Introduction: Legislators in the Steel-Hard Casing

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Michael Koß

This chapter identifies the problem of legislative democracy. As a response to growing pressures to increase procedural efficiency in the wake of the Industrial Revolution and the advent of more inclusive suffrage formulae, legislators face two procedural alternatives: to centralize control over the legislative agenda, to create powerful committees. Talking legislatures combine centralized agenda control and weak committees, working ones decentralized agenda control and powerful committees, and hybrid ones centralized agenda control and powerful committees. According to the dynamic partisan perspective adopted in this book, a centralization of agenda control only occurs as a response to anti-system obstruction. Given legislators’ demand for mega-seats, the creation of powerful committees is the default way to rationalize legislative procedures. If, however, legislators fail to procedurally respond to anti-system obstruction they risk a breakdown of legislative procedures. This is why this book ultimately focuses on legislative democracy rather than legislative organization.

Author(s):  
Michael Koß

This book sheds light on the institutional development of four (emerging) Western European parliaments. Parliaments in Western Europe are noteworthy for several reasons. Their institutional designs differ remarkably, with distinct consequences for their policy output. Scholars have diagnosed the decline of legislatures for over a century now. Based on a model of distributive bargaining over legislative procedures, this book engages in a comparative process-tracing analysis of ninety reforms, which restructured control over the plenary agenda and committee power in Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany between 1866 and 2015. The analysis presented suggests that legislators in Western Europe rationalize procedures as a response to growing levels of legislative workload. As a consequence, legislatures evolve towards one of two procedural ideal types: talking or working legislatures. In talking legislatures, governments enjoy privileges in legislative agenda-setting (resulting in centralized agenda control) and committees are weak. In contrast, working legislatures combine decentralized agenda control with powerful committees. Which path legislators chose is determined by the appearance of anti-system obstruction. If anti-system parties obstruct legislative business, legislators surrender ancient procedural privileges and agree to a centralization of agenda control. Otherwise, their demand for legislative mega-seats on committees triggers the evolution of working legislatures. If legislators fail to respond to an anti-system threat, legislative procedures break down. For this reason, the central aim of procedural reforms in Western European parliaments is to maintain legislative democracy. Rather than a decline of legislatures, for talking legislatures to successfully overcome an anti-system threat indicates the resilience of legislative democracy.


Author(s):  
Marijana Vidas-Bubanja ◽  
◽  
Snežana Popovčić-Avrić ◽  
Iva Bubanja ◽  
◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
pp. 68-90
Author(s):  
I. Vietrynskyi

The article examines the prerequisites for the creation and early stages of development of the Commonwealth of Australia from the founding of the first European colonies prior to the legal formalization of the federation. Also mentioned are the variability of approaches to the development of Australia’s historiography, in particular from the positions of classical English and modern Australian views. Also, the early stages of the development of the continent that preceded the discovery of Australia by Europeans are considered. It analyzes the wide context of geopolitical processes in Europe in the era of imperialism (XVI-XIX centuries), as well as the circumstances of the formation of large colonial empires. In particular, features of the status, place and role of England in the international political processes of the XVIІ and XVIII centuries are shown, and the stages of the formation of the British colonial empire are also considered. The complex of internal socio-economic as well as foreign policy prerequisites for the beginning of the colonization of Australia by Great Britain is analyzed, in particular the attention paid to the consequences of the British Industrial Revolution XVIII. The stages of formation of the British colonies in Australia, as well as the development of the mainland from the establishment of the first settlement - New South Wales until full control of the continent are investigated. The characteristics of the economic, social, political, demographic and other aspects of the development of Australian colonies are analyzed. The article discusses the evolution of trade and administrative relations between individual colonies, as well as the stages of preparation for the creation of a federation, which was called the Commonwealth of Australia and changed the country's colonial position to the dominion status in the British Empire. Particular attention is paid to the international political processes that accompanied the development of the Australian continent, as well as the role of colonial administrations in regional geopolitical processes, in particular the colonization of New Guinea.


