scholarly journals Fragmentation and Information Access

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-53
Author(s):  
Adam Elgac ◽  
Agustín Rayo
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Information Access ◽  
Mental States ◽  
English Word ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Imperfect Recall ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Single Batch

Is there an English word that ends in ‘MT’? (If you are stumped, think about it for a moment and then read the last word of this abstract.) Before you figured out (or read) the answer to that question, did you possess the information that the word that is the answer is an English word that ends in ‘MT’? In a sense, yes: the word was in your vocabulary. But in another sense, no: perhaps you weren’t able to immediately answer the puzzle question. For finite agents, this phenomenon is unavoidable. We often possess a piece of information for some purposes (or with respect to some elicitation conditions) but not for other purposes (or conditions). This suggests that a mental state be represented not by a single batch of information, but rather by an ‘access table’—a function from purposes to batches of information. This representation makes clear what happens during certain ‘aha!’ moments in reasoning. It also allows us to model agents who exhibit imperfect recall, confusion, and mental fragmentation. And it sheds light on the difference between propositional knowledge and knowledge-how. The upshot is that representing mental states using access tables is more fruitful than one might have dreamt.

scholarly journals Durand of St.-Pourçain on Reflex Acts and State Consciousness

Vivarium ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-240
Author(s):  
Peter John Hartman
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Mental Power ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Conscious Mental State

Abstract Some of my mental states are conscious and some of them are not. Sometimes I am so focused on the wine in front of me that I am unaware that I am thinking about it. But sometimes, of course, I take a reflexive step back and become aware of my thinking about the wine in front of me. What marks the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious one? In this article, the author focuses on Durand of St.-Pourçain’s rejection of the higher-order theory of state consciousness, according to which a mental act is conscious when there is another, suitably related, mental (reflex) act that exists at the same time with it. Durand rejects such higher-order theories on the grounds that they violate the thesis that a given mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a given time. The author first goes over some of Durand’s general arguments for this thesis. He then turns to Durand’s application of the thesis to the issue of state consciousness and reflex acts. He closes by considering the objection that Durand’s same-order theory of state consciousness makes consciousness ubiquitous.

scholarly journals Comorbidity between depression and anxiety: assessing the role of bridge mental states in dynamic psychological networks

BMC Medicine ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin N. Groen ◽  
Oisín Ryan ◽  
Johanna T. W. Wigman ◽  
Harriëtte Riese ◽  
Brenda W. J. H. Penninx ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Symptom Clusters ◽  
Depression And Anxiety ◽  
Comorbid Depression ◽  
Vector Autoregressive ◽  
Credible Intervals ◽  
The Difference ◽  
First Time

Abstract Background Comorbidity between depressive and anxiety disorders is common. A hypothesis of the network perspective on psychopathology is that comorbidity arises due to the interplay of symptoms shared by both disorders, with overlapping symptoms acting as so-called bridges, funneling symptom activation between symptom clusters of each disorder. This study investigated this hypothesis by testing whether (i) two overlapping mental states “worrying” and “feeling irritated” functioned as bridges in dynamic mental state networks of individuals with both depression and anxiety as compared to individuals with either disorder alone, and (ii) overlapping or non-overlapping mental states functioned as stronger bridges. Methods Data come from the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA). A total of 143 participants met criteria for comorbid depression and anxiety (65%), 40 participants for depression-only (18.2%), and 37 for anxiety-only (16.8%) during any NESDA wave. Participants completed momentary assessments of symptoms (i.e., mental states) of depression and anxiety, five times a day, for 2 weeks (14,185 assessments). First, dynamics between mental states were modeled with a multilevel vector autoregressive model, using Bayesian estimation. Summed average lagged indirect effects through the hypothesized bridge mental states were compared between groups. Second, we evaluated the role of all mental states as potential bridge mental states. Results While the summed indirect effect for the bridge mental state “worrying” was larger in the comorbid group compared to the single disorder groups, differences between groups were not statistically significant. The difference between groups became more pronounced when only examining individuals with recent diagnoses (< 6 months). However, the credible intervals of the difference scores remained wide. In the second analysis, a non-overlapping item (“feeling down”) acted as the strongest bridge mental state in both the comorbid and anxiety-only groups. Conclusions This study empirically examined a prominent network-approach hypothesis for the first time using longitudinal data. No support was found for overlapping mental states “worrying” and “feeling irritable” functioning as bridge mental states in individuals vulnerable for comorbid depression and anxiety. Potentially, bridge mental state activity can only be observed during acute symptomatology. If so, these may present as interesting targets in treatment, but not prevention. This requires further investigation.

DISTINGUISHING THE INDISTINGUISHABLE OF THE WORDS INJURED, WOUNDED, AND HURT: A CORPUS INVESTIGATION

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Kusumawardani Dewa Ayu Novi
Keyword(s):  
English Word ◽  
Know How ◽  
Efl Students ◽  
The Difference

Most people, especially EFL students, claimed that English has rich vocabularies. Each vocabulary has many synonyms that could be found in thesaurus. But the problem is, those synonymous words can hardly be differentiated when applied in daily communication. It is because each of the English word has its own context and rule when it is used in a sentence or an utterance. However, in reality, this rule is often ignored by people. It is because they rely more on their intuition. Yet, it needs more than intuition to know the difference and how to use the words properly. The words ‘injured’, ‘wounded’, and ‘hurt’ were chosen as the object of this study, since those words are synonymous and distinguishable. A quick survey had been done by the researcher to know how EFL students and people in general used these three words. It turned out that they used those three words by ignoring the rule and depending on their intuition instead. The aim of this research is to help people to know the difference among those three words. By retrieving data from COCA and finding the collocation of those words, it is hoped that the reader will realize that these synonymous words are not as synonymous as they thought.

