Undermining Governors: Argentina’s Double-Punishment Federal Spending Strategy

Author(s):  
Tracy Beck Fenwick ◽  
Lucas González

Abstract Throughout Latin American federations, programmatic welfare spending is increasingly nationally oriented and bureaucratically delivered. By explaining the logic and the effects of combining two types of federal spending, discretionary and non-discretionary, this article uncovers an additional driver that contributes to understanding policymaking and its implementation not only in Argentina, but potentially in other robust federal systems such as Brazil, Canada, and the United States. Using original data on federal infrastructure and programmatic social welfare spending for the twenty-four provinces of Argentina between 2003 and 2015, we provide empirical evidence that both forms of spending penalize opposition districts and more populated urban provinces (regardless of partisan affinity), and thus undercut the ability of key governors to become future presidential challengers. This research suggests that presidents of territorially diverse federations with strong governors can utilize the dual-punishment spending strategy to alter the balance of power, reinforcing the dominance of the center.

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1407-1429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Bernardi ◽  
James Adams

Issue ownership theory posits that when social welfare is electorally salient, left-wing parties gain public support by rhetorically emphasizing social welfare issues. There is less research, however, on whether left-wing governing parties benefit from increasing social welfare spending. That is, it is not known whether leftist governments gain from acting on the issues they rhetorically emphasize. This article presents arguments that voters will not react to governments’ social welfare rhetoric, and reviews the conflicting arguments about how government support responds to social welfare spending. It then reports time-series, cross-sectional analyses of data on government support, governments’ social welfare rhetoric and social welfare spending from Britain, Spain and the United States, that support the prediction that government rhetoric has no effects. The article estimates, however, that increased social welfare spending sharply depresses support for both left- and right-wing governments. These findings highlight a strategic dilemma for left-wing governments, which lose public support when they act on their social welfare rhetoric by increasing welfare spending.


2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 1089-1111
Author(s):  
MARK McLAY

AbstractDuring the summer of 1967, the United States experienced a series of race riots across the nation's cities as largely black neighbourhoods rebelled against the conditions in which they were living. The crisis reached its apogee in July when the worst riots since the American Civil War struck Detroit. In this atmosphere, legislators were faced with a stark choice of punishing rioters with stricter crime measures or alleviating living conditions with substantial federal spending. Despite being a minority in Congress, elected Republicans found themselves holding the balance of power in choosing whether the federal government would enforce law and order or pursue social justice for ghetto residents. While those Republicans who pursued ‘order’ have been given prominence in historiographical narratives, such politicians only represent one side of the Republican response. Indeed, moderate and progressive Republicans rallied to save Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty and a host of urban spending initiatives that had appeared politically doomed. These actions reveal that scholars have overestimated Republican conservatism during the 1960s. Nonetheless, the rioting left a long-term legacy that enabled ‘order’ eventually to triumph over ‘justice’ in the following five decades.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 39-53
Author(s):  
M. A.-M. Kodzoev

After Donald Trump becoming US president, the process of normalizing US-Cuban relations was interrupted for four years. After his inauguration, as he had promised during the election campaign, he canceled almost all of the achievements of his predecessor in the area of improving bilateral ties and subsequently consistently tightened sanctions against Havana. This could have been due to the desire of Trump to provide a reciprocal ‘service’ to the ultra-conservative interest groups in Washington, D.C. whose substantial support was used during the elections. At the same time, the Republican, usually not inclined to caution in decision-making, gradually introduced new restrictions on interaction with the Latin American country and was in no hurry to use all instruments available at once. Probably, in this way Trump tried to keep for himself as long as possible the main ‘bargaining chip’, which the Island of Freedom became in his internal political game quid pro quo the new partners from among the ‘hawks’. Therefore, the White House began to take the most aggressive measures just on the eve of the 2020 elections and immediately after them. The victory of the Democrat Joseph Biden, who served as a vice-president in Barack Obama administration, did not allow the calculations of the ultra-conservatives to come true in full: Cuba withstood the pressure from the United States and there was hope that Washington and Havana would again meet at the negotiating table. But under what conditions the parties can return to the topic of normalizing relations is still unknown. In this sense, a lot will depend on the team of the elected president, senior officials who will be included in his team. In addition, the changes in regional international relations that have taken place in recent years will also play a role. The situation some six years ago, which prompted the White House to move closer to the Island of Freedom, has partially lost its relevance today. In this regard, the position of the Latin American states, the American-Cuban community in the United States, as well as the current balance of power in the Congress deserve special attention. The article uses a problematic approach, the main task of which was to analyze the main results of Trump’s anti-Cuban policy and to identify opportunities for improving US-Cuban relations during the Biden administration.


