Bank Culture

2019 ◽  
pp. 23-47
Author(s):  
Huw Macartney

This chapter expands on the two explanations for bank culture. Firstly, it explores the idea that culture is determined by financial and non-financial incentives, and values. Secondly, the chapter explores the financialization of Anglo-America. It argues that financialization stemmed from a crisis of accumulation in the post-war economy, but came to reshape a full range of financial and non-financial corporate activities. It explains though that financialization breeds instability and inequality, and that Anglo-American banks exploit and exacerbate these conditions. This is the argument that will be developed more fully in coming chapters, in order to understand the more significant determinants of ‘bad’ bank culture.

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spero Simeon Zachary Paravantes

While trying to understand and explain the origins and dynamics of Anglo-American foreign policy in the pre and early years of the Cold War, the role thatperception played in the design and implementation of foreign policy became acentral focus. From this point came the realization of a general lack of emphasisand research into the ways in which the British government managed to convincethe United States government to assume support for worldwide British strategicobjectives. How this support was achieved is the central theme of this dissertation.This work attempts to provide a new analysis of the role that the British played in the dramatic shift in American foreign policy from 1946 to 1950. Toachieve this shift (which also included support of British strategic interests in theEastern Mediterranean) this dissertation argues that the British used Greece, first asa way to draw the United States further into European affairs, and then as a way toanchor the United States in Europe, achieving a guarantee of security of theEastern Mediterranean and of Western Europe.To support these hypotheses, this work uses mainly the British andAmerican documents relating to Greece from 1946 to 1950 in an attempt to clearlyexplain how these nations made and implemented policy towards Greece duringthis crucial period in history. In so doing it also tries to explain how Americanforeign policy in general changed from its pre-war focus on non-intervention, to the American foreign policy to which the world has become accustomed since 1950. To answer these questions, I, like the occupying (and later intervening)powers did, must use Greece as an example. In this, I hope that I may be forgivensince unlike them, I intend not to make of it one. My objectives for doing so lie notin justifying policy, but rather in explaining it. This study would appear to havespecial relevance now, not only for the current financial crisis which has placedGreece once again in world headlines, but also for the legacy of the Second WorldWar and the post-war strife the country experienced which is still playing out todaywith examples like the Distomo massacre, German war reparations and on-goingsocial, academic and political strife over the legacy of the Greek Civil War.


2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine C. Sredl ◽  
Clifford J. Shultz ◽  
Ružica Brečić

Through this longitudinal study of a historically significant, complex, conflicted and evolving macromarketing space, Bosnia’s Arizona Market, the authors reveal that marketing systems are not merely random artifacts of human behavior; rather, they are adaptive, purposeful, can be pernicious and/or provisioning, and ultimately—if they are to reflect our humanity—must be well integrated into other prosocial systems to affect the best possible outcomes for all stakeholders. By engaging with a marketing system in a post-conflict, divided society, we are better able to understand the genesis and evolution of markets and marketing systems; the relationships among war economy, peace accords, and the ways that post-war marketing systems create community, provide for community needs, and create new vulnerabilities for some community members. The authors conclude with a discussion of implications for sustainable peace and prosperity in Bosnia and in other post-conflict marketing systems, and suggestions for future research.


Author(s):  
Stephen Bowman

This chapter examines the activities of the Pilgrims Society against the backdrop of official international relations in the immediate post-war years, in particular during the presidency of Warren Harding. It analyses the Pilgrims Society’s role in many of the most pressing issues in the Anglo-American relationship, for example the US refusing to join the League of Nations, the war debt question, and naval disarmament. It focuses on a banquet held in London in 1921 for the US Ambassador George Harvey, whose remarks at the event about the League of Nations caused controversy and resulted in significant levels of press coverage. This chapter also looks at the growing anti-Britishness in the US in this period and examines how this impacted upon the Pilgrims Society. The chapter ultimately establishes that the Pilgrims Society consolidated its position as a semi-official public diplomacy actor while at the same time coming under increasing public scrutiny.


2019 ◽  
pp. 175-190
Author(s):  
Andrew Gamble

One of the distinctive features of the idea of an Anglosphere has been a particular view of world order, based on liberal principles of free movement of goods, capital and people, representative government, and the rule of law, which requires a powerful state or coalition of states to uphold and enforce them. This chapter charts the roots as well as the limits of this conception in the period of British ascendancy in the nineteenth century, and how significant elements of the political class in both Britain and the United States in the twentieth century came to see the desirability of cooperation between the English-speaking nations to preserve that order against challengers. This cooperation was most clearly realised in the Second World War. The post-war construction of a new liberal world order was achieved under the leadership of the United States, with Britain playing a largely supportive but secondary role. Cooperation between Britain and the US flourished during the Cold War, particularly in the military and intelligence fields, and this became the institutional core of the ‘special relationship’. The period since the end of the Cold War has seen new challenges emerge both externally and internally to the Anglo-American worldview.


1985 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Newton

Most commentators on the 1949 sterling crisis have viewed it as an episode with implications merely for the management of the British economy. This paper, based on the public records now available, discusses the impact of the crisis on British economic foreign policy. In particular it suggests that the crisis revealed deep Anglo-American differences, centring on the nature of the Marshall Plan, on the international value of the sterling area, and on the proper relationship between the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Ultimately the British succeeded in resolving these disagreements: but this triumph ironically implied both the defeat of British aims in post-war European reconstruction and a long term delusion that great power status could be maintained on the basis of a special relationship-with the United States.


1942 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-337
Author(s):  
Kurt Wilk

The war in the Pacific has focused attention on rubber as one of the key materials of peace and war economy. It has not only caused domestic adjustments in the United States as previously in other consuming countries, both allied and enemy, but has terminated an epoch in international rubber control. At the same time, it has accentuated the permanent international concern about basic materials—their location, accessibility, production, distribution, and utilization. Thus the international rubber régime, as it operated up to the disruption of trade-lanes and the invasion and devastation of producing areas, is of interest not only because of its effects in the period just ended but also as an approach to problems of international economic policy and administrative technique which are likely to continue into post-war world organization, no matter how different its political and strategical foundations may be.


1942 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 656-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold Wolfers

Often it has been asserted that if the United States had stood by her allies after 1918 and joined the League of Nations, peace in Europe would have been secure. While this overstresses the point, it is certainly true that the lack of unity among the victors, both at Versailles and afterwards, deprived the world of anything like a center of coördination and leadership. Even the Concert of Europe of bygone days could claim greater authority than a League from which five out of seven great powers were either permanently or temporarily absent, and in which the two remaining powers, Britain and France, were rarely in agreement.In view of this experience, it makes sense to regard continued coöperation between at least some of the important allies of this war, assuming the defeat of Hitler and his partners, as being an essential prerequisite for a more durable peace. If at least the two great English-speaking powers could form between themselves a solid partnership, so it is argued, would not their combined strength and their supremacy of the seas quite naturally attract other nations into their orbit and thus enable them to preserve the order and peace of the world? Their rôle is envisaged as a kind of enlarged replica of that which the British Empire fulfilled with no little success throughout most of the nineteenth century.


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