The Constitution of Mental Content in the imaginatio

Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

This chapter addresses Spinoza’s concept of the imagination. It first shows that, given the usage of the term imaginatio in the Ethics, Spinoza’s understanding departs from tradition by comprising both perceptions and fantasies under one single concept. Consistently, Spinoza’s treatment of the process referred to as imaginari accounts for both the realist underpinning of any cognition and the tendency of human thought to represent the external world in a distorted manner. Finally, it is argued that Spinoza’s views on the imagination are such as to enable cultural, historical, or—more generally—semantic influences to play a considerable role in the determination of our actual mental content. In sum, the chapter shows how Spinoza’s treatment of the cognitive processing of imaginative ideas contributes to making his realist rationalism a plausible option as it allows for genetic reconstructions of mental contents in great detail.

2018 ◽  
pp. 51-86
Author(s):  
Walter Glannon

This chapter examines major psychiatric disorders as disorders of consciousness, memory, and will. All of these disorders involve disturbances in how the brain processes and integrates information about the body and external world. Distorted mental content in these psychopathologies impairs the capacity to consider different action plans, and to form and execute particular plans in particular actions. Dysfunctional mental states correlating with dysfunctional neural states impair the capacity for flexible behavior and adaptability to the environment. This dysfunction also impairs the capacity for insight into a psychiatric disorder and understanding the need for and motivation to seek treatment.


Dialogue ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-566
Author(s):  
Irene Sonia Switankowsky

Many theorists in epistemology and mind accept externalism with respect to content–namely, the claim that the conditions that individuate mental content are external to the occurrence of that content as a mental fact. Whatever it is that distinguishes a pain in the knee from a pain in the toe—or, alternatively, whatever it is that makes it possible for the subject to discriminate this pain as a pain in the knee from that pain as a pain in the toe—are factors and conditions located in the physical and external world. This much externalism seems to be required even if one is a thoroughly entrenched mentalist. This “content externalism” is captured, fairly effectively, by the more traditional distinction between concepts and percepts. What is then asserted by the mentalist is that concepts have their source or origin in the external world, but the perceptual content does not. Perceptual content can be identified in different ways which are: (1) the view that identifies the distinguishing feature of the perceptual with qualia, a position not far removed from the Lockean distinction between Primary and Secondary qualities; or, (2) the perceptual might also be characterized in terms of representationalism, where qualia are an essential part of the representational medium, but where the representational medium contains conceptual content as well. In either case, the perceptual is Type and/or Token distinct from whatever is the external physical conditions or states of affairs causally responsible for the occurrence of either the conceptual content or the perceptual content. An argument for the claim that percepts (colours, sounds, smells, touches, and so on) are essential and necessary is that, without such percepts, there can be no experience.


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini

Almost no one cites Sellars, while reinventing his wheels with gratifying regularity. (Dennett 1987, 349)In philosophy of mind, there is functionalism about mental states and functionalism about mental contents. The former — mental State functionalism — says that mentalstatesare individuated by their functional relations with mental inputs, Outputs, and other mental states. The latter — usually called functional or conceptual or inferential role semantics — says that mentalcontentsare constituted by their functional relations with mental inputs, Outputs, and other mental contents (and in some versions of the theory, with things in the environment). If we add to mental State functionalism the popular view that mental states have their content essentially, then mental state functionalism may be seen as a form of functional role semantics and a solution to theproblem of mental content,namely, the problem of giving a naturalistic explanation of mental content. According to this solution, the functional relations that constitute contents are physically realized — in a metaphysically unmysterious way — by the functional relations between mental inputs, outputs, and the mental states bearing those contents.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-39
Author(s):  
Murat Kaş