1999 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-116
Author(s):  
Frank O. Mora

Diplomatic and economic relations between Latin American countries and the People’s Republic of China have become increasingly relevant for both sides, particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and scientific and technological cooperation. Relations have also intensified because of changes in the international balance of power; the PRC’s Third World policy is shaped by the friction between the PRC and the world’s great powers, including the United States. Competition from Taiwan for Latin American opportunities is another significant influence.


Author(s):  
Alexandra Délano Alonso

This chapter demonstrates how Latin American governments with large populations of migrants with precarious legal status in the United States are working together to promote policies focusing on their well-being and integration. It identifies the context in which these processes of policy diffusion and collaboration have taken place as well as their limitations. Notwithstanding the differences in capacities and motivations based on the domestic political and economic contexts, there is a convergence of practices and policies of diaspora engagement among Latin American countries driven by the common challenges faced by their migrant populations in the United States and by the Latino population more generally. These policies, framed as an issue of rights protection and the promotion of migrants’ well-being, are presented as a form of regional solidarity and unity, and are also mobilized by the Mexican government as a political instrument serving its foreign policy goals.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanchi Malhotra ◽  
Imran Masood ◽  
Noberto Giglio ◽  
Jay D. Pruetz ◽  
Pia S. Pannaraj

Abstract Background Chagas disease is a pathogenic parasitic infection with approximately 8 million cases worldwide and greater than 300,000 cases in the United States (U.S.). Chagas disease can lead to chronic cardiomyopathy and cardiac complications, with variable cardiac presentations in pediatrics making it difficult to recognize. The purpose of our study is to better understand current knowledge and experience with Chagas related heart disease among pediatric cardiologists in the U.S. Methods We prospectively disseminated a 19-question survey to pediatric cardiologists via 3 pediatric cardiology listservs. The survey included questions about demographics, Chagas disease presentation and experience. Results Of 139 responses, 119 cardiologists treat pediatric patients in the U.S. and were included. Most providers (87%) had not seen a case of Chagas disease in their practice; however, 72% also had never tested for it. The majority of knowledge-based questions about Chagas disease cardiac presentations were answered incorrectly, and 85% of providers expressed discomfort with recognizing cardiac presentations in children. Most respondents selected that they would not include Chagas disease on their differential diagnosis for presentations such as conduction anomalies, myocarditis and/or apical aneurysms, but would be more likely to include it if found in a Latin American immigrant. Of respondents, 87% agreed that they would be likely to attend a Chagas disease-related lecture. Conclusions Pediatric cardiologists in the U.S. have seen very few cases of Chagas disease, albeit most have not sent testing or included it in their differential diagnosis. Most individuals agreed that education on Chagas disease would be worth-while.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda J. Bilmes

AbstractThe United States has traditionally defined national security in the context of military threats and addressed them through military spending. This article considers whether the United States will rethink this mindset following the disruption of the Covid19 pandemic, during which a non-military actor has inflicted widespread harm. The author argues that the US will not redefine national security explicitly due to the importance of the military in the US economy and the bipartisan trend toward growing the military budget since 2001. However, the pandemic has opened the floodgates with respect to federal spending. This shift will enable the next administration to allocate greater resources to non-military threats such as climate change and emerging diseases, even as it continues to increase defense spending to address traditionally defined military threats such as hypersonics and cyberterrorism.


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