Mereology

Author(s):  
A. J. Cotnoir ◽  
Achille C. Varzi

Mereology is the formal theory of parthood relations. Mereological theories—have become a chapter of central interest in metaphysics, but also with applications in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science. This book provides a critical survey and an up-to-date assessment of the main results in this area, with an eye to both their philosophical underpinnings and their formal properties. In doing so, it also aims to investigate the varieties of formal systems currently available. After a brief history of the development of mereology, introductions to different axiomatizations of so-called classical mereology, alongside set-theoretic and algebraic models, are presented in a clear and accessible manner. The book addresses formal and philosophical issues surrounding the notions of parthood, identity, decomposition, atomism, composition, and more. As a result, the book, provides resources to aide the development of new, non-classical theories of parthood (such as non-well-founded mereologies, non-transitive mereologies, non-extensional mereologies, and more). Consideration is devoted to impact that the logical background has on mereological results (including higher-order, temporal, modal, non-classical logics). A detailed index, appendices, and a comprehensive bibliography makes this book an indispensable resource to researchers in every field where part-whole theorizing plays a fundamental role.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Bochner

How do words stand for things? Taking ideas from philosophical semantics and pragmatics, this book offers a unique, detailed, and critical survey of central debates concerning linguistic reference in the twentieth century. It then uses the survey to identify and argue for a novel version of current 'two-dimensional' theories of meaning, which generalise the context-dependency of indexical expressions. The survey highlights the history of tensions between semantic and epistemic constraints on plausible theories of word meaning, from analytic philosophy and modern truth-conditional semantics, to the Referentialist and Externalist revolutions in theories of meaning, to the more recent reconciliatory ambition of two-dimensionalists. It clearly introduces technical semantical notions, theses, and arguments, with easy-to-follow, step-by-step guides. Wide-ranging in its scope, yet offering an accessible route into literature that can seem complex and technical, this will be essential reading for advanced students, and academic researchers in semantics, pragmatics, and philosophy of language.


Contemporary work on ontology, logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language still owes much to W.V. Quine. Nevertheless his views are now often dismissed because of mistaken or overly simplified conceptions of his philosophy. The development of his views over time are often overlooked, and in particular the growing importance of a kind of structuralism to his system as it evolved. This volume provides a fuller, richer picture of Quine’s views and their development. It is the first to investigate Quine’s views on structure and how it permeates and shapes his attitude to a range of philosophical questions. It includes contributions by world-famous philosophers and experts in a range of subfields including philosophical logic, philosophy of language, history of philosophy, mathematics, philosophy of time, and set theory. Chapters by Michael Resnik, Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride, John Collins, Jaroslav Peregrin, and Paul Gregory explore whether Quine’s structuralism is epistemological, language-based, or ontological. Greg Frost-Arnold, Robert Sinclair, and Gary Kemp and Andrew Lugg explore Quine’s views on structure from a historical point of view. Nathan Salmón, Gila Sher, Marianna Antonutti Marfori, and Natalja Deng consider Quine’s views on the structure of logic, language, and theories in relation to contemporary philosophy, specifically ontology, the philosophy of logic and mathematics, philosophy of set theory, and philosophy of time.


Problemos ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 78 ◽  
pp. 43-51
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys ◽  
Evaldas Nekrašas

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama analitinės kalbos ir mokslo filosofijos raida Lietuvoje. Konstatuojama, kad analitinė filosofija Lietuvoje pradėta plėtoti XX amžiaus aštuntajame dešimtmetyje, kai Evaldas Nekrašas ir Rolandas Pavilionis paskelbė savo pirmųjų mokslo filosofijos ir kalbos filosofijos tyrinėjimų, kuriuose remiamasi analitine tradicija, rezultatus. Straipsnyje analizuojami jų ir kitų tyrėjų, kurie rėmėsi ta pačia tradicija, pirmiausia Algirdo Degučio ir Albino Plėšnio darbai. Analitinė filosofija buvo pirmoji nemarksistinės filosofijos kryptis, pradėta plėtoti pokarinėje Lietuvoje, todėl aštuntajame ir devintajame dešimtmečiuose ji atliko svarbų vaidmenį plečiant šalyje filosofinių tyrinėjimų tematiką ir keičiant jų metodologinius pagrindus. Nors pastaruoju metu jos įtaka Lietuvos filosofijoje kiek sumažėjo, ji aiškiai juntama kai kuriuose pastarojo meto darbuose, kuriuose nagrinėjamos sąmonės filosofijos, priežastingumo, humanitarinių ir socialinių mokslų metodologijos problemos. Ji padarė nemažą poveikį ir pozityvizmo raidos bei politinės filosofijos problemų tyrimui.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Lietuvos filosofija, analitinė filosofija, kalbos filosofija, mokslo filosofija, pozityvizmas.Analytical Philosophy of Language and Science in LithuaniaJonas Dagys, Evaldas Nekrašas SummaryThe paper presents an overview of analytical philosophy in Lithuania. It is observed that analytical philosophy had not been studied or developed in Lithuania before the 1970s, when Evaldas Nekrašas and Rolandas Pavilionis began their work in philosophy of science and philosophy of language, rooted in analytical tradition. The article discusses the works of Nekrašas and Pavilionis, as well as those of others (e.g., Degutis and Plėšnys). It notes that analytical philosophy was the first non-Marxist trend of philosophy to be developed in post-war Lithuania, and thus it was of considerable influence at the time when the Marxist methodology had to be overthrown. Although the influence of analytical philosophy in Lithuania has diminished during later years in favour of postmodern trends, it is still evident in some recent works on philosophy of mind, philosophy of causation, and methodology of the humanities and social sciences. It has also made a strong impact upon the development of political philosophy and research in the history of positivism.Keywords: Lithuanian philosophy, analytical philosophy, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, positivism.


