Defending Virtuous Motivation

Author(s):  
Joshua May

This chapter considers remaining empirical challenges to the idea that we’re commonly motivated to do what’s right for the right reasons. Two key factors threaten to defeat claims to virtuous motivation, self-interest (egoism) and arbitrary situational factors (situationism). Both threats aim to identify defective influences on moral behavior that reveal us to be commonly motivated by the wrong reasons. However, there are limits to such wide-ranging skeptical arguments. Ultimately, like debunking arguments, defeater challenges succumb to a Defeater’s Dilemma: one can identify influences on many of our morally relevant behaviors that are either substantial or arbitrary, but not both. The science suggests a familiar trade-off in which substantial influences on many morally relevant actions are rarely defective. Arriving at this conclusion requires carefully scrutinizing a range of studies, including those on framing effects, dishonesty, implicit bias, mood effects, and moral hypocrisy (vs. integrity).

Author(s):  
Joshua May

Wide-ranging debunking arguments aim to support moral skepticism based on empirical evidence (particularly of evolutionary pressures, framing effects, automatic emotional heuristics, and incidental emotions). But such arguments are subject to a debunker’s dilemma: they can identify an influence on moral belief that is either substantial or defective, but not both. When one identifies a genuinely defective influence on a large class of moral beliefs (e.g. framing effects), this influence is insubstantial, failing to render the beliefs unjustified. When one identifies a main basis for belief (e.g. automatic heuristics), the influence is not roundly defective. There is ultimately a trade-off for sweeping debunking arguments in ethics: identifying a substantial influence on moral belief implicates a process that is not genuinely defective. We thus lack empirical reason to believe that moral judgment is fundamentally flawed. Our dual process minds can yield justified moral beliefs despite automatically valuing more than an action’s consequences.


Author(s):  
Lodiana Nitti ◽  
Friandry Windisany Thoomaszen

ABSTRACT Parental perception will affect the fulfillment of children’s participation rights. Fullfilment of children’s participation rights will be fulfilled optimally if parents pay anttention to opinions while providing opportunities for children to make and make decisions about the child’s goals and self-interest. The subjects studied consisted of 5 subjects consisting of father and mother who had children aged 9- 12 years. This study uses qualitative research methods, with data retrieval tools in teh form of interviews, observation and documentation. From the research found data were the subjects do not fulfill the right of participation of children up to the maximum ladder where children’s participation rights range from the first ladder to the third ladder. The first ladder to the third ladder is actually a non- participating ladder. This means that children is manipulated, dominated by parents, there is direct communation and the severity of the parent. The children felt disappointed, sad, and angry with the parents but they still tried to hear and obey the parent’s decision. Children from third and fourth subjects experienced excessive fear to speak to their parent (father). Suggestions for parents to be more caring and fulfill the rights of children’s participation so as not to affect the growth and development of children. Keywords: participation rights, children, parents


Author(s):  
Joshua May

Even if we can rise above self-interest, we may just be slaves of our passions. But the motivational power of reason, via moral beliefs, has been understated, even in the difficult case of temptation. Experiments show that often when we succumb, it is due in part to a change in moral (or normative) judgment. We can see this by carefully examining a range of experiments on motivated reasoning, moral licensing, moral hypocrisy, and moral identity. Rationalization, perhaps paradoxically, reveals a deep regard for reason, to act in ways we can justify to ourselves and to others. The result is that we are very often morally motivated or exhibit moral integrity. Even when behaving badly, actions that often seem motivated by self-interest are actually ultimately driven by a concern to do what’s right.


Author(s):  
Joshua May

This chapter introduces the long-standing idea that inappropriate motives, such as self-interest, can militate against virtuous motivation (acting for the right reasons). Some theorists have tried to show that we are universally egoistic by appeal to empirical research, particularly evolutionary theory, moral development, and the neuroscience of learning. However, these efforts fail and instead decades of experiments on helping behavior provide powerful evidence that we are capable of genuine altruism. We can be motivated ultimately by a concern for others for their own sake, especially when empathizing with them. The evidence does not show that empathy blurs the distinction between self and other in a way that makes helping behavior truly egoistic or non-altruistic. Whether grounded in Christian love (agape) or the Buddhist notion of no-self (anātman), such self-other merging proposals run into empirical and conceptual difficulties.


