Consonance and Dissonance

Author(s):  
Alexander Rehding

Despite their fundamental importance to music theory, consonance and dissonance are surprisingly slippery concepts. They cannot unequivocally be identified as acoustical, aesthetic, physiological, psychological, or cultural-historical. This chapter examines a wide range of approaches to consonance/dissonance, focusing on four debates: the age-old sensus/ratio discussion, contrapuntal treatises, non-Western evidence from cognitive science, and evolutionary arguments. The discussion includes musical examples by Joseph Haydn, Alban Berg, Tsimane′ singing, and various European compositions from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. It is impossible to fully close the gap between different approaches, in part because different definitions take their starting points in different objects: cognitive approaches work with sounds while music-theoretical traditions work with notes and intervals. But the diversity of approaches opens up new angles on certain conflations that music theory often tolerates—such as the equivocation between successive and simultaneous intervals—to illustrate how the consonance/dissonance pair functions in different contexts.

2019 ◽  
pp. 497-504
Author(s):  
Thomas Wynn

Contributions to evolutionary cognitive archaeology (ECA) now present a wide range of commitments to cognitive science itself. It is still common to find quasi-cognitive approaches that rely on terms with little to no grounding in formal cognitive science, but which also have practical utility, especially when discussing technical cognition. Many ECA practitioners now employ terms and concepts grounded in cognitive science, most often cognitive neuroscience, though most of these remain post hoc applications. A more powerful approach begins with a cognitive ability of interest, identifies representative activities that would leave an archaeological signature, and traces their development in archaeological record. Such an approach not only enhances the picture presented by the standard narrative of paleoanthropology but also puts ECA in a position to make positive contributions to cognitive science itself.


1992 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Newell

AbstractThe book presents the case that cognitive science should turn its attention to developing theories of human cognition that cover the full range of human perceptual, cognitive, and action phenomena. Cognitive science has now produced a massive number of high-quality regularities with many microtheories that reveal important mechanisms. The need for integration is pressing and will continue to increase. Equally important, cognitive science now has the theoretical concepts and tools to support serious attempts at unified theories. The argument is made entirely by presenting an exemplar unified theory of cognition both to show what a real unified theory would be like and to provide convincing evidence that such theories are feasible. The exemplar is SOAR, a cognitive architecture, which is realized as a software system. After a detailed discussion of the architecture and its properties, with its relation to the constraints on cognition in the real world and to existing ideas in cognitive science, SOAR is used as theory for a wide range of cognitive phenomena: immediate responses (stimulus-response compatibility and the Sternberg phenomena); discrete motor skills (transcription typing); memory and learning (episodic memory and the acquisition of skill through practice); problem solving (cryptarithmetic puzzles and syllogistic reasoning); language (sentence verification and taking instructions); and development (transitions in the balance beam task). The treatments vary in depth and adequacy, but they clearly reveal a single, highly specific, operational theory that works over the entire range of human cognition, SOAR is presented as an exemplar unified theory, not as the sole candidate. Cognitive science is not ready yet for a single theory – there must be multiple attempts. But cognitive science must begin to work toward such unified theories.


In spite of the wide use and fundamental importance of the classical Gibbs adsorption theorem, its validity has never been given adequate experimental demonstration. Until quite recently the principal means available for testing this theorem was the “moving bubble method”, developed by Donnan and Barker, and later by McBain, Davies, and DuBois. Almost without exception this method has given results many times greater than the values calculated from either the exact or the approximate Gibbs equation. A recent exhaustive investigation of this dynamic method by DuBois and Todd has shown, moreover, that the results for moving bubbles may be varied and controlled over a wide range by merely altering the size or speed of the bubbles or the amount of accompanying liquid. Thus the results, although definite and repro­ducible, vary greatly with the experimental conditions, and hence they bear no definite relation either to the Gibbs value or to that for mono-molecular adsorption. It is evident that a moving surface carries in general an amount of adsorbed material which is much greater than that predicted by the Gibbs theorem. Similar high results are reported by Seymour, Tartar, and Wright for moving droplets of benzene in water, which may carry with them as much soap as would correspond to twenty or more mono-layers.


1943 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 184-202
Author(s):  
George R. Vila

Abstract Buna-S is an unsaturated polymer capable of undergoing vulcanization. This may be effected by the application of heat in the presence of sulfur. The process is accelerated by certain organic substances which are used widely for a similar purpose in natural rubber. Preliminary teats have indicated that most of them are applicable to Buna-S, and appear superior to any other chemicals yet investigated. This is fortunate in view of the present emergency, as plants for their manufacture already exist and the industry is familiar with their use. In spite of superficially similar effects, more careful study has indicated that it is an oversimplification to assume various accelerators will produce ideptical effects in both polymers. A wide range of materials is now available to the industry, and the task of accurately evaluating all of them is complex. In addition, an indefinite number of combinations are theoretically possible. The present investigation was undertaken to determine what effect different chemical types of organic accelerators were likely to have on properties of fundamental importance.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Hellmuth Margulis

Music can seem to be the human behavior that is least susceptible to explanation, but a long history exists of applying various frameworks to try to understand it. The cognitive science of music integrates ideas from philosophy, music theory, experimental psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, and computer modeling to answer questions about music’s role in people’s lives. The art of music psychology is to bring rigorous scientific methodologies to questions about the human musical capacity while applying sophisticated humanistic approaches to framing and interpreting the science.


2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 702-703
Author(s):  
David A. Schwartz

Shepard has challenged psychologists to identify nonarbitrary principles of mind upon which to build a more explanatory and general cognitive science. I suggest that such nonarbitrary principles may fruitfully be sought not only in the laws of physics and mathematics, but also in the logical entailments of different categories of representation. In the example offered here, conceptualizing mental events as indexical with respect to the events they represent enables one to account parsimoniously for a wide range of empirical psychological phenomena. [Shepard]


1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 615-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim van Gelder

According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, and only sustained empirical research in cognitive science will determine the extent to which that is true.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 645-653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Bell

The nine responses to my focus article ‘Re-constructing Babel: Discourse analysis, hermeneutics and the Interpretive Arc’ are cross-disciplinary, as is the article itself. They come from discourse studies (Van Dijk, Billig, Wodak), cognitive science (Tepe, Yeari and Van den Broek, Van Dijk), Old Testament studies (Billig), hermeneutics (Pellauer, Scott-Baumann), history (Gardner) and literature (Pratt). I identify and address five main issues which I see these responses raising for discourse interpretation: the role of author intent and the original sociocultural context in interpretation; principles of translation, particularly in relation to the Babel story; issues of certainty and subjectivism in interpretation, again including the Babel story; the role and limitations of cognitive approaches, and the potential of images like ‘unfolding the matter of the text’ to be realized in teaching hands-on discourse work; and finally a call to new listening in the encounter with hermeneutics, as a route to freshening the field I like to call Discourse Interpretation.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Callaway ◽  
Jessica Hamrick ◽  
Tom Griffiths

In the history of cognitive science, there have been two competing philosophies regarding how people reason about the world. In one, people rely on rich, generative models to make predictions about a wide range of scenarios; while in the other, people have a large “bag of tricks”, idiosyncratic heuristics that tend to work well in practice. In this paper, we suggest that rather than being in opposition to one another, these two ideas complement each other. We argue that people’s capacity for mental simulation may support their ability to learn new cue- based heuristics, and demonstrate this phenomenon in two experiments. However, our results also indicate that participants are far less likely to learn a heuristic when there is no logical or explicitly conveyed relationship between the cue and the relevant outcome. Furthermore, simulation—while a potentially useful tool—is no substitute for real world experience.


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