Good and Bad Actions

2020 ◽  
pp. 48-81
Author(s):  
Alastair Norcross

Should consequentialism simply equate rightness with goodness? It is usually assumed to be possible, and sometimes even desirable, for consequentialists to make judgments about the goodness of actions, in addition to states of affairs. Whether a particular action is good or bad, and how good or bad it is, are two such judgments. However, consequentialism cannot provide a satisfactory account of the goodness of actions, on the most natural approach to the question. Strictly speaking, a consequentialist cannot judge one action to be better or worse than another action performed at a different time or by a different person. Consequentialism is actually strengthened by the realization that actions can only be judged as better or worse than possible alternatives.

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Schiattarella ◽  
Gaetano Riemma ◽  
Marco La Verde ◽  
Gianluigi Franci ◽  
Annalisa Chianese ◽  
...  

: Polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS) is a condition that affects about 15% of women of reproductive age and is correlated with infertility, insulin resistance, and obesity. The etiology of PCOS is multifactorial and genetic, endocrine, and metabolic causes were involved. New evidence suggests a link between microorganisms residing in the digestive tracts of humans and the development of PCOS. Moreover, an imbalance in the gut microbial community could be a possible factor for the onset of insulin resistance and obesity. Hyperandrogenism, a key feature of PCOS, could also play a critical role in shaping the microbiome community. Probiotics could modify the gut microbiota and serve as a potential treatment for PCOS. Here we disclose the association between PCOS and intestinal microbiota and the possible role of probiotics as a new treatment approach.


Author(s):  
John R. Searle

Intentionality is that feature of the mind by which it is directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world. Intentionality is simply aboutness or directedness. “Proposition” is more difficult, but the essential idea is this: every intentional state has a content. Sometimes it seems that the content just enables a state to refer to an object. So if John loves Sally, then it appears that the content of his love is simply “Sally”. But if John believes that it is raining, then the specification of the content requires an entire “that” clause. “Are there non-propositional intentional states?” amounts to the question, “Are there intentional states whose content does not require specification with a ‘that’ clause?” This chapter explores whether there are any non-propositional states, and suggest that a very limited class, such as boredom, is in fact non-propositional.


Author(s):  
Samuel Scheffler

Many discussions of future generations attempt to identify a satisfactory population axiology: a principle that would enable us to assess the relative value of total states of affairs that differ in population-related respects. Such an axiology would in turn supply the basis for a principle of beneficence, which would spell out our responsibilities for promoting optimal population outcomes. By contrast, the approach defended in this book is predominantly attachment-based. The reasons for caring about the fate of future generations discussed in previous chapters all depend on our existing values and evaluative attachments and on our conservative disposition to preserve and sustain the things that we value. This chapter appeals to the nature of valuing to clarify these forms of dependence, and it explores the contrast between the axiological and attachment-based approaches.


Author(s):  
Mark Jago

What should we say about the ‘difficult’ cases of truthmaking, involving general and negative existential truths, modal truths, counterfactual truths, analytic truths, and temporal truths? The toughest cases are the general and negative existential truths. I’ll argue that we can’t account for them without introducing new bits of ontology (§5.2 and §5.3). Armstrong’s totality states of affairs are not the best option (§5.4). Negative states of affairs are a better bet (§5.5), although their metaphysical analysis is difficult (§5.6). I’ll discuss the remaining cases – modal truths, counterfactual truths, analytic truths, and temporal truths – in §5.7.


Author(s):  
Robert Guay

Schopenhauer claims that his understanding of morality identifies and preserves its essential content as it is shared among various philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions. Indeed, he seems to argue that only by rooting moral value, virtue, and responsibility as he does in compassion and beneficence can a satisfactory account of morality be given. At the same time, however, Schopenhauer also insists that no prescriptive account of morality can be given: the very idea of a moral rule is spurious, and morality can only be approached from a theoretical perspective. In this chapter, the author argues that Schopenhauer reconciles this tension between conventional and revisionist strands by justifying morality as the appropriate form of responsiveness to the intrinsic senselessness of existence. Morality, then, is not a rational or strategic pursuit but an expression of the correct attitude toward the unavailability of any sensible pursuit; it is practical insofar as it needs to be sustained in order to express the appreciation of metaphysical truth. The author then addresses three sets of issues: why compassion is a superior form of responsiveness to indifference or arbitrariness, the extent to which this account preserves the content of morality as conventionally understood, and the extent to which this account enables Schopenhauer to address objections regarding the distinctness of persons, the importance of phenomenal concerns, and the possibility of agency.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn O’Meara ◽  
Asifa Majid

AbstractPrevious studies claim there are few olfactory metaphors cross-linguistically, especially compared to metaphors originating in the visual and auditory domains. We show olfaction can be a source for metaphor and metonymy in a lesser-described language that has rich lexical resources for talking about odors. In Seri, an isolate language of Mexico spoken by indigenous hunter-gatherers, we find a novel metaphor for emotion never previously described – “anger stinks”. In addition, distinct odor verbs are used metaphorically to distinguish volitional vs. non-volitional states-of-affairs. Finally, there is ample olfactory metonymy in Seri, especially prevalent in names for plants, but also found in names for insects and artifacts. This calls for a re-examination of better-known languages for the overlooked role olfaction may play in metaphor and metonymy. The Seri language illustrates how valuable data from understudied languages can be in highlighting novel ways by which people conceptualize themselves and their world.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 994
Author(s):  
Elisa Alòs ◽  
Jorge A. León

Here, we review some results of fractional volatility models, where the volatility is driven by fractional Brownian motion (fBm). In these models, the future average volatility is not a process adapted to the underlying filtration, and fBm is not a semimartingale in general. So, we cannot use the classical Itô’s calculus to explain how the memory properties of fBm allow us to describe some empirical findings of the implied volatility surface through Hull and White type formulas. Thus, Malliavin calculus provides a natural approach to deal with the implied volatility without assuming any particular structure of the volatility. The aim of this paper is to provides the basic tools of Malliavin calculus for the study of fractional volatility models. That is, we explain how the long and short memory of fBm improves the description of the implied volatility. In particular, we consider in detail a model that combines the long and short memory properties of fBm as an example of the approach introduced in this paper. The theoretical results are tested with numerical experiments.


Dialogue ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale

David Lewis has shocked the philosophical community with his original version of extreme modal realism according to which “every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is”. Logical Space is a plenitude of isolated physical worlds, each being the actualization of some way in which a world could be, that bear neither spatiotemporal nor causal relations to each other. Lewis has given independent, converging arguments for this. One is the argument from the indexicality of actuality, the other an elaborate cost-benefit argument of the inference-to-the-best explanation sort to the effect that a systematic analysis of a number of concepts, including modality, causality, propositions and properties, fares better under his theory than under any rival one that takes a possible world to be either a linguistic entity or an ersatz abstract entity such as a maximal compossible set of properties, propositions or states of affairs. Lewis' legion of critics have confined themselves mostly to attempts at a reductio ad absurdum of his theory or to objections to his various analyses. The indexical argument, on the other hand, has not been subject to careful critical scrutiny. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this argument cannot withstand such scrutiny. Its demise, however, leaves untouched his argument from the explanatory superiority for his extreme modal realism.


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