Introduction
A key aspect of the colonial state was a geo-political dualism of space in which settlers occupied the rich agricultural plain and urban centres while Algerian peasants inhabited the communes mixtes, the forests and mountains of the interior. After the First World War the caids, the traditional élites that governed the peasants through indirect rule and patron-client relations, entered a crisis of legitimacy and were challenged by communist and nationalist movements. Marxists and historians have tended to perceive the peasants as lacking in political consciousness, incapable of organized resistance, but a new social history, by restoring agency to the lowest strata of the colonized, demonstrates that they assumed a key role in the long-term move towards insurrection. Contrary to the conventional interpretation of rural revolution as a movement initiated by a vanguard party of urban militants, the nationalists adapted to, and built upon, the traditional social and political structures of the peasant community, including the village assemblies. The colonial state largely failed in its attempts to cut the root cause of rebellion through economic modernization of the peasant economy. After 1956 the French launched Opération Pilote, a massive counterinsurgent experiment that deployed anthropology and psychological warfare, but signally failed to contain an insurrection that was embedded within the family, kin, and associational structures of rural society.