Schopenhauer

2020 ◽  
pp. 214-219
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Right ◽  
Universal Law

According to Schopenhauer, Kant is right on two points: (1) Morality is to be separated from self-interest. (2) The categorical imperative states a universal law for all rational agents. But Kant is wrong to believe that his second point supports the first. The only purely rational aspect of morality is a demand for consistency that is compatible with any content whatever. We understand morality only when we see that it rests on compassion for others, which moves us to care about the welfare and suffering of others for their own sake. The right moral outlook requires us to overcome two errors about the reality of other people: (1) Egoism rests on failure to recognize that other people are just as real as I am. (2) Compassion requires us to see that there is no real distinction between myself and other people.

Kant and Some Critics

2020 ◽  
pp. 188-213
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Mutual Respect ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Moral Rightness ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Universal Law

Kant argues that an understanding of the relation between morality and rational agency reveals the nature of moral rightness. Moral principles give us reasons for acting apart from our feeling or preferences. They give us reasons that apply to all rational agents alike. Principles that embody such reasons conform to a categorical imperative that states a universal law for all rational agents. Against critics who contend that this universal law is too general to tell us anything useful about right and wrong, Kant argues that it requires us to treat rational agents as ends in themselves, not to be sacrificed simply for the sake of other people’s goals. This attitude of mutual respect among rational agents is the basis for a moral and social order that realizes human freedom.

The Practical Significance of Kant’s Categorical Imperative

2021 ◽  
pp. 177-198
Author(s):  
Carla Bagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Standard Interpretation ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Right ◽  
Universal Law

On a standard interpretation, the aim of the formula of universal law is to provide a decision procedure for determining the deontic status of actions. By contrast, this chapter argues for the practical significance of the Categorical Imperative (CI) centering on Kant’s account of the dynamics of incentives. This approach avoids some widespread misconceptions about how the CI operates and false expectations about what it promises and delivers. In particular, it explains how it differs from deductive practical inferences. The CI is the supreme form of morality, and yet not in the sense that particular categorical principles can be derived deductively from it, once the relevant details are supplied. The efficacy of practical reasoning primarily concerns agents and consists in their reorientation toward the right end. Moral knowledge is knowledge about what we ought to do, but it is also a distinctive variety of self-knowledge, that is, knowledge of ourselves as rationally efficacious agents.

Hegel

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-225
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Rational Agent ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Right

Hegel believes that we can grasp the character of morality by reflexion on different aspects of the rational will. In willing we will a particular goal, but we also will it as our own goal, as the goal of a rational agent who has other ends. As rational agents we apply critical standards to the goals that we will. Kant is right to argue that morality includes these critical standards, but (as Schopenhauer argues) he is wrong to suppose that the critical standards alone give us the true content of morality. We find the correct morality in so far as we find the goals that meet the right critical standards; these are the goals that fully realize the nature of the rational agent. If we find these goals, we overcome (contrary to Schopenhauer) any opposition between self-interest and morality.

PENERAPAN PERSEPSI ORANGTUA DALAM MEMENUHI HAK PARTISIPASI ANAK USIA 9-12 TAHUN DI DESA BENA AMANUBAN SELATAN NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-138
Author(s):  
Lodiana Nitti ◽  
Friandry Windisany Thoomaszen
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Research Methods ◽  
Growth And Development ◽  
Data Retrieval ◽  
Qualitative Research Methods ◽  
Parental Perception ◽  
The Third ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Participation Rights ◽  
The Right

ABSTRACT Parental perception will affect the fulfillment of children’s participation rights. Fullfilment of children’s participation rights will be fulfilled optimally if parents pay anttention to opinions while providing opportunities for children to make and make decisions about the child’s goals and self-interest. The subjects studied consisted of 5 subjects consisting of father and mother who had children aged 9- 12 years. This study uses qualitative research methods, with data retrieval tools in teh form of interviews, observation and documentation. From the research found data were the subjects do not fulfill the right of participation of children up to the maximum ladder where children’s participation rights range from the first ladder to the third ladder. The first ladder to the third ladder is actually a non- participating ladder. This means that children is manipulated, dominated by parents, there is direct communation and the severity of the parent. The children felt disappointed, sad, and angry with the parents but they still tried to hear and obey the parent’s decision. Children from third and fourth subjects experienced excessive fear to speak to their parent (father). Suggestions for parents to be more caring and fulfill the rights of children’s participation so as not to affect the growth and development of children. Keywords: participation rights, children, parents

Defending Virtuous Motivation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Behavior ◽  
Situational Factors ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Moral Hypocrisy ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Mood Effects ◽  
The Right

