Is the Anselmian Being Loving?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Central Task ◽  
Characteristic Modes ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter argues that we have no good reason to believe, and strong reason to doubt, that God, as an Anselmian (that is, absolutely perfect) being, is bound by familiar norms of moral goodness. There is an explanatory gap between ‘x is an aspect of a sentient creature’s well-being’ and ‘x is a reason for an agent to promote it’ that moral philosophers recognize, and it is a central task of ethics to explain how it can be crossed. But the characteristic modes of crossing it (those indebted to Hobbes, Hume, Kant, and Aristotle) appeal to features specific to finite creatures like us. Thus, we should be dubious that an absolutely perfect being is bound by norms of moral goodness.

Drug attitude and subjective well-being in antipsychotic treatment monotherapy in real-world settings

1999 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Balestrieri ◽  
Guido Di Sciascio ◽  
Miriam Isola ◽  
Emanuele Lomonaco ◽  
Elisa Maso ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Stepwise Multiple Regression ◽  
Antipsychotic Treatment ◽  
Anticholinergic Drugs ◽  
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis ◽  
Subjective Well Being ◽  
Second Generation Antipsychotics ◽  
Univariate Analyses ◽  
Drug Attitude

SummaryAims– To assess using two well-know scales (DAI-30 and SWN) the drug attitude and subjective well-being of patients treated with haloperidol or second-generation antipsychotics (SGA) in four different Italian communities.Methods– The sample included 145 patients taking five different antipsychotics (APs) in mono-therapy: haloperidol, clozapine, olanzapine, risperidone, quetiapine. A stepwise multiple regression analysis (SMRA) was used to analyse the contribution of different AP treatments and of other predictors to SWN and DAI-30 scores. Results – Univariate analyses showed no differences in DAI-30 and SWN scores across treatments. The SMRA showed that SWN scores were negatively correlated with the severity of the psychoses (BPRS scores), while the DAI-30 scores were negatively correlated with the severity of the psychoses and positively correlated both with the length of drug treatment and with the use of olanzapine. Conclusions – Our study does not confirm a better drug attitude in patients treated with SGA with respect to haloperidol. The only partial exception is the better performance of olanzapine over haloperidol on DAI-30, which could be due to the lower use of anticholinergic drugs during olanzapine treatment. The differences between the SWN and DAI-30 may give good reason for the use of both instruments during AP treatments.Declarationof Interest: No grants have been received for this study. In the last two years: Matteo Balestrieri has received grants from AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, BMS, Janssen-Cilag, Boehringer-Ingelheim, Innova-Pharma, Pfizer, Bristol, Abbott, Lundbeck; Guido Di Sciascio has received grants from AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, BMS, Janssen-Cilag, Sanofi-Aventis, Wyeth, Boehringer- Ingelheim; Elisa Maso has received grants from Pfizer; Cesario Bellantuono has received grants from Eli Lilly, BMS, Boehringer- Ingelheim, Innova-Pharma, Italfarmaco; The other authors have not received any grants in the last two years.

THE ROLE OF EPISTEMIC VIRTUE IN THE REALIZATION OF BASIC GOODS

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Baril
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Popular Opinion ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
In Virtue Of

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, there is good reason to think that the qualities that make people good reasoners also make them better off. I will focus specifically on epistemic virtue: roughly, the kind of character in virtue of which one is excellently oriented towards epistemic goods. I propose that epistemic virtue is importantly implicated in the realization of some of the goods that are widely believed to be instrumental to, or even constitutive of, well-being. Here I focus on one such good: friendship.

scholarly journals Changes in Physical Activity Are Associated with Corresponding Changes in Psychological Well-Being: A Pandemic Case Study

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (20) ◽  
pp. 10680
Author(s):  
Micael Dahlen ◽  
Helge Thorbjørnsen ◽  
Hallgeir Sjåstad ◽  
Petra von Heideken Wågert ◽  
Charlotta Hellström ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Physical Activity ◽  
Life Satisfaction ◽  
Daily Activity ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Activity Level ◽  
Organized Activities ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Psychological Well Being ◽  
Cross Sectional Design

Societal crises and personal challenges are often followed by substantial changes in physical activity. Is there a link between such changes and psychological well-being? Seeking to answer this question, we conducted a correlational study on a representative sample in Sweden during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic (N = 1035). About 49% of the sample had decreased their physical activity compared to their self-reported activity level prior to the pandemic, whereas 32% had increased it. The results showed a positive and robust association between changes in daily activity level and corresponding changes in psychological well-being. Specifically, individuals who had reduced their physical activity over the last year reported lower life satisfaction than before, and individuals who had increased their physical activity reported higher life satisfaction than before. The amount of complete physical inactivity (sitting) showed a similar pattern as the exercise data, meaning that individuals who reported increasing inactivity per day also reported a greater decline in life satisfaction. Additional analyses showed that the association between daily activity level and life satisfaction was somewhat stronger for men than for women, but there was no difference when comparing individual versus organized activities. The current study was based on a cross-sectional design, measuring self-reported change over time. Recent work from other research teams have used longitudinal data and experience-sampling in different settings, finding similar results. We conclude that there is good reason to recommend physical exercise as a coping strategy in difficult times.

