scholarly journals Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?

2006 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Cox ◽  
Stephen C. Hayne
2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (4II) ◽  
pp. 493-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taseer Salahuddin ◽  
Asad Zaman

In the recent literature, consensus has emerged that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon; see Alkire and Santos (2010) for a review of the major arguments. Nonetheless, the most widely used measures of poverty remain unidimensional, being based on income or caloric intake cutoffs. The logic for the use of income based measures was that it was only lack of income which led to deprivation—with sufficient income; rational agents would automatically eliminate deprivations in all dimensions in the right sequence of priorities. However, careful studies like Thorbecke (2005) and Banerjee and Duflo (2006) show that this does not happen. Even while malnourished and underfed, the poor spend significant portions of their budgets on festivals, weddings, alcohol, tobacco and other non-essential items. The move from abstract theoretical speculation based on mathematical models of human behaviour to experiments and observations of actual behaviour has led to dramatic changes in the understanding of poverty and how to alleviate it. Some of these insights are encapsulated in a new approach to poverty advocated by Banerjee and Duflo (2011).


Author(s):  
Michael J. Boulton ◽  
Peter J. R. Macaulay ◽  
Siobhan Atherton ◽  
Louise Boulton ◽  
Tracey Colebourne ◽  
...  

AbstractIn tackling the widespread problem of bullying victimisation, researchers have acknowledged the value of focusing on changing bullying-related beliefs and using peer-based interventions. In three studies (N = 419, 237 intervention and 182 controls), we tested the effectiveness of the CATZ cross-age teaching programme by inviting small groups of 11-year-olds to incorporate information supporting positive beliefs (concerning non-physical forms of bullying, the value of disclosing being bullied to adults, and helping victims) into a lesson they devised for themselves and to deliver that to small groups of 9-year-olds. Specifically, we examined if the intervention would promote that (i) non-physical forms of bullying are unacceptable (study 1), (ii) disclosing bullying to adults and getting the right kind of help have value and importance (study 2), and (iii) victims can be assisted in safe ways (study 3). Self-reports of nine specific aspects of these beliefs were collected from CATZ tutors and age-matched controls prior to and following the intervention, and at five-week follow-up in one study, using both open and closed questions. Results indicated significant positive effects of CATZ on all nine outcome variables, with mostly medium and high effect sizes. These findings support the use of CATZ to foster positive anti-bullying beliefs, and issues related to its wider uptake are discussed.


Development ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 225-238
Author(s):  
J. S. H. Taylor ◽  
D. J. Willshaw ◽  
R. M. Gaze

In Xenopus embryos of stage 30 the right eye was translocated, without rotation, to a left host orbit. Shortly after metamorphosis the visuotectal projection through the operated eye was mapped electrophysiologically and shown to be normal dorsoventrally but reversed nasotemporally. Labelling of small groups of retinal axons with HRP showed that the fibre trajectories from dorsal and ventral retina were normal, whereas fibres from nasally placed retina had diencephalic pathways and tectal terminations typical of temporal fibres, and fibres from temporally placed retina had diencephalic pathways and tectal terminations typical of nasal fibres. Thus from just beyond the chiasma the fibres had already achieved the major uniaxial rearrangement necessary to establish a normal tract distribution despite the eye translocation. The fibre rearrangement required to permit the formation of a nasotemporally inverted visuotectal projection appears, therefore, to occur not on the tectum or in the optic tract, but either within the nerve or at the chiasma.


Author(s):  
Andrews Reath

The core idea of autonomy is that of sovereignty over oneself, self-governance or self-determination: an agent or political entity is autonomous if it is self-governing or self-determining. The ancient Greeks applied the term to city-states. In the modern period, the concept was extended to persons, in particular by Kant, who gave autonomy a central place in philosophical discourse. Kant argued for the autonomy of rational agents by arguing that moral principles, which authoritatively limit how we may act, originate in the exercise of reason. They are thus laws that we give to ourselves, and Kant thought that rational agents are bound only to self-given laws. Much contemporary discussion has focused on the somewhat different topic of personal autonomy, and autonomy continues to be an important value in contemporary liberalism and in ethical theory. It is important to distinguish different senses of autonomy because of variation in how the concept is used. Self-governance or self-determination appears to require some control over the desires and values that move one to action, and some such control is provided by the capacity to subject them to rational scrutiny. Thus, autonomy is often understood as the capacity to critically assess one’s basic desires and values, and to act on those that one endorses on reflection. In other contexts, autonomy is understood as a right, for example as the right to act on one’s own judgment about matters affecting one’s life, without interference by others. The term is also sometimes used in connection with ethics itself, to refer to the thesis that ethical claims cannot be reduced to nonethical claims.