This chapter considers remaining empirical challenges to the idea that we’re commonly motivated to do what’s right for the right reasons. Two key factors threaten to defeat claims to virtuous motivation, self-interest (egoism) and arbitrary situational factors (situationism). Both threats aim to identify defective influences on moral behavior that reveal us to be commonly motivated by the wrong reasons. However, there are limits to such wide-ranging skeptical arguments. Ultimately, like debunking arguments, defeater challenges succumb to a Defeater’s Dilemma: one can identify influences on many of our morally relevant behaviors that are either substantial or arbitrary, but not both. The science suggests a familiar trade-off in which substantial influences on many morally relevant actions are rarely defective. Arriving at this conclusion requires carefully scrutinizing a range of studies, including those on framing effects, dishonesty, implicit bias, mood effects, and moral hypocrisy (vs. integrity).

Beyond Self-Interest

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Helping Behavior ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Christian Love ◽  
The Right ◽  
Conceptual Difficulties

This chapter introduces the long-standing idea that inappropriate motives, such as self-interest, can militate against virtuous motivation (acting for the right reasons). Some theorists have tried to show that we are universally egoistic by appeal to empirical research, particularly evolutionary theory, moral development, and the neuroscience of learning. However, these efforts fail and instead decades of experiments on helping behavior provide powerful evidence that we are capable of genuine altruism. We can be motivated ultimately by a concern for others for their own sake, especially when empathizing with them. The evidence does not show that empathy blurs the distinction between self and other in a way that makes helping behavior truly egoistic or non-altruistic. Whether grounded in Christian love (agape) or the Buddhist notion of no-self (anātman), such self-other merging proposals run into empirical and conceptual difficulties.

scholarly journals Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?

2006 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Cox ◽  
Stephen C. Hayne
Keyword(s):  
Small Groups ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
The Right

scholarly journals Multidimensional Poverty Measurement in Pakistan :Time Series Trends and Breakdown

2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (4II) ◽  
pp. 493-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taseer Salahuddin ◽  
Asad Zaman
Keyword(s):  
Time Series ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Caloric Intake ◽  
Multidimensional Poverty ◽  
Poverty Measurement ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Multidimensional Poverty Measurement ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Right

In the recent literature, consensus has emerged that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon; see Alkire and Santos (2010) for a review of the major arguments. Nonetheless, the most widely used measures of poverty remain unidimensional, being based on income or caloric intake cutoffs. The logic for the use of income based measures was that it was only lack of income which led to deprivation—with sufficient income; rational agents would automatically eliminate deprivations in all dimensions in the right sequence of priorities. However, careful studies like Thorbecke (2005) and Banerjee and Duflo (2006) show that this does not happen. Even while malnourished and underfed, the poor spend significant portions of their budgets on festivals, weddings, alcohol, tobacco and other non-essential items. The move from abstract theoretical speculation based on mathematical models of human behaviour to experiments and observations of actual behaviour has led to dramatic changes in the understanding of poverty and how to alleviate it. Some of these insights are encapsulated in a new approach to poverty advocated by Banerjee and Duflo (2011).

scholarly journals Doing good vs. avoiding bad in prosocial choice: A refined test and extension of the morality preference hypothesis

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben M Tappin ◽  
Valerio Capraro
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Judgment And Decision Making ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Right ◽  
Human Social Life

Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions (such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Game experiments) is not driven by outcome-based social preferences – as classically assumed – but by a generalized morality preference for “doing the right thing”. Here we argue that the key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018) comprise prominent methodological confounds and open questions that bear on influential psychological theory. Specifically, their design confounds: (i) preferences for efficiency with self-interest; and (ii) preferences for action with preferences for morality. Furthermore, their design fails to dissociate the preference to do “good” from the preference to avoid doing “bad”. We thus designed and conducted a preregistered, refined and extended test of the morality preference hypothesis (N=801). Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that prosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for doing the morally right thing. Inconsistent with influential psychological theory, however, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was as potent as the preference to avoid doing “bad” in this case.

scholarly journals VICES OF CONSENT CONCERNING THE CIVIL LEGAL ACT

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-111
Author(s):  
Roxana Denisa Vidican ◽  
Ionel DIDEA ◽  
Diana Maria ILIE
Keyword(s):  
The Real ◽  
Legal Relationship ◽  
The Will ◽  
Legal Equality ◽  
The Right ◽  
Universal Law

"The right is the totality of the conditions under which the will of each can coexist with the will of all, according to a universal law of freedom".Immanuel Kant.The requirement that the expression of will to be uncorrupted is a legal necessity, but also a guarantee of compliance with the principle of freedom of civil legal acts, the real principle of will and the principle of law which enshrines the legal equality of the parties to civil legal relationship since the legal civil act must be the consequence of a volitional attitude, free and conscious expressed

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