L'anglicisme dans la langue française

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 00013
Author(s):  
Danny Susanto
Keyword(s):  
English Language ◽  
Oil Industry ◽  
English Word ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Font Size ◽  
The World ◽  
French Speaking ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Bibliographic Study

<p class="Abstract">The purpose of this study is to analyze the phenomenon known as&nbsp;<span style="font-size: 1rem;">“anglicism”: a loan made to the English language by another language.&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">Anglicism arose either from the adoption of an English word as a&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">result of a translation defect despite the existence of an equivalent&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">term in the language of the speaker, or from a wrong translation, as a&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">word-by-word translation. Said phenomenon is very common&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">nowadays and most languages of the world including making use of&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">some linguistic concepts such as anglicism, neologism, syntax,&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">morphology etc, this article addresses various aspects related to&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">Anglicisms in French through a bibliographic study: the definition of&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">Anglicism, the origin of Anglicisms in French and the current situation,&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">the areas most affected by Anglicism, the different categories of&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">Anglicism, the difference between French Anglicism in France and&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">French-speaking Canada, the attitude of French-speaking society&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">towards to the Anglicisms and their efforts to stop this phenomenon.&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">The study shows that the areas affected are, among others, trade,&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">travel, parliamentary and judicial institutions, sports, rail, industrial&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">production and most recently film, industrial production, sport, oil industry, information technology,&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">science and technology. Various initiatives have been implemented either by public institutions or by&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">individuals who share concerns about the increasingly felt threat of the omnipresence of Anglicism in&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 1rem;">everyday life.</span></p>

Stable neural representations of mental states across target people and stimulus modalities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
The Self ◽  
Similarity Analysis ◽  
Multiple Modalities ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
Conceptual Core ◽  
Stimulus Modalities ◽  
Huge Variety

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers are able to accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person’s? Is reading about someone’s anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain regions associated with social cognition expressed stable neural representations of mental states across both targets and modalities. This suggests that people use stable models of mental states across different people and contexts.

Mental state dynamics explain the origin of mental state concepts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Milena Rmus ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Artificial Neural Network ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social World ◽  
The Social ◽  
Artificial Neural ◽  
Ebb And Flow

People’s thoughts and feelings ebb and flow in predictable ways: surprise arises quickly, anticipation ramps up slowly, regret follows anger, love begets happiness, and so forth. Predicting these transitions between mental states can help people successfully navigate the social world. We hypothesize that the goal of predicting state dynamics shapes people’ mental state concepts. Across seven studies, when people observed more frequent transitions between a pair of novel mental states, they judged those states to be more conceptually similar to each other. In an eighth study, an artificial neural network trained to predict real human mental state dynamics spontaneously learned the same conceptual dimensions that people use to understand these states: the 3d Mind Model. Together these results suggest that mental state dynamics explain the origins of mental state concepts.

People represent their own mental states more distinctly than others’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Distance ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Behavioral Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
External Cues

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.

Dehumanization and Mentalizing Animals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Phenomenal States

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.

Theology and the Knowledge of Persons

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Knowledge Of Persons

This chapter is concerned with the question of the difference between philosophy and theology. It rejects certain prevalent ways of thinking about this difference. It argues that a more promising way of thinking about these disciplines is to be found in their names: “philosophy” in its etymology means something like the love of wisdom; “theology” in its etymology means something like the word with regard to God. God, unlike wisdom, is not an abstract universal. Rather, and by virtue of being characterized by mind and will, God is more nearly a person. The chapter spells out the implications of this difference, arguing that the knowledge at issue when we do theology is irreducible to propositional knowledge. Rather, it is a knowledge of persons. The chapter illuminates the role of the knowledge of persons in theological discussion and draws some conclusions about the methodology which will be useful to theology.

scholarly journals Propositionalism and Questions that do not have Correct Answers

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Felappi
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Do So

AbstractAs the label suggests, according to propositionalism, each intentional mental state, attitude or event is or involves a relation to a proposition. In this paper, I will discuss a case that seems prima facie not to be accountable for by propositionalism. After having presented the case, I will show why it is different from others that have been discussed in the literature as able to show that propositionalism cannot be correct. I will then consider what the propositionalist can say to fix the problem and I will show that no strategy that is genuinely propositionalist seems promising. I will not conclude that propositionalism is doomed. But I will show that if propositionalism can account for our case at all, it can only do so by losing its main appeal, i.e. its elegance and simplicity. But then propositionalism seems to have lost its advantage with respect to its obvious alternative, i.e. a pluralist account according to which mental states, attitudes and events are not all homogeneously relations to propositions, but rather our mental life should be accounted for in terms of a plurality of kinds of relata.

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