ing if one remembers that the Industrial Revolution started in France a few decades after England. But several authors [Levy-Leboyer, 1968; Asselain, 1984; and Keyder & O'Brien, 1978] ex­ plain that the French economy always kept up with technological progress in Great-Britain. A massive deceleration in the economy occurred between 1790 and 1810; the French industrial produc­ tion, which was probably equivalent in volume to the English one in 1790, was reduced to a much lower level in 1810. However, a new start occurred after 1810 and the two countries had parallel industrial growths all through the 19th century. Cost accounting systems may have appeared around the turn of and after the 15 th century in Europe [Gamer, 1954]. They actually spread to most firms during the industrial revolution in the 19th century; first in England, then in France, then in the USA, and in Germany. The aim of the present article is to describe the creation and development of such an industrial accounting system at Cie Saint-Gobain. This paper discusses the development of accounting by this very old company (created in 1665) between 1820, when it abandoned single entry bookkeeping, and 1880, when it achieved a full cost system. When examining the archives, this researcher saw no evidence that the textbooks mentioned above were read by anyone at Saint-Gobain. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SAINT-GOBAIN: THE ROYAL MANUFACTURE AND THE PRIVILEGE Instead of continuing to buy glass from Venice, which was too much for the finances of the French kingdom, Colbert encouraged the foundation of a Manufacture Royale des Glaces, established in Rue Reuilly in Paris. The creation and development of the Com­ pany resulted from privileges granted by the monarch to business­ men successively in 1665, 1683, 1688, 1695, 1702, 1757 and 1785. Those privileges made the firm a hybrid one, depending both on public and private laws; on the one hand it had a privilege and on the other hand the legal statutes of a limited Company [Pris, 1973, p. 26]. Having a privilege meant industrial, commercial, fiscal, ad­ ministrative, juridical and financial advantages such as exemption of taxes, free circulation for goods bought and sold, and a prohibi­ tion for anyone to sell the same kind of product. Saint-Gobain was therefore protected from possible rivals and all those years of 194

2014 ◽  
pp. 250-250

Author(s):  
NICHOLAS G. NAPOLIO ◽  
CHRISTIAN R. GROSE

Does majority party control cause changes in legislative policy making? We argue that majority party floor control affects legislator behavior and agenda control. Leveraging a natural experiment where nearly one tenth of a legislature’s members died within the same legislative session, we are able to identify the effect of majority party floor control on the legislative agenda and on legislator choices. Previous correlational work has found mixed evidence of party effects, especially in the mid-twentieth century. In contrast, we find that majority party control leads to (1) changes in the agenda and (2) changes in legislators’ revealed preferences. These effects are driven by changes in numerical party majorities on the legislative floor. The effects are strongest with Republican and nonsouthern Democratic legislators. The effects are also more pronounced on the first (economic) than the second (racial) dimension. Additional correlational evidence across 74 years adds external validity to our exogenous evidence.


2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron

The Center for Responsive Politics reports that U.S. lobbying expenditures substantially exceed interest group campaign contributions, without including the lobbying that is not required to be reported to the government. Although it has grown in Europe, particularly with respect to the European Union, lobbying is less important than in the United States. Bennedsen and Feldmann (BF) provide an important and insightful explanation for the difference in terms of the institutional structure of governments. They present a model of informational lobbying in client politics where an interest group provides information to a majority-rule (three-member) legislature. The legislature chooses the scale of a program whose benefits can be distributed among legislative districts. The legislative agenda setter has a vote buying problem and allocates benefits to one other legislator to obtain her vote. BF compare legislatures operating with and without a confidence procedure that allows the agenda setter to tie passage of its proposal the continuation of the government. This commentary considers the method for comparing these two institutions, assesses the implications of the theory, and considers future research related to the theory.


Author(s):  
Hye-Jin Kwon, Hee-Kyung Lim

The development of IT industry is playing an important role in the prevention of the COVID-19 infection in Korea. The development of IT industry is used in various fields. The beauty industry in the era of the 4th Industrial Revolution can identify the racial, regional and individual characteristics of customers through the use of big data with the AI system. It is also expected that such development will bring a change in the creation of new jobs and occupations in the service industry. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an environment that enables the development of nurturing education and creativity of outstanding individuals who will lead new business trends. In addition, a beauty-related industry that can meet the desire of new elderly consumers throughout the society is required. It is expected that the beauty industry in Korea will require a service that combines self-development, convenience and plays for companies, workers and consumers in future.


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