Locke’s Underlying Background Beliefs

Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker

This chapter brings together the results of the previous chapters and shows what role Locke’s moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs play in his thinking about persons and personal identity. Locke breaks with traditional metaphysical debates, first, by adopting a metaphysically agnostic stance with regard to the materiality or immateriality of thinking substances and, second, by arguing for a kind-dependent approach to questions of identity over time. Locke’s moral and legal conception of a person, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, is informed by his moral and religious beliefs. His thinking about moral accountability can be challenged and has been challenged by his contemporaries. Although Locke has good reasons for distinguishing our idea of a person from that of a human being and of a substance, these reasons are based on his metaphysical agnostic views and his religious belief in an afterlife.

Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker

This book offers a new perspective on John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Ruth Boeker’s interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. She argues that taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity over time, means that his account of personhood should be considered separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, Boeker argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. Moreover, she shows that Locke’s religious beliefs in an afterlife and a last judgement make it attractive to distinguish between the ideas of persons, human beings, and substances, and to defend a consciousness-based account of personal identity. In contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, she argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume.


2015 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 39-56
Author(s):  
Eric T. Olson

AbstractDerek Parfit claims that we are not human beings. Rather, each of us is the part of a human being that thinks in the strictest sense. This is said to solve a number of difficult metaphysical problems. I argue that the view has metaphysical problems of its own, and is inconsistent with any psychological-continuity account of personal identity over time, including Parfit's own.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-494
Author(s):  
Michał Kumorek

Time has a very important function in considering the identity of a person. It is the factor that brings identity into question. The core of the problem is the question of whether the person is the same as he or she was at another time. The problem of personal identity was one of the most important issues in Paul Ricoeurs philosophy. He considers this problem in the context of time and notes that traditional models of identity as sameness and as selfhood have been entangled in various aporias. He, therefore, proposes two new models of identity that are related in different ways to temporality: character and promise. Character is a model that changes over time through the acquisition or loss of various traits. The promise, on the other hand, is a model that resists the pressure of time attempts to keep a given word. In this way, these two different models create the framework for Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity. In this concept, time enables the development of action in a story. It allows the action to turn around, but it also allows the human being to look at the story of his or her life. Character and promise are models that allow the human being to look at his or her life as a certain temporal entity that is constantly threatened by unforeseen accidents and events but also constantly absorbs them and, through to time, gives the possibility of retrospection leading to synthesis. This synthesis allows us to look at a single life as a whole, belonging to the same person endowed with the character and challenge of keeping a promise.


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson

This chapter examines the difference between John Locke's definition of a person [P], considered as a kind of thing, and his definition of a subject of experience of a certain sophisticated sort [S]. It first discusses the equation [P] = [S], where [S] is assumed to be a continuing thing that is able to survive radical change of substantial realization, as well as Locke's position about consciousness in relation to [P]'s identity or existence over time as [S]. It argues that Locke is not guilty of circularity because he is not proposing consciousness as the determinant of [S]'s identity over time, but only of [S]'s moral and legal responsibility over time. Finally, it suggests that the terms “Person” and “Personal identity” pull apart, in Locke's scheme of things, but in a perfectly coherent way.


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


Author(s):  
Kevin Vallier ◽  
Michael Weber

This chapter articulates and defends a “partially subjectivist” way of defining burdens on religious belief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On this view, courts should largely defer to plaintiffs as to what is a burden on their religious belief. There is only a minor requirement that the plaintiffs have to satisfy, which is to show that the government is doing something that pressures them to act in a way contrary to their beliefs—a relatively easy hurdle to clear. In general, courts are ill-equipped to determine what people’s religious beliefs really are, and this extends to determining when those beliefs are substantially burdened. More strongly, there is a tradition that says evaluating when people’s religious beliefs are burdened is really none of the court’s business. The partially subjectivist view honors these principles.


2016 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen

AbstractNorenzayan et al.’s theoretical synthesis is highly plausible and commendable. However, the empirical evidence for the arguments on mentalizing, cognitive biases, and religious belief is currently not as strong as the writers suggest. Although certainly abundant and compelling, this evidence is indirect, contradictory, and weak and must be acknowledged as such. More direct studies are needed to support the theory.


1991 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-156
Author(s):  
Winfred George Phillips

In Brand Blanshard's major defence of reason in religion, Reason and Belief, he criticizes both Roman Catholics and Protestants for advocating contradictory theological doctrines and for believing beyond what the evidence supports. Claiming belief to be an ethical matter, with one morally responsible for one's religious beliefs, he holds that one is morally obligated in such metaphysical matters to believe only what the evidence warrants. Blanshard finds that religious beliefs typically fail to meet the standard of this ethics of belief, and thus his ethics appears inhospitable to religious belief.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 258
Author(s):  
Febri Vive Kananda ◽  
. Relin D.E ◽  
I Made Wika

<p><em>Hinduism believes in the existence of four phases of life to be traversed by the so-called Chess Dormitory. The four phases of human development are Brahmacari, Grehasta, Wanaprasta, and Bhiksuka (Sanyasin). Of the four phases, marriage is included in the stage of development of life, the second human being (Grehasta). In Javanese traditional marriage contains many values that are poured in the symbols, one of which is used like the Kembar Mayang. All ceremonial facilities in Java still use the standard or rules in the Javanese tradition that still apply and is a local religious belief. However, people's understanding of the ceremonial facilities is still lacking. This research is a qualitative research which in collecting data, researcher use observation technique, interview, document study and literature study.</em></p><p><em>From this research, </em><em>t</em><em>he process of marriage ceremony of Hindu people in Sidorejo village in general starts from</em><em> lamaran, pasang </em><em>tarub, selamatan, inauguration of husband and wife, bridal meeting (nemokake manten), and the peak is marked with marriage party and continued with ceremony sepasaran.</em><em> </em><em>Upacara marriage of Hindu have function (1) preserving Javanese tradition as a form of preservation of ancestral traditions that have been carried out for generations, (2) religious function (3) social function. The theological significance embodied in the Hindu marriage ceremony in Sidorejo Village is as early as entering the life of grhasta, the cleansing of the spirits of the ancestors, obtaining the suputra and surely embodying a happy family of birth and mind (sukinah).</em></p><p><em> </em></p>


2017 ◽  
pp. 126-138
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Zavaliy

The article «The gene of agricultural grain-growing civilization of the modern Ukrainian territory as a marker of religious beliefs» by О. Zavalii. The issue of the origins of the agricultural culture of the territory of modern Ukraine is considered in the article, based on the analysis of the leading foreign and domestic scientists’ research. The culture served as the source of religious beliefs based on the Natural worldview which was predetermined by the geographical living conditions.


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