The Crisis of the Ryukyus (1877–82)

Author(s):  
Patrick Sze-lok Leung ◽  
Anthony Carty

Okinawa is now considered as Japanese territory, without challenge from most world powers. However, this is debatable from a historical viewpoint. The Ryukyu Kingdom which dominated the islands was integrated into Japan in 1879. The transformation is seen by Wang Hui as a process of modernization. This chapter argues the issue from an international law perspective. It shows that Ryukyu was an independent State as demonstrated by the 1854 Ryukyu–US Treaty, although it sent regular tributes to China. The Japanese integration by coercion is not justifiable. The people of Ryukyu were willing to continue being a tributary State rather than part of Japan. Britain, as the greatest colonial power, did not object. China and the US attempted to intervene in this affair, but no treaty has so far been concluded. Therefore, the status of Ryukyu/Okinawa remains unresolved and may need to be revisited, while putting the history context into consideration.

1935 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shalom Kassan

It is now an established principle of modern international law, that there exists in every independent State but one body of law. This body of law is administered by all the courts alike over all persons and things within its territorial limits. These courts, within the limits of their respective jurisdictions, do not discriminate between the various inhabitants of the State. The origin, nationality or religion of the people who appear before the courts is not questioned, and is not of any importance.


1988 ◽  
Vol 28 (265) ◽  
pp. 321-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
The Review

The protection of refugees and displaced persons is guaranteed by many universal and regional instruments of international law. The rules are there, but for several years the humanitarian organizations charged with implementing them have constantly had to face new situations brought about by the scale and frequency of mass population movements, especially in the Third World, and new types of violence which affect both the status and the possibilities for protection of the people concerned. Very often, the solutions arrived at by these bodies have taken the form of assistance rather than protection, the one not always easily distinguishable from the other.


Author(s):  
Castellino Joshua ◽  
Doyle Cathal

This chapter assesses the question of the people and peoples to whom the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) applies, tracking the concepts of person, persons, groups, people, and peoples in international law, and the UNDRIP's contribution to these concepts. The opening section of the chapter illustrates that the status of indigenous peoples in customary international law stands closer to peoples in the continuum between minorities and peoples. Minorities, while gaining the right to protection and promotion of their group identity, do not automatically gain the right to self-determination. Indigenous peoples ought to, but their rights towards this are constrained by state interests.


2007 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-256
Author(s):  
Cavid Abdullahzade

AbstractAs part of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Azerbaijan Republic ended its protracted existence as one of the fifteen members of the Soviet Union and became an independent state. As a result, on 30 August 1991, she became a full subject of international law. Currently, Azerbaijan is a party to a number of international treaties, virtually all major human rights treaties registered with the UN Secretary-General, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as a number of related Council of Europe human rights agreements.A tendency towards internationalization and a general 'opening' to international law can also be seen in the Azeri Constitution, which was adopted by public referendum on 12 November 1995. Like many other former Soviet Republics, Azerbaijan, in its 1995 Constitution, has rejected the traditional Soviet dualist approach of the implementation of international law in the domestic legal system and has established a monist system within the context of a relationship between national and international law. This article discusses these changes in the Azeri attitude towards international law, in particular the status of international treaties, with special reference to those problems stemming from the implementation of international treaties in the domestic legal system of Azerbaijan.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy William Waters

In September 2014, the people of Scotland voted on whether or not to become an independent state. The consequences of independence would have been complex –decisions about accession to the EU, currency union, defense. Seemingly less dramatic, yet no less important, are the consequences of Scotland not seceding — the effects in global law and politics of the very fact that the referendum happened, and that it failed. Many elements of the Scottish case find close parallels in claims for secession elsewhere in the world. Yet those claims more often meet less welcoming receptions. Indeed, it is not the attempt to secede, but the existing state's acquiescence that marks this case as different: The UK is the rare country that acknowledges the possibility of its own division. Great Britain's acquiescence both made Scottish secession possible and made it an outlier, whose precedential value must be closely interrogated. The key missing element is any evidence that the process was shaped by a sense of international legal obligation — indeed, the pathways of Scottish secession have been an insular affair, a function of particularly British law and politics, in which international law played little role. This article argues that the Scottish referendum provides little precedent for a changing legal norm — yet also offers a compelling model for how such a new norm ought to look. This article is about something that did not happen, and why it does not matter — but also why precisely that is so important.


English Today ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark F. Seilhamer

