scholarly journals Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1816) ◽  
pp. 20151975 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Antisocial Behaviour ◽  
The Other ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Spatial Selection ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Eusocial Insects ◽  
Selection For

Rewarding cooperation is in many ways expected behaviour from social players. However, strategies that promote antisocial behaviour are also surprisingly common, not just in human societies, but also among eusocial insects and bacteria. Examples include sanctioning of individuals who behave prosocially, or rewarding of free-riders who do not contribute to collective enterprises. We therefore study the public goods game with antisocial and prosocial pool rewarding in order to determine the potential negative consequences on the effectiveness of positive incentives to promote cooperation. Contrary to a naive expectation, we show that the ability of defectors to distribute rewards to their like does not deter public cooperation as long as cooperators are able to do the same. Even in the presence of antisocial rewarding, the spatial selection for cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas is enhanced. Since the administration of rewards to either strategy requires a considerable degree of aggregation, cooperators can enjoy the benefits of their prosocial contributions as well as the corresponding rewards. Defectors when aggregated, on the other hand, can enjoy antisocial rewards, but due to their lack of contributions to the public good they ultimately succumb to their inherent inability to secure a sustainable future. Strategies that facilitate the aggregation of akin players, even if they seek to promote antisocial behaviour, thus always enhance the long-term benefits of cooperation.

scholarly journals Nodes with the highest control power play an important role at the final level of cooperation in directed networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Ebrahimi ◽  
Marzieh Yousefi ◽  
Farhad Shahbazi ◽  
Mohammad Ali Sheikh Beig Goharrizi ◽  
Ali Masoudi-Nejad
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Final Level ◽  
Input Signals ◽  
Tumoral Cells ◽  
Power Play

AbstractControllability of complex networks aims to seek the lowest number of nodes (the driver nodes) that can control all the nodes by receiving the input signals. The concept of control centrality is used to determine the power of each node to control the network. The more a node controls the nodes through connections in the network, the more it has the power to control. Although the cooperative and free-rider strategies and the final level of cooperation in a population are considered and studied in the public goods game. However, it is yet to determine a solution to indicate the effectiveness of each member in changing the strategies of the other members. In a network, the choice of nodes effective in changing the other nodes’ strategies, as free-riders, will lead to lower cooperation and vice versa. This paper uses simulated and real networks to investigate that the nodes with the highest control power are more effective than the hubs, local, and random nodes in changing the strategies of the other nodes and the final level of cooperation. Results indicate that the nodes with the highest control power as free-riders, compared to the other sets being under consideration, can lead to a lower level of cooperation and are, therefore, more effective in changing the strategies of the other nodes. The obtained results can be considered in the treatment of cancer. So that, destroying the tumoral cells with the highest control power should be a priority as these cells have a higher capability to change the strategies of the other cells from cooperators to free-riders (healthy to tumoral).

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

scholarly journals Translucent players: Explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-408
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Joseph Y Halpern
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Equity And Efficiency

In the past few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when noncooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. However, a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game. The approach can also be extended to take into account a player’s concerns that his social group (or God) may observe his actions. This extension helps explain prosocial behavior in situations in which previous models of social behavior fail to make correct predictions (e.g. conflict situations and situations where there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency).

scholarly journals Astronomy Development in Morocco: a Challenge to Stimulate Science and Education

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 59-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khalil Chamcham
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
International Level ◽  
The Public ◽  
Science And Education ◽  
Set Up

AbstractFrom my experience in Morocco, I discuss the difficulties one can face while trying to set up projects in a country where astronomy is a forgotten science: everything has to be built from scratch and, at the same time, one is required to keep up the pace at the international level. But, on the other side, it is quite a relief to see the strong demand from students and the public. In these circumstances even professional astronomy cannot survive without feedback from the public and long-term investment in education at all levels.

Change or continuation? Long-term city management on the example of local development strategy of Katowice

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Podgórska-Rykała
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Management ◽  
Development Strategy ◽  
Local Development ◽  
Large City ◽  
The Other ◽  
City Management ◽  
Common Elements ◽  
The Public ◽  
The City

The aim of this article is to look at strategic management of a large city from the