Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8

This volume presents contributions from scholars spread across three continents and domiciled in twelve different countries, whose common interest is evidence theory as related to law. Evidence theory as related to law stayed mostly dormant until the advent of the “New Evidence Scholarship” in the mid-eighties of the twentieth century. The publication of William Twining’s book, Theories of Evidence: Bentham & Wigmore in 1985 and the 1986 Boston University Law Review Evidence Symposium volume have changed things around. These publications have irreversibly changed the direction of the study of evidence by shifting evidence scholars’ focus from rules to reasons. The shift from rules to reasons was transformative along two dimensions: interdisciplinarity and internationalization. The realization that reasons moving the factfinding process forward are antecedent to, and consequently more important than, evidentiary rules has opened up new paths of inquiry that connected adjudicative factfinding to epistemology, mathematics, economics, psychology, sociology, political morality, and linguistics, and led to further and richer explorations of how theories of probability and induction affect the understanding and reform of the law of evidence. The primacy of reasons has also created a sizable common ground for theorizing for evidence scholars from different countries. With a focus on reasons rather than rules, the differences between factfinding in the more regulated Anglo-American systems vis-à-vis the freer European systems—once understood as dramatic—became less important. The Introduction to the volume presents its chapters and highlights the major philosophical and interdisciplinary insights discussed in it.

Author(s):  
Christian Dahlman ◽  
Alex Stein ◽  
Giovanni Tuzet

Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law presents a cross-disciplinary overview of the core issues in the theory and methodology of adjudicative evidence and factfinding, assembling the major philosophical and interdisciplinary insights that define evidence theory, as related to law, in a single book. The volume presents contemporary debates on truth, knowledge, rational beliefs, proof, argumentation, explanation, coherence, probability, economics, psychology, bias, gender, and race. It covers different theoretical approaches to legal evidence, including the Bayesian approach, scenario theory, and inference to the best explanation. The volume’s contributions come from scholars spread across three continents and twelve different countries, whose common interest is evidence theory as related to law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-317
Author(s):  
Vladimir Feshchenko

The article analyzes one of the forms of nomadism in the intellectual world, which is called cultural transfers. One of the directions in the study of cultural transfers is the migration of concepts and notions between scientific knowledge (in this case linguistic) and literary experience (mainly experimental). The article is devoted to one of such migration trajectory from the perspective of interdiscourse methodology. We discuss the works of one of the agents of cultural transfer in the field of linguistics – R. Jakobson. The task of the article is to draw a trajectory according to which the linguistic concepts of Jakobson intertwine with parallel processes in literary (mainly poetic) experiments. The analysis concludes that precisely in connection with close contexts and transfers between poetry and linguistics, the Russian science of language represented by Jakobson develops a view of literature as a special language and a special communicative system. This trend is not typical for the Anglo-American linguistic tradition of the twentieth century, the quintessence of which in the middle of the century was represented in the theories of N. Chomsky and his circle.