The structure of human cognition and the means of apprehension is suitable only for partly and gradually conceiving reality. This limitation has led to a certain distance between appearance and reality. This means that there will always be a gap between the judgments of the mind about the external world and its contents, which are entities, cases, facts, and states. This partiality and partiteness of human understanding has produced the truth-maker problem with regard to mind judgments. Muslim scholars who admit the correlation between the structure of reality and the categories of the mind but reject the notion of the construction and the determination of reality by the mind refer to the realm that is independent of the mind’s personal judgments as nafs al-amr. This realm is concerned with the all degrees of reality, namely—from the existent to the non-existent, from the necessity to the contingency and impossibility, from the absolute to the relative, from the material to the non-physical, from the external to the mental, and from the real entities to the abstracted ones—which step into the shot of human cognition or not. Carrying the concept of nafs al-amr from the logical plane to the metaphysical realm that intersects epistemology and ontology has led to debates that pave the way for various treatments. In particular, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 672/1274) nafs al-amr epistle that posited it to the cosmic sphere resulted in criticisms of this conception of nafs al-amr, and these criticisms are the same ones directed to the Avicennian theory of emanation and its epistemological implications. Scholars who use this concept free from any metaphysical presumption and implication argue against his leap from the logical to the cosmic sphere. During the following period, this tension occasioned debates that led to the approaches that refer to the various degrees of reality, i.e., to the cosmic spheres, the spiritual realms, and the divine realms. This work aims to create a map of treatments, arguments and problems with regard to the concept of nafs al-amr.


Author(s):  
Aidan Moran ◽  
John Toner

We are constantly bombarded by information. Therefore, during every waking moment of our lives, we face decisions about which stimuli to prioritize and which ones to ignore. To complicate matters, the information that clamors for our attention includes not only events that occur in the world around us but also experiences that originate in the subjective domain of our own thoughts and feelings. The end result is that our minds can consciously attend to only a fraction of the rich kaleidoscope of information and experiences available to us from our senses, thoughts, memories, and imagination. Attentional processes such as “concentration,” or the ability to focus on the task at hand while ignoring distractions, are crucial for success in sport and other domains of skilled performance. To illustrate, Venus Williams, one of the greatest tennis players of all time, proclaimed that “for the players it is complete and pure focus. You don’t see anything or hear anything except the ball and what’s going on in your head.” For psychological scientists, concentration resembles a mental spotlight (like the head-mounted torch that miners and divers wear in dark environments) that illuminates targets located either in the external world around us or in the internal world of our subjective experiences. A major advantage of this spotlight metaphor is that it shows us that concentration is never “lost”—although it can be diverted to targets (whether in the external world or inside our heads) that are irrelevant to the task at hand. Research on attentional processes in sport and performance has been conducted in cognitive psychology (the study of how the mind works), cognitive sport psychology (the study of mental processes in athletes), and cognitive neuroscience (the study of how brain systems give rise to mental processes). From this research, advances have been made both in measuring attentional processes and in understanding their significance in sport and performance settings. For example, pupillometry, or the study of changes in pupil diameter as a function of cognitive processing, has been used as an objective index of attentional effort among skilled performers such as musicians and equestrian athletes. Next, research suggests that a heightened state of concentration (i.e., total absorption in the task at hand) is crucial to the genesis of “flow” states (i.e., rare and elusive moments when everything seems to come together for the performer) and optimal performance in athletes. More recently, studies have shown that brief mindfulness intervention programs, where people are trained to attend non-judgmentally to their own thoughts, feelings, and sensations, offer promise in the quest to enhance attentional skills in elite athletes. By contrast, anxiety has been shown to divert skilled performers’ attention to task-irrelevant information—sometimes triggering “choking” behavior or the sudden and significant deterioration of skilled performance. Finally, concentration strategies such as “trigger words” (i.e., the use of short, vivid, and positively phrased verbal reminders such as “this ball now”) are known to improve athletes’ ability to focus on a specific target or to execute skilled actions successfully.