scholarly journals PROMOTING EMPLOYEE WELFARE AND GENERAL WELL-BEING AT THE WORKPLACE

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (43) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanae Errhouni ◽  
G. Sundharavadive
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Psychosocial Risks ◽  
Employee Welfare ◽  
A Company

The performance of a company is intimately linked to well-being at work, i.e. to the development of its employees internally. And for good reason, psychosocial risks at work are receiving increasing attention from managers

scholarly journals Happiness and Wellbeing

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruchi Sundriyal ◽  
Dr. Ravindra Kumar
Keyword(s):  
Satisfaction With Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Subjective Well Being ◽  
Psychological Well Being ◽  
Happy People ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Personal Strengths ◽  
Public Happiness ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Psychological System

Happiness is a mental or emotional state of well-being characterized by positive or pleasant emotions ranging from contentment to intense joy. Happiness as a concept seems to be readily embraced by the majority of people and appears to be more valued than the pursuit of money, moral goodness or going to heaven. Philosophers and religious thinkers often define happiness in terms of living a good life, or flourishing, rather than simply as an emotion. Happiness economics suggests that measures of public happiness should be used to supplement more traditional economic measures when evaluating the success of public policy. Happy people are healthy people. Happy people live longer and enjoy a greater quality of life. They function at a higher level, utilizing their personal strengths, skills, and abilities to contribute to their own well-being as well as that of others and society. Wellbeing is a contented state of being happy and healthy and prosperous. Psychological well-being refers to how people evaluate their lives. These evaluations may be in the form of cognitions or in the form of affect. The cognitive part is an information based appraisal of one’s life that is when a person gives conscious evaluative judgments about one’s satisfaction with life as a whole. Most people evaluate their life as either good or bad, so they are normally able to offer judgments. People invariably experience moods and emotions which have a positive effect or a negative effect. We can define psychological well-being in terms of internal experience of the respondent and their own perception of their lives. People have a level of subjective well-being even if they do not often consciously think about it, and the psychological system offers virtually a constant evaluation of what is happening to the person.

Subjective Measures of Well‐Being: Philosophical Perspectives

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Angner
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Subjective Measures ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Do So

The goal of this article is to explore some fundamental assumptions underlying subjective measures of well-being, as compared to more traditional economic measures. Its main thesis is that psychologists and economists have sharply different philosophical commitments, a fact that is seldom made explicit. Although it is perfectly reasonable for social and behavioral scientists to be wary of spending too much time thinking about the philosophical foundations of their enterprise, there are moments when it is eminently useful to do so. In this case, this article maintains, there is good reason to attend to these foundations, since they are directly relevant to the assessment of the various measures. A better grasp of fundamental commitments, this article argues, goes a long way toward explaining why psychologists' and economists' efforts to measure welfare or well-being are so different, and why there is relatively little fruitful communication and collaboration across fields.

Consciousness

2021 ◽  
pp. 214-251
Author(s):  
Jessica M. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Knowledge Argument ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Conceivability Argument ◽  
Emergent Phenomenon ◽  
Strong Emergence ◽  
Physical Features

Wilson considers whether consciousness is either Weakly or Strongly emergent. Some have seen consciousness as the best case for a Strongly emergent phenomenon, reflecting that subjective or qualitative aspects of consciousness depart so greatly from physical features that some anti-physicalist view (perhaps Strong emergence) must be true. Wilson considers two such ‘explanatory gap’ strategies, associated with the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986) and the conceivability argument (Chalmers 1996, 2009). She argues that each strategy fails, for reasons not much previously explored; hence while the Strong emergence of consciousness remains an open empirical possibility, there is currently no motivation for taking this to actually be so. Wilson then argues that attention to the determinable nature of qualitative conscious states provides good reason to take such states to be Weakly emergent by lights of a determinable-based account, and defends the application of such an account to mental states against various objections.

Cicero: Tusculan Disputations II and V

1989 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. E. Douglas
Keyword(s):  
English Translation ◽  
Mental Distress ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Latin Text ◽  
Moral Goodness

The Fifth Tusculan Disputation is the finest of the five books, its nearest rival being the First. The middle three books, represented in this edition by the Second, are, as the author clearly intended, less elevated, though still showing Cicero's flair for elegant and lively exposition, and providing much valuable information about the teaching of the main Hellenistic philosophical schools, especially the Stoics. They argue that the perfect human life, or complete human well-being, that of the 'wise man', is unaffected by physical and mental distress or extremes of emotion. Against this background, the Fifth puts the positive, mainly Stoic, case that virtue, moral goodness, is alone and of itself sufficient. The book presents Latin text with facing-page English translation, introduction and commentary.

