Coetzee, publicada en 1999, y, en particular, el personaje de un profesor de literatura cincuentón, David Lurie, quien, tras haber sido expulsado de su universidad por acoso sexual, se traslada al campo donde se dedica a eutanasiar e incinerar con decencia y respeto a animales no deseados. Desde la perspectiva de la filosofía kantiana, el ensayo argumenta que la preocupación de Lurie por los cadáveres de animales, a pesar de su aparente falta de sentido, podría ser considerada como un signo de la renovación de su humanidad. En cierto modo, es la naturaleza (los animales no deseados y sus cadáveres) la que hace redescubrir a Lurie su humanidad. El ensayo concluye sosteniendo que Desgracia, combinada con la teoría moral de Kant, es una novela que transmite la idea (kantiana) de que la forma en que los seres humanos encuadran a la naturaleza, es decir, su forma de relacionarse con ella, configura la manera en que encuadran a su propia humanidad.  

scholarly journals Is the Kantian Transcendentalism Idealism? Kant's Conceptual Realism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Sergey Katrechko
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order System ◽  
Realistic Interpretation ◽  
Conceptual Realism ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Empirical Realism ◽  
Empirical Idealism

In my paper I argue, relying on Kantian definitions and conceptual distinctions, the thesis that Kantian transcen-dental philosophy, which he characterizes as a second-order system of transcendental idealism, is not [empirical] idealism, but a form of realism (resp. compatible with empirical realism [A370-1]). As arguments in favor of this “realistic” thesis, I consistently develop a realistic interpretation of the Kant’s concept of appearance (the theory of “two aspects”), as well as of Kantian Copernican revolution, of his theory of intuition as cognitive ability which 'giving' ‘us objects, of the concept of double affection and noumenal causality.

scholarly journals Deber y finalidad en la ética de Kant

2007 ◽  
pp. 165-189
Author(s):  
Francisco Javier Iracheta Fernández
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Tradition ◽  
Aristotelian Ethics ◽  
The One ◽  
Kant's Ethics

In this article I intend to show that Kant’s ethics is teleological (ethics of purposes), in contraposition to what a venerable neo-aristotelic and neo-hegelian moral tradition thinks. It is true that law ideas and categorical imperative are central to Kant’s moral theory, and therefore, it can be classified as deontological. However, here I want to prove that Kant’s deontological moral philosophy can’t be appropriately understood without assuming that, at the same time, it is a teleological moral theory in a sense very similar to the one that makes aristotelian ethics teleological, namely, based on a purpose of the action that consists in the fulfilment of a flourishing and good life.

Could Kant have really been an utilitarian?

2004 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 37-61
Author(s):  
Nenad Cekic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
The Real

In this paper the author examines Hare's idea of reconciliation of utilitarianism and Kant's moral theory. The key term which connects these two theories is the idea of universality of moral notions and judgments. But the real question is: which type of universality, and how does that universality work? Hare's idea of universalisability apparently is not Kantian universality required by categorical imperative. The author concludes that main Hare's argument in favor of "Kantian utilitarianism" is based upon basic misunderstanding of central notions of Kant's ethical theory.

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