Author(s):  
Jennifer Rose Carr

On an attractive, naturalistically respectable theory of intentionality, mental contents are a form of measurement system for representing behavioral and psychological dispositions. This chapter argues that a consequence of this view is that the content/attitude distinction is measurement system relative. As a result, there is substantial arbitrariness in the content/attitude distinction. Whether some measurement of mental states counts as characterizing the content of mental states or the attitude is not a question of empirical discovery but of theoretical utility. If correct, this observation has ramifications in the theory of rationality. Some epistemologists and decision theorists have argued that imprecise credences are rationally impermissible, while others have argued that precise credences are rationally impermissible. If the measure theory of mental content is correct, however, then neither imprecise credences nor precise credences can be rationally impermissible.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-41
Author(s):  
Chiu Yui Plato Tse

AbstractThe relation between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism awaits more careful determination, i. e. whether the issue of their compatibility hinges on their ontological view on the relation between physical and mental phenomena (i. e. whether it is supervenience or emergence) or on their epistemological view on our access to mental content. The aim of this paper is to identify a tension between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism, which lies not in their ontological view on the nature of substances, but in their epistemological view on the relation between self-awareness and the first-personal access to mental content. I will first trace the (mis)understanding of transcendental idealism as Berkeleyan idealism to a misinterpretation of the self-knowledge premise in transcendental arguments. I will argue that transcendental idealism is not so much concerned with grounding reality of the external world as with establishing the agential nature of the first-personal perspective of experience, and it has an important implication on the meaning and function of self-awareness in transcendental idealism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 64-69
Author(s):  
F.B. Narzikulova

The article provides definitions of the concept of image, the nature of image from the point of view of scientific, historical and theoretical analysis, which are most often found in scientific literature. The article examines the nature of image as an element of culture in the philosophy of ancient thinkers such as Ibn Sina, al-Farabi, Confucius, their views, ideas, and views. The scientific study of the spiritual world and the thought process of the great people of the past who made a great contribution to the development of civilization plays an important role in fostering a sense of pride in future generations. The works of outstanding minds reflect the achievements of human thought of a certain historical period, the way of life of a large group of people of a particular time. There is an assumption that the term "image" comes from the English language. It conveys at least five meanings-image, statue-idol, metaphor, icon, similarity. But, given the fact that this term existed in ancient times, it is impossible to say with certainty that "image" is derived from French or English, most likely, it is borrowed, as shown by the transformation over time of its content and almost simultaneously later appearance in both these languages.


Author(s):  
Ulisses Tadeu Vaz De Oliveira

Literature has been especially important in the construction of human thought and development. From this perspective, ideology, as a contextual dimension of a higher order, gets into the literary text and, at the same time, becomes shaped by the genius of authors throughout the centuries. Therefore, when we face ideological social dilemmas, such as the emergence, change, perpetuation and consequences of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination on disability in our society, it is natural to question the role of the literature in the formation of foundational ideological paradigms. This article intends to marry a literary analysis with the functional linguistic approach of Appraisal –dealing with the semantics of evaluation– in order to present an initial set of ideas of our literary tradition in Galician-Portuguese medieval songs. Research goals include: the identification of (mis)representations of disability in the corpus; the detection of ideology(ies) scaffolding prejudicial representations; and the determination of the role of Galician Portuguese songs in consolidating or strengthening this type of prejudice. Results revealed this body of art presenting a misrepresentation of disabled people that, ultimately, composed a corollary of ideological heritage that have influenced the Iberian and Western literary tradition until the present time.


1966 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 93-97
Author(s):  
Richard Woolley

It is now possible to determine proper motions of high-velocity objects in such a way as to obtain with some accuracy the velocity vector relevant to the Sun. If a potential field of the Galaxy is assumed, one can compute an actual orbit. A determination of the velocity of the globular clusterωCentauri has recently been completed at Greenwich, and it is found that the orbit is strongly retrograde in the Galaxy. Similar calculations may be made, though with less certainty, in the case of RR Lyrae variable stars.


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