Author(s):  
Robert Stern ◽  
Nicholas Walker

As an intellectual tradition, the history of Hegelianism is the history of the reception and influence of the thought of G.W.F. Hegel. This tradition is notoriously complex and many-sided, because while some Hegelians have seen themselves as merely defending and developing his ideas along what they took to be orthodox lines, others have sought to ‘reform’ his system, or to appropriate individual aspects and overturn others, or to offer consciously revisionary readings of his work. This makes it very hard to identify any body of doctrine common to members of this tradition, and a wide range of divergent philosophical views can be found among those who (despite this) can none the less claim to be Hegelians. There are both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reasons for this: on one hand, Hegel’s position itself brings together many different tendencies (idealism and objectivism, historicism and absolutism, rationalism and empiricism, Christianity and humanism, classicism and modernism, a liberal view of civil society with an organicist view of the state); any balance between them is hermeneutically very unstable, enabling existing readings to be challenged and old orthodoxies to be overturned. On the other hand, the critical response to Hegel’s thought and the many attempts to undermine it have meant that Hegelians have continually needed to reconstruct his ideas and even to turn Hegel against himself, while each new intellectual development, such as Marxism, pragmatism, phenomenology or existential philosophy, has brought about some reassessment of his position. This feature of the Hegelian tradition has been heightened by the fact that Hegel’s work has had an impact at different times over a long period and in a wide range of countries, so that divergent intellectual, social and historical pressures have influenced its distinct appropriations. At the hermeneutic level, these appropriations have contributed greatly to keeping the philosophical understanding of Hegel alive and open-ended, so that our present-day conception of his thought cannot properly be separated from them. Moreover, because questions of Hegel interpretation have so often revolved around the main philosophical, political and religious issues of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hegelianism has also had a significant impact on the development of modern Western thought in its own right. As a result of its complex evolution, Hegelianism is best understood historically, by showing how the changing representation of Hegel’s ideas have come about, shaped by the different critical concerns, sociopolitical conditions and intellectual movements that dominated his reception in different countries at different times. Initially, Hegel’s influence was naturally most strongly felt in Germany as a comprehensive, integrative philosophy that seemed to do justice to all realms of experience and promised to preserve the Christian heritage in a modern and progressive form within a speculative framework. However, this position was quickly challenged, both from other philosophical standpoints (such as F.W.J. Schelling’s ‘positive philosophy’ and F.A. Trendelenburg’s neo-Aristotelian empiricism), and by the celebrated generation of younger thinkers (the so-called ‘Young’ or ‘Left’ Hegelians, such as Ludwig Feuerbach, David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Arnold Ruge and the early Karl Marx), who insisted that to discover what made Hegel a truly significant thinker (his dialectical method, his view of alienation, his ‘sublation’ of Christianity), this orthodoxy must be overturned. None the less, both among these radicals and in academic circles, Hegel’s influence was considerably weakened in Germany by the 1860s and 1870s, while by this time developments in Hegelian thought had begun to take place elsewhere. Hegel’s work was known outside Germany from the 1820s onwards, and Hegelian schools developed in northern Europe, Italy, France, Eastern Europe, America and (somewhat later) Britain, each with their own distinctive line of interpretation, but all fairly uncritical in their attempts to assimilate his ideas. However, in each of these countries challenges to the Hegelian position were quick to arise, partly because the influence of Hegel’s German critics soon spread abroad, and partly because of the growing impact of other philosophical positions (such as Neo-Kantianism, materialism and pragmatism). Nevertheless, Hegelianism outside Germany proved more durable in the face of these attacks, as new readings and approaches emerged to counter them, and ways were found to reinterpret Hegel’s work to show that it could accommodate these other positions, once the earlier accounts of Hegel’s metaphysics, political philosophy and philosophy of religion (in particular) were rejected as too crude. This pattern has continued into the twentieth century, as many of the movements that began by defining themselves against Hegel (such as Neo-Kantianism, Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, post-structuralism and even ‘analytic’ philosophy) have then come to find unexpected common ground, giving a new impetus and depth to Hegelianism as it began to be assimilated within and influenced by these diverse approaches. Such efforts at rapprochement began in the early part of the century with Wilhelm Dilthey’s attempt to link Hegel with his own historicism, and although they were more ambivalent, this connection was reinforced in Italy by Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile. The realignment continued in France in the 1930s, as Jean Wahl brought out the more existentialist themes in Hegel’s thought, followed in the 1940s by Alexander Kojève’s influential Marxist readings. Hegelianism has also had an impact on Western Marxism through the writings of the Hungarian Georg Lukács, and this influence has continued in the critical reinterpretations offered by members of the Frankfurt School, particularly Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas and others. More recently, most of the major schools of philosophical thought (from French post-structuralism to Anglo-American ‘analytic’ philosophy) have emphasized the need to take account of Hegel, and as a result Hegelian thought (both exegetical and constructive) is continually finding new directions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (04) ◽  
pp. 691-720 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIANBING MA ◽  
WEIRU LIU ◽  
DIDIER DUBOIS ◽  
HENRI PRADE