2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
ASTIER M. ALMEDOM

The effects of war-induced anxiety and mental distress on individuals and groups can either be mitigated or exacerbated by ‘humanitarian action’. This paper focuses on two key factors that protect the mental well-being of war-affected populations: organized displacement or assisted relocation; and coordinated humanitarian aid operations that are responsive to local needs. Qualitative data from two internally displaced person (IDP) camps in Eritrea are presented. Analysis of these data serves to substantiate and refine a working hypothesis: that social support of the right type, provided at the right time and level, can mitigate the worst effects of war and displacement on victims/survivors. An integrated model of psychosocial transition is suggested. The implications of this approach for humanitarian policy and practice are discussed in the wider context of current debates and lamentations of the ‘humanitarian idea’.


2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Emmanuel A. Mjema

This paper discusses the technological innovativeness in engineering enterprises in Tanzania and analyses the factors affecting the innovativeness. It starts by analyzing various concepts regarding innovation, then analyzed from documentary review factors affecting innovativeness and then analyzed the innovativeness in Tanzanian enterprises.From the documentary review it was learnt that the following key factors influence technological innovativeness: Existence of innovation management; Existence of market to absorb the products of innovation; Existence of partnership between the universities and the firms; Existence of positive culture and politics towards innovation; The governmentplaying its role to influence innovation; Existence of the right knowledge; and Ability of the enterprises to access to financing institutions that support innovation.The research shows that there is hardly any fundamental innovation in Tanzania, what is presented as innovation is the copying of technologies and manufacture them using local material. Theresearcher established the following factors affecting the innovativeness of engineering enterprises in Tanzania: Level of education among the entrepreneurs in engineering enterprises; financing for the enterprises in Tanzania; partnership with R&D institutions; innovativeness culture; and market for Tanzanian products.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy D. Wilson ◽  
Erin Corwin Westgate ◽  
Nick Buttrick ◽  
Daniel Gilbert

This chapter is concerned with a type of thinking that has received little attention, namely intentional “thinking for pleasure”—the case in which people deliberately focus solely on their thoughts with the goal of generating positive affect. We present a model that describes why it is difficult to enjoy one's thoughts, how it can be done successfully, and when there is value in doing so. We review 36 studies we have conducted on this topic with just over 10,000 participants. We found that thinking for pleasure does not come easily to most people, but can be enjoyable and beneficial under the right conditions. Specifically, we found evidence that thinking for pleasure requires both motivation and the ability to concentrate. For example, several studies show that people enjoy thinking more when it is made easier with the use of “thinking aids.” We present evidence for a trade-off model that holds that people are most likely to enjoy their thoughts if they find those thoughts to be personally meaningful, but that such thinking involves concentration, which lowers enjoyment. Lastly, we review evidence for the benefits of thinking for pleasure, including an intervention study in which participants found thinking for pleasure enjoyable and meaningful in their everyday lives.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben M Tappin ◽  
Valerio Capraro

Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions (such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Game experiments) is not driven by outcome-based social preferences – as classically assumed – but by a generalized morality preference for “doing the right thing”. Here we argue that the key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018) comprise prominent methodological confounds and open questions that bear on influential psychological theory. Specifically, their design confounds: (i) preferences for efficiency with self-interest; and (ii) preferences for action with preferences for morality. Furthermore, their design fails to dissociate the preference to do “good” from the preference to avoid doing “bad”. We thus designed and conducted a preregistered, refined and extended test of the morality preference hypothesis (N=801). Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that prosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for doing the morally right thing. Inconsistent with influential psychological theory, however, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was as potent as the preference to avoid doing “bad” in this case.


Author(s):  
Luthfi Widyantoko

This paper discusses the rights of the poor and marginalized in obtaining the right to education as one of the basic human rights. This paper is based on the condition that the urgency of educational development is one of the top priorities in the national development agenda. Educational development is very important because of its significant role in achieving progress in various fields of life: social, economic, political, and cultural. Therefore, the Government is obliged to fulfill the rights of every citizen in obtaining education services in order to improve the quality of life of the Indonesian people as mandated by the 1945 Constitution, which requires the Government to be responsible in educating the life of the nation and creating public welfare. The lack of equal distribution of education in Indonesia is a classic problem which until now there has not been any strategic steps from the government to handle it. This paper confirms that the achievement of the right to education in Indonesia has not been achieved and is motivated by several key factors, among government policies. In addition, human resources and infrastructure are also one of the causes of unequal access to education in Indonesia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document