I have Danish parents, grown up in France, lived in the UK for 10 years and now living in Holland for the past 9 years. I am a different person in each language, adapting myself to the culture of the people who speak it. I have always wondered how the language could affect the message so much. It also affects my tone of voice and my emotions. [Christina, on July 27th, 2011]I find myself being more self-depreciating and less likely to accept praise when speaking in Japanese than when speaking English. Furthermore, a colleague once told me that even if he can't hear, he can tell which language I am using from 10-15 metres away, by looking at my posture, gestures and general body language. [Tim, on July 27th, 2011]My friends once told me that when I switch to Russian even my facial features change, becoming colder and harsher – set jaw, narrow eyes, speaking in a low voice, but with an intensity that makes everyone else listen. [Julia, on July 30th, 2011]The above quotations represent just a small portion of blogosphere postings from bilingual and multilingual individuals commenting on how they perceive and appear to have very distinct and separate personalities when speaking the different languages in their linguistic repertoires. Many such postings, like the first one above by Christina, explicitly attribute this phenomenon to attempts on the part of speakers to assimilate to the cultural norms of the countries where the languages are traditionally spoken. Scholarly treatments of the same phenomenon (e.g., Bryant, 1984; Hu & Reiterer, 2009; Zukowski/Faust, 1997) generally do likewise, often citing Schumann's (1978, 1986) Acculturation Model, which equates L2 proficiency with the extent to which a learner is able to adopt the culture of a target language group, and Guiora's (1967, 1979) concept of Language Ego, in which the permeability of one's L1 identity determines receptiveness to taking on new linguistic identities. According to these theories, a learner of Korean, for example, would be likely to develop a distinctly Korean L2 persona (as well as linguistic proficiency) if he or she has both a high level of affinity for Korean culture and a very permeable L1 language ego. Such arguments still, no doubt, apply to languages such as Korean or Japanese that are intrinsically associated with specific countries and cultures. Given the status of English as an international lingua franca in today's world, however, it can no longer be assumed that learners of English have any motive or desire to acculturate into traditionally English-speaking cultures, such as those of the US, England, or Australia. If learners/users of English associate the language not with such traditionally English-speaking cultures, but instead with an imagined global community of English users, do they still develop English L2 personas that are distinct from their L1 personas and feel ‘like a different person’ when speaking English?


Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

Foreign relations under the US Constitution starts with the paradox, also seen in domestic matters, of relatively scant text providing guidance for the exercise of vast power. Founding understandings, structural inference, and ongoing constitutional custom and precedent have filled in much, though hardly all, of the framework over the course of two hundred years. As a result, two basic questions frame the relationship between the Constitution and US foreign policy: (1) which parts of the US government, alone or in combination, properly exercise authority in the making of foreign policy; and (2) once made, what is the status of the nation’s international legal obligations in the US domestic legal system. The making of American foreign policy is framed by the Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers. Congress, the president, and the courts are all allocated discrete yet significant foreign affairs authority. Determining the exact borders and overlaps in areas such as the use of military force, emergency measures, and treaty termination continues to generate controversy. The status of international law in the US legal system in the first instance turns on whether resulting obligations derive from agreements or custom. The United States enters into international agreements in three ways: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. Complex doctrine deals with the domestic applicability of treaties in particular. US courts primarily apply customary international law in two basic ways. They can exercise a version of their common lawmaking authority to fashion rules of decision based on international custom. They also apply customary international law when incorporated into domestic law by statute.


2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-569
Author(s):  
Henri Meyrowitz

The debate which has been going on for many years now among governments of the member countries of NATO on the ratification of the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, signed in 1977, focusses mainly on the effects of such an instrument on deterrence and nuclear strategy. It is the fear of these effects that France has used to justify her refusal to become part of Protocol I. At the time of the signing of Protocol I, the US and Great Britain made the declaration that the new regulations as introduced by Protocol I "are not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons". It appears that, for a reason which has nothing to do with atomic weapons, the Reagan administration intends not to ask the Senate for ratification of Protocol I. The governments of Italy and Belgium who ratified the Protocol in February and May 1986 respectively, have supplemented their ratification with a declaration similar to that of the two powers. As for the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the answer must from now on rely on the combination of Protocol I and the "nuclear clause" from the declaration of the two powers and their allies. Hence the status of nuclear weapons in international law is comprised of three elements : a) The first use of nuclear weapons is not, in itself prohibited. - b) This use is subjected to the regulations of the common law of war, as has been "reaffirmed" by Protocol I, and which applies both to conventional and nuclear weapons. - c) The bans and restrictions, as provided for in these regulations, and which mark out the thin bounds which allow for the use of atomic weapons, pertain only to the use of these arms and not to nuclear deterrence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shadi Sakran

‘[B]ehind every Palestinian there is a great general fact: that he once – and not so long ago– lived in a land of his own called Palestine, which is now no longer his homeland.’ The question of whether the Palestinian people, as a people, are entitled to exercise the right to external self-determination has been highly controversial over the years. Divided scholarly research, particularly regarding the attitude of the State of Israel which, at time of writing, has not yet explicitly recognized the Palestinian peoples’ right to emerge as an independent State, serves as evidence to this claim. In 2004, the ICJ in the Wall Advisory Opinion observed that the Palestinians’ right to self-determination is no longer in issue. This observation serves as the benchmark for this paper to revisit the identification of a people under international law. This paper critically examines whether constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition in statehood can assist in understanding the concept of a people in the law of self-determination. While concluding that neither theory of recognition is satisfactory, this paper argues that application of the right to self-determonation, within and beyond the colonial context, is inevitably linked to the territory peoples inhabit. Although the relationship between peoples and territories should come as no surprise, the key element in determining a people is not based on the people but on the status of the territory they inhabit.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
Ada Guven

This article offers a description of the concept free and fair election being the most fundamental principle defining credible elections is that they must reflect the free expression of the will of the people. Human rights treaties and international law doctrine have established that in order to hold democratic elections, states should assure their transparency, accountability and most of all must be inclusive by giving any citizen the equal opportunities to participate and be elected in the elections. These broad principles are strengthened by several electoral process-related responsibilities, as well as several key rights and freedoms, each of which derive from public international law. The paper aim in the second part to analyse the article of the US constitution that provide for the criteria of free and fair elections and more specifically the principle of ballot secrecy. Furthermore, the article will analyse the caselaw of the Supreme Court of US regarding the right to vote and elections and the interpretation of this Court in the application of the legislation.


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