“The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism”
This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant’s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected.
1967 ◽
Vol 28
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pp. 105-176
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1972 ◽
Vol 30
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pp. 560-561
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