This is the ninth volume of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. As with earlier volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield with this timeframe along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including work by top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in the philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our discipline, while at the same time inviting wider interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-103
Author(s):  
Jingyu Xiao ◽  
Ruofan Wang

AbstractIn the history of Russian philosophy of language, Bakhtin and Shpet are two very important figures. As scholars having reached the peak of academic humanities, they both scored great achievements in many fields. The contributions they made to semiotics have a direct impact on the semiotic view of the Moscow-Tartu School and other scholars who later represented the highest achievements of Russian semiotics. It was many years earlier than Bakhtin that Shpet put forward views similar to those of Bakhtin. But Bakhtin surpassed Shpet and extended semiotics to a broader humanistic space.


Author(s):  
Christopher Lawrence

Abstract Robert Maxwell Young's first book Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century (1970), written from 1960 to 1965, still merits reading as a study of the naturalization of mind and its relation to social thought in Victorian Britain. I examine the book from two perspectives that give the volume its unique character: first, Young's interest in psychology, which he considered should be used to inform humane professional practices and be the basis of social reform; second, new approaches to the history of scientific ideas. I trace Young's intellectual interests to the Yale Philosophy Department, the Cambridge Department of Experimental Psychology and a new history and philosophy of science community. Although Young changed his political outlook and historiography radically after 1965, he always remained faithful to ideas about thought and practice described in Mind, Brain.


Bertrand Russell. My mental development. A reprint of IX 82(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 1–20; also third edition, Tudor Publishing Company, New York 1951, pp. 1-20; also paper-bound reprint of the third edition, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston, and London, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 1-20. - Hans Reichenbach. Bertrand Russell's logic. A reprint of IX 76(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 21–54; also ibid. 1951, pp. 21-54; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 21-54. - Morris Weitz. Analysis and the unity of Russell's philosophy. A reprint of IX 77(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 55–121; also ibid. 1951, pp. 55-121; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 55-121. - Kurt Göde. Russell's mathematical logic. A reprint of XI 75. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 123–153; also ibid. 1951, pp. 123-153; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 123-153. - James Feibleman. A reply to Bertrand Russell's introduction to the second edition of The principles of mathematics. A reprint of IX 77(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 155–174; also ibid. 1951, pp. 155-174; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 155-174. - G.E. Moore. Russell's “theory of descriptions.” A reprint of IX 78(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 175–225; also ibid. 1951, pp. 175-225; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 175-225. - Max Black. Russell's philosophy of language. A reprint of IX 78(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 227–255; also ibid. 1951, pp. 227-255; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 227-255. - Philip P. Wiener. Method in Russell's work on Leibniz. A reprint of IX 82(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 257–276; also ibid. 1951, pp. 257-276; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 257-276. - Ernest Nagel. Russell's philosophy of science. A reprint of IX 79. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 317–349; also ibid. 1951, pp. 317-349; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 317-349. - Andrew Paul Ushenko. Russell's critique of empiricism. A reprint of IX 80. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 385–417; also ibid. 1951, pp. 385-417; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 385-417.