Belief revision characterizes the process of revising an agent's beliefs when receiving new evidence. In the field of artificial intelligence, revision strategies have been extensively studied in the context of logic-based formalisms and probability kinematics. However, so far there is not much literature on this topic in evidence theory. In contrast, combination rules proposed so far in the theory of evidence, especially Dempster rule, are symmetric. They rely on a basic assumption, that is, pieces of evidence being combined are considered to be on a par, i.e. play the same role. When one source of evidence is less reliable than another, it is possible to discount it and then a symmetric combination operation is still used. In the case of revision, the idea is to let prior knowledge of an agent be altered by some input information. The change problem is thus intrinsically asymmetric. Assuming the input information is reliable, it should be retained whilst the prior information should be changed minimally to that effect. To deal with this issue, this paper defines the notion of revision for the theory of evidence in such a way as to bring together probabilistic and logical views. Several revision rules previously proposed are reviewed and we advocate one of them as better corresponding to the idea of revision. It is extended to cope with inconsistency between prior and input information. It reduces to Dempster rule of combination, just like revision in the sense of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM) reduces to expansion, when the input is strongly consistent with the prior belief function. Properties of this revision rule are also investigated and it is shown to generalize Jeffrey's rule of updating, Dempster rule of conditioning and a form of AGM revision.


1989 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray S. Anderson

The culture split between science and theology by which theology tends to abandon the concrete observable world to science, while science tends to dismiss questions of ontology (God), is presented as a framework within which to examine the preceding articles in this issue. The inadequacy of attempting to bridge this dichotomy by constructing a synthesis between psychology and theology on the common ground of religious experience is shown. An alternative approach to theology as having its focus on the interaction between the human self, others and God is presented, suggesting that a convergence between theology and psychology can be found in their common interest in the nature of the human self as being-in-becoming. This convergence is examined as an isomorphic structure where, despite different “ancestry,” theology and psychology attempt to explain and give meaning to human experience as grounded in being (ontology), experienced in a knowing way (epistemology), and open to change by the reality of transcendent being which moves the self toward goals which offer healing and hope (teleology).


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-91
Author(s):  
A. Malthuf Siroj

Islamic law has two dimensions at once, namely universality and locality. In contemporary Islamic legal thought, there are two trends that contain mutual attraction between the two to bring dimension of locality to the dimension of universality on one side, and vice versa on the other side. As a consequence, there will be two possibilities, absoluteness or relativization of Islamic law. The legal discourse increasingly gains its own intensity in recently in line with the development of science and the use of various approaches in the study of Islamic law. Islamic law that is universally used is called syari`ah. This syariah law is rules of Allah SWT that is produced from texts with qath’î quality either from the side of the existency or the meanings without human beings rasional (ra’y) intervention because those texts are not the object of Ijtihad. Meanwhile, local Islamic Law is called fiqh. It is the law which is produced from texts with zhannî quality and becomes an object of Ijtihad. Because Fiqh is the result of Ijtihad so that it is usual when there are many madzhabs on it. Therefore, this paper will put this issue in proportion to find common ground between the two trends of contemporary Islamic legal thought. So that, it will hopefully clear up us the limits of universality and locality dimension of Islamic law, a focus of this legal discourse.


Author(s):  
Hisham G. Abusaada

This article examines the common fate of the three concepts that interprets the sameness of cities. It begins with a concise exploration of “personality”, “identity” and “character” in terms of the dual singularity—difference and similarity—of cities. Whatever, there is still a significant overlap between the meaning of identity and character, which threatens to weaken both concepts. This research addresses two aspects. The first is the dimensions of the common ground between personality, identity, and character. The second explores these two dimensions in the conventional and the contemporary prospects concepts in the Western paradigms to create the cities of tomorrow for offering the toolkit of singularity. The main conclusion highlights the question is: What should be examined to produce cities that are not alike in the future? Ultimately, there is scope to further strengthen singularity- based planning and design approaches through a toolkit help specialists to dominate the sameness of cities.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document