scholarly journals Reviving Hedonism about Well-Being: Refuting the Argument from False Pleasures and  Restricting the Relevance of Intuitive 'Evidence'

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Daniel Michael Turton
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Sufficient Evidence ◽  
Warning Sign ◽  
Significant Information ◽  
The Road ◽  
Experience Machine ◽  
One Step ◽  
On The Road

<p>Throughout the vast majority of its history, hedonism about well-being has been perennially unpopular (Feldman 2004). The arguments in this essay take steps towards reviving the plausibility of hedonism about well-being. The main argument currently used to refute hedonism about well-being, the Argument from False Pleasures, is shown to lack sufficient evidence to be compelling. The main evidence provided for the Argument from False Pleasures comes in the form of two thought experiments, the Experience Machine (Nozick 1974) and the Deceived Businessman (Kagan 1998). These thought experiments typically produce strong intuitive responses, which are used to directly support the Argument from False Pleasures. This essay investigates how theories of well-being are currently evaluated by moral philosophers, with a specific focus on the place our intuitions have in the process. Indeed, the major role that moral intuitions play in evaluating theories of well-being, despite their sometimes dubious epistemic credentials, leads to an in-depth enquiry into their inner workings and potential for containing normatively significant information. The investigation, which draws on the work of Woodward and Allman (2007), concludes that intuitions about unrealistic thought experiments should not play an important role in evaluating theories of well-being. Rather, they should only act as a warning sign, highlighting moral propositions for further analysis. Based on these findings, a new method for assessing theories of well-being is suggested and applied to a specific internalist account of hedonism about well-being to show how the Deceived Businessman and Experience Machine thought experiments lack normative significance, leaving the Argument from False Pleasures without sufficient evidence to be compelling. Indeed, this essay concludes that the Argument from False Pleasures should no longer be thought to provide any good reason to believe that hedonism about well-being is implausible. This result is only one step on the road to reviving hedonism about well-being, but it is a very important one.</p>

scholarly journals Hedonism and Happiness in Theory and Practice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Daniel Michael Weijers
Keyword(s):  
Meaning In Life ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Academic Discipline ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Experience Machine ◽  
Good For ◽  
Philosophical Debates

<p>In this thesis, I investigate several different questions about happiness and hedonism in theory and practice and offer several arguments and theories. In addition to making progress in these happiness-related areas of inquiry, this thesis aims to demonstrate the complexity and variety of happiness-related problems and the broad range of real-world problems that considerations of happiness can help to resolve. Furthermore, nearly every chapter of this thesis demonstrates how interdisciplinary analyses can bring new movement to problems that have become insulated within one academic discipline. This thesis is divided into two main parts. Chapters 1 through 5 constitute Part 1, and Chapters 6 through 8 constitute Part 2. Part 1 of this thesis is focused on theory and questions about what we should believe. In particular, Part 1 is concerned with Prudential Hedonism, a theory of what is good for a person, which claims (roughly) that a preponderance of pleasure over pain (sometimes referred to as happiness) is what is ultimately good for people. After providing a broad overview of hedonism, and especially Prudential Hedonism, in Chapter 1, the remainder of Part 1 focuses on one main question from philosophical debates about well-being: does the experience machine thought experiment give us good reason to believe that internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism are all false? The main conclusion that I argue for in Part 1 is that no, the experience machine thought experiment does not gives us good reason to believe that internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism are all false. Part 2 of this thesis is focused on practice, and particularly on how considerations of happiness can inform certain practices and help us to understand what we should do in certain circumstances. Unlike Part 1, which has a smooth narrative flow from chapter to chapter, Part 2 contains three relatively unrelated chapters, each of which investigates a different question without relying on the conclusions of any previous chapters. Chapter 6 argues that an optimistic view about scientific and technological progress allows for two interesting new theories for the meaning of life debate, and discusses what people with certain kinds of belief might want to do to achieve true meaning in life. One of these theories posits that causing there to be infinite happiness can be a way to achieve a truly meaningful life. Chapter 7 demonstrates how considerations of human happiness can justify why a particular set of distributive principles are the fairest way to apportion the burdens associated with adapting to, and mitigating, the potentially devastating effects of rapid climactic change. Based on these considerations, Chapter 7 includes fairly specific policy recommendations about what governments should do about climate change. This thesis also includes a Postscript for Policymakers. Compared to Chapters 2 to 7, the Postscript for Policymakers takes a much higher-level approach; it seeks to provide general answers to two very broad questions. Given its broader scope and different intended audience, the Postscript for Policymakers does not include in-depth discussion of all likely objections. The two questions addressed in the Postscript for Policymakers are: should policymakers use findings from the science of happiness to guide their policy decisions, and how can they best do this? The Postscript for Policymakers concludes that findings from the science of happiness should be used to guide policymaking (with several qualifications), and it provides recommendations for how best to do this.</p>

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