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-496
Author(s):  
Ann S. Ferebee

1894 ◽  
Vol 40 (169) ◽  
pp. 249-251

With the publication in the “Pall Mall Magazine” of the first of Lord Wolseley's articles on “The Decline and Fall of Napoleon,” the inveterate controversy as to the position of the “Corsican Parvenu” in the military and general history of the world assumes a new aspect, the development of which, as psychologists, we shall watch with much interest. There have already been three great epochs in this protracted conflict of opinion. To his contemporaries and rivals of the type of Dumouriez, Bonaparte was a magnificent charlatan of mediocre ability, fit only to serve as a divisional commander under men of light and leading like themselves. The school of thought, however, which saw no genius in the famous march from Boulogne to Ulm and Austerlitz necessarily wielded an ephemeral influence, and was quickly superseded by the reactionary school, of whose views Thiers was at once the founder and the ablest exponent. Over the veteran author of “The Consulate and the Empire” the spirit of Napoleon exercised a fascination of which the records of hero-worship furnish few analogies. Then came the school of Lanfrey, Taine, and Seeley. The method which these great writers sought to pursue in investigating the life and character of Bonaparte was excellent. They set before themselves as the object to be attained a cold, critical survey, detached alike from the rancour of Dumouriez and the adulation of Thiers. But they failed, and failed badly. In spite of all their critical acumen—and perhaps because of it—the Napoleonic idea eluded their grasp. They were no better fitted for their task than Bunyan would have been for that of writing an impartial biography of Charles the Second, and the writer who will raise a real living Napoleon from the 32 volumes of “Correspondance” in which his life and thoughts are entombed has still to appear above the literary horizon. Lord Wolseley makes no attempt to fill this vacant rôle. Indeed, we doubt whether it could be adequately filled by one who believes Napoleon to have been “the greatest of all the great men” that ever lived. But he makes a contribution of much interest and value to a question that has been occasionally mooted of late years, viz., What was the mysterious malady from which the French Emperor suffered at the close of his public life in Europe? Perhaps we ought to suspend a definite answer to this question till we see what else Lord Wolseley has to say on the subject in his remaining articles. But in the meantime a rapid summary of the evidence on the point available to any student of modern French literature may not be inopportune. Of course, the matter to be considered is whether there was, in fact, at the end of Napoleon's military career a failing in his powers. Our ancestors would, no doubt, have deemed it unpatriotic to question that the “Boney” whom Wellington beat at Waterloo not only knew his best and did it, but was as competent a general as the hero of Arcola and Rivoli. But this comforting position is no longer tenable. Lord Wolseley points to the fatal delay of Napoleon at Wilna in the Russian campaign of 1812, and his equally fatal omission to support Ney at the crisis of the battle of Borodino; and, if we mistake not, the campaigns of Leipsic and Waterloo yield evidences still more cogent that the very faculty of commandership repeatedly deserted Bonaparte at the time when its presence was essential to his fortunes. The direct testimony of his contemporaries to the same fact is not wanting. Marshal Augereau (as we learn from Macdonald's memoirs) noticed it, although his coarsely-grained and jealous mind saw in it only a proof of the incompetence which he preferred to consider as a characteristic of his master, and the officers who received the fugitive Corsican on his return from Elba were astounded at his alternate fits of garrulity and silence, tremendous energy and hopeless lassitude. If, then, the fact of Napoleon's mental and physical decline is established, what was the cause? Lord Wolseley goes no further at present than “mental and moral prostration,” and there is certainly nothing extraordinary in the theory that the prodigious and continuous strain to which the mighty intellect of the great captain had for years been subjected was at last destroying its machinery. But there is also positive evidence, we think, that Napoleon had become the victim of epilepsy, and without dwelling on the subject further just now, till Lord Wolseley's series has been completed, we may point out that the theory here suggested derives some corroboration from the circumstance on which his lordship's first article offers abundant proof, that while Napoleon's power of executing his plans was impaired, the splendour of his military imagination survived, and even increased in apparent brilliancy at the last.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liba Taub

Abstract In 1990, Deborah Jean Warner, a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, published her now-classic article ‘What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?’. These questions were prompted by practical curatorial considerations: what was she supposed to collect for her museum? Today, we are still considering questions of what we collect for the future, why, and how. These questions have elicited some new and perhaps surprising answers since the publication of Warner’s article, sometimes – but not only – as a reflection of changing technologies and laboratory practices, and also as a result of changes in those disciplines that study science, including history of science and philosophy of science. In focusing attention on meanings associated with scientific instrument collections, and thinking about what objects are identified as scientific instruments, I consider how definitions of instruments influence what is collected and preserved.


Author(s):  
Philip Enros

An effort to establish programs of study in the history of science took place at the University of Toronto in the 1960s. Initial discussions began in 1963. Four years later, the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology was created. By the end of 1969 the Institute was enrolling students in new MA and PhD programs. This activity involved the interaction of the newly emerging discipline of the history of science, the practices of the University, and the perspectives of Toronto’s faculty. The story of its origins adds to our understanding of how the discipline of the history of science was institutionalized in the 1960s, as well as how new programs were formed at that time at the University of Toronto.


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