Data Integrity

Author(s):  
Keith M. Martin

This chapter discusses cryptographic mechanisms for providing data integrity. We begin by identifying different levels of data integrity that can be provided. We then look in detail at hash functions, explaining the different security properties that they have, as well as presenting several different applications of a hash function. We then look at hash function design and illustrate this by discussing the hash function SHA-3. Next, we discuss message authentication codes (MACs), presenting a basic model and discussing basic properties. We compare two different MAC constructions, CBC-MAC and HMAC. Finally, we consider different ways of using MACs together with encryption. We focus on authenticated encryption modes, and illustrate these by describing Galois Counter mode.

Author(s):  
Kannan Balasubramanian

Cryptographic Hash Functions are used to achieve a number of Security goals like Message Authentication, Message Integrity, and are also used to implement Digital Signatures (Non-repudiation), and Entity Authentication. This chapter discusses the construction of hash functions and the various attacks on the Hash functions. The Message Authentication Codes are similar to the Hash functions except that they require a key for producing the message digest or hash. Authenticated Encryption is a scheme that combines hashing and Encryption. The Various types of hash functions like one-way hash function, Collision Resistant hash function and Universal hash functions are also discussed in this chapter.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-72
Author(s):  
Muhammad Rehan Anwar ◽  
Desy Apriani ◽  
Irsa Rizkita Adianita

The hash function is the most important cryptographic primitive function and is an integral part of the blockchain data structure. Hashes are often used in cryptographic protocols, information security applications such as Digital Signatures and message authentication codes (MACs). In the current development of certificate data security, there are 2 (two) types of hashes that are widely applied, namely, MD and SHA. However, when it comes to efficiency, in this study the hash type SHA-256 is used because it can be calculated faster with a better level of security. In the hypothesis, the Merkle-Damgård construction method is also proposed to support data integrity verification. Moreover, a cryptographic hash function is a one-way function that converts input data of arbitrary length and produces output of a fixed length so that it can be used to securely authenticate users without storing passwords locally. Since basically, cryptographic hash functions have many different uses in various situations, this research resulted in the use of hash algorithms in verifying the integrity and authenticity of certificate information.


First Monday ◽  
2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Praveen Gauravaram ◽  
Adrian McCullagh ◽  
Ed Dawson

This paper discusses the legal and practical implications of attacks, presented at Crypto ’2004, against various 128–bit hash functions and in particular MD5 due to its wide usage. These attacks are significant because a number of important applications depend on MD5. It is argued in this paper that the MD–x style of hash function designs for various applications can be a single point of failure. New hash function design schemes with some strict security properties should be developed in order to avoid new attacks in the future.


2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650026 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fatma Kahri ◽  
Hassen Mestiri ◽  
Belgacem Bouallegue ◽  
Mohsen Machhout

Cryptographic hash functions are at the heart of many information security applications like message authentication codes (MACs), digital signatures and other forms of authentication. One of the methods to ensure information integrity is the use of hash functions, which generates a stream of bytes (hash) that must be unique. But most functions can no longer prevent malicious attacks and ensure that the information have just a hash. Because of the weakening of the widely used SHA-1 hash algorithm and concerns over the similarly-structured algorithms of the SHA-2 family, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has initiated the SHA-3 contest in order to select a suitable drop-in replacement. KECCAK hash function has been submitted to SHA-3 competition and it belongs to the final five candidate functions. In this paper, we present the implementation details of the hash function’s KECCAK algorithm, moreover, the proposed KECCAK design has been implemented on XILINX FPGAs. Its area, frequency, throughput and efficiency have been derived and compared and it is shown that the proposed design allows a trade-off between the maximum frequency and the area implementation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 145 ◽  
pp. 552-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grace C.W. Ting ◽  
Bok Min Goi ◽  
S. W. Lee

H.264/AVC is a widespread standard for high definition video (HD) for example DVD and HD videos on the internet. To prevent unauthorized modifications, video authentication can be used. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis of a H.264/AVC video authentication scheme proposed by Saadi et al. [1] at EUSIPCO 2009. Our result will prevent situations where newer schemes are developed from the scheme thus amplifying the flaw. The designers claimed that the scheme can detect modifications on watermarked video. However, we show that an attacker can modify the watermarked video and compute a valid watermark such that the recipient will retrieve a watermark from the modified watermarked video that will match what the recipient computes during video authentication check. Thus, the recipient will think the tampered video is authentic. The first main problem of the scheme is its use of hash functions for watermark generation. Since hash functions are public functions not depending on any secret, the attacker can modify the watermarked video and feed this through the hash function to compute a new watermark. The second problem is that it is possible for the attacker to perform watermark embedding thus producing a modified watermarked video. On receiving the modified video, the recipient recomputes the watermark and compares this with the watermark extracted from the video. They will match because the embedded watermark and recomputed watermark use the same hash function based watermark generation and the same input i.e. the modified video. Our cryptanalysis strategy applies to any watermarking based video authentication scheme where the watermark and embedding are not functions of secrets. As countermeasure, the functions should be designed so that only legitimate parties can perform them. We present two improved schemes that solve this problem based on private key signing functions and message authentication functions respectively.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1.5) ◽  
pp. 230
Author(s):  
A. Murali ◽  
K Hari Kishore

Data manipulations are made with the use of communication and networking systems. But at the same time, data integrity is also a needed and important property that must be maintained in every data communicating systems. For this, the security levels are provided with cryptographic primitives like hash functions and block ciphers which are deployed into the systems. For efficient architectures, FPGA-based systems like AES-GCM and AEGIS-128 plays in the best part of the re-configurability, which supports the security services of such communication and networking systems. We possibly focus on the performance of the systems with the high security of the FPGA bit streams. GF (2128) multiplier is implemented for authentication tasks for high-speed targets. And also, the implementations were evaluated by using vertex 4.5 FPGA’s


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (13) ◽  
pp. 2050188
Author(s):  
Zhuo Liu ◽  
Yong Wang ◽  
Gongkun Jiang ◽  
Leo Yu Zhang

The inherent random-like behavior and one-way property of iteration in chaotic systems provide a good basis for designing Hash function. In the era of big data, due to the increasing data capacity in applications, fast Hash functions with parallel mode are highly desirable when authenticating data integrity. We analyze the issue of how to parallelize Hash function with iterative structure. Some security requirements on parallel Hash function are presented. In addition, using chaotic map and block cipher, we construct a keyed parallel Hash function. The message blocks are firstly processed in parallel by a DM-like structure. Furthermore, a tree mode with chaotic map is utilized to combine the outputs of the hash round function in parallel. The proposed Hash function is analyzed by theory and tested by computer simulations. The test results show that the proposed scheme can resist the various common attacks against Hash functions. It satisfies the secure performance requirements of Hash function. Owing to the usage of the parallel mode to process messages, the proposed chaos-based Hash function possess high efficiency and has high potential in applications to guarantee data integrity on a parallel computing platform.


2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (02) ◽  
pp. 163-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
HARRIS E. MICHAIL ◽  
DIMITRIOS SCHINIANAKIS ◽  
COSTAS E. GOUTIS ◽  
ATHANASIOS P. KAKAROUNTAS ◽  
GEORGIOS SELIMIS

Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are widely used in order to authenticate data packets, which are transmitted thought networks. Typically MACs are implemented using modules like hash functions and in conjunction with encryption algorithms (like Block Ciphers), which are used to encrypt the transmitted data. However NIST in May 2005 issued a standard, addressing certain applications and their needs, defining a way to implement MACs through FIPS-approved and secure block cipher algorithms. In this paper the best performing implementation of the CMAC standard is presented, in terms of throughput, along with an efficient AES design and implementation.


Author(s):  
Stefan Kölbl ◽  
Martin M. Lauridsen ◽  
Florian Mendel ◽  
Christian Rechberger

Recently, many efficient cryptographic hash function design strategies have been explored, not least because of the SHA-3 competition. These designs are, almost exclusively, geared towards high performance on long inputs. However, various applications exist where the performance on short (fixed length) inputs matters more. Such hash functions are the bottleneck in hash-based signature schemes like SPHINCS or XMSS, which is currently under standardization. Secure functions specifically designed for such applications are scarce. We attend to this gap by proposing two short-input hash functions (or rather simply compression functions). By utilizing AES instructions on modern CPUs, our proposals are the fastest on such platforms, reaching throughputs below one cycle per hashed byte even for short inputs, while still having a very low latency of less than 60 cycles. Under the hood, this results comes with several innovations. First, we study whether the number of rounds for our hash functions can be reduced, if only second-preimage resistance (and not collision resistance) is required. The conclusion is: only a little. Second, since their inception, AES-like designs allow for supportive security arguments by means of counting and bounding the number of active S-boxes. However, this ignores powerful attack vectors using truncated differentials, including the powerful rebound attacks. We develop a general tool-based method to include arguments against attack vectors using truncated differentials.


Author(s):  
Pooya Farshim ◽  
Claudio Orlandi ◽  
Razvan Rosie

We study the security of symmetric primitives under the incorrect usage of keys. Roughly speaking, a key-robust scheme does not output ciphertexts/tags that are valid with respect to distinct keys. Key-robustness is a notion that is often tacitly expected/assumed in protocol design — as is the case with anonymous auction, oblivious transfer, or public-key encryption. We formalize simple, yet strong definitions of key robustness for authenticated-encryption, message-authentication codes and PRFs. We show standard notions (such as AE or PRF security) guarantee a basic level of key-robustness under honestly generated keys, but fail to imply keyrobustness under adversarially generated (or known) keys. We show robust encryption and MACs compose well through generic composition, and identify robust PRFs as the main primitive used in building robust schemes. Standard hash functions are expected to satisfy key-robustness and PRF security, and hence suffice for practical instantiations. We however provide further theoretical justifications (in the standardmodel) by constructing robust PRFs from (left-and-right) collision-resistant PRGs.


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