2019 ◽  
pp. 63-97
Author(s):  
Carl Hoefer

In this chapter, Humean objective chance (HOC) is laid out and discussed using a number of examples. The theory can be summarized as follows: Chances are constituted by the existence of patterns in the mosaic of events in the world. These patterns are such as to make the adoption of credences identical to the chances rational in the absence of better information, if one is obliged to make guesses or bets concerning the outcomes of chance setups. The full set of objective chances in our world is a Best System composed of many kinds of chances, at various levels of scale and with varying kinds of support in the Humean base. What unifies all the chances is their ability to play the role of guiding credence, as codified in the Principal Principle. The Best System(s) involved in HOC are, as with Lewis, determined by a balance of simplicity and strength and fit; through examples, the right way to understand these notions is sketched. HOC is explicitly pragmatic and is tied to the needs and capacities of limited rational agents.


2020 ◽  
pp. 220-225
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Hegel believes that we can grasp the character of morality by reflexion on different aspects of the rational will. In willing we will a particular goal, but we also will it as our own goal, as the goal of a rational agent who has other ends. As rational agents we apply critical standards to the goals that we will. Kant is right to argue that morality includes these critical standards, but (as Schopenhauer argues) he is wrong to suppose that the critical standards alone give us the true content of morality. We find the correct morality in so far as we find the goals that meet the right critical standards; these are the goals that fully realize the nature of the rational agent. If we find these goals, we overcome (contrary to Schopenhauer) any opposition between self-interest and morality.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 1261-1291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jess Benhabib ◽  
Alberto Bisin

Invariably, across a cross-section of countries and time periods, wealth distributions are skewed to the right displaying thick upper tails, that is, large and slowly declining top wealth shares. In this survey, we categorize the theoretical studies on the distribution of wealth in terms of the underlying economic mechanisms generating skewness and thick tails. Further, we show how these mechanisms can be micro-founded by the consumption–savings decisions of rational agents in specific economic and demographic environments. Finally we map the large empirical work on the wealth distribution to its theoretical underpinnings. (JEL C46, D14, D31, E21, J31)


2020 ◽  
pp. 214-219
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

According to Schopenhauer, Kant is right on two points: (1) Morality is to be separated from self-interest. (2) The categorical imperative states a universal law for all rational agents. But Kant is wrong to believe that his second point supports the first. The only purely rational aspect of morality is a demand for consistency that is compatible with any content whatever. We understand morality only when we see that it rests on compassion for others, which moves us to care about the welfare and suffering of others for their own sake. The right moral outlook requires us to overcome two errors about the reality of other people: (1) Egoism rests on failure to recognize that other people are just as real as I am. (2) Compassion requires us to see that there is no real distinction between myself and other people.


Author(s):  
Giovanni Merlo

AbstractTo qualify as a fully rational agent, one must be able rationally to revise one’s beliefs in the light of new evidence. This requires, not only that one revise one’s beliefs in the right way, but also that one do so as a result of appreciating the evidence on the basis of which one is changing one’s mind. However, the very nature of belief seems to pose an obstacle to the possibility of satisfying this requirement – for, insofar as one believes that p, any evidence that not-p will strike one as misleading and, on the face of it, believing that a certain piece of evidence is misleading is incompatible with appreciating the fact that such evidence should bear on the question at hand. Call this the ‘Paradox of Belief Revision’. This paper introduces the Paradox of Belief Revision, compares it with Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox, and suggests that we may be able to see a way out of the former if we assume that rational agents are systematically aware of their own beliefs as beliefs they have.


Author(s):  
R. A. Hill

This paper explores the relationship between justice and government, examining views on the subject expressed by traditional political philosophers such as Rousseau and Locke, as well as those expressed by contemporary political theorists such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick. According to Rawls, justice is one of the fundamental concerns of a governing body; Locke and Rousseau agree that government and justice are essentially connected. Nozick and Max Weber, however, claim that the essential characteristic of government is not justice, but power. This paper argues that government, as an institution formed and controlled by human beings, is subject to the moral injunction to treat human beings as entities accorded certain rights, and included among these rights is the right to just treatment. Governments are therefore enjoined to be just because human beings, as rational agents, and therefore persons, are owed the minimal respect due a person, such as the right to freedom and the right to forbearance from harm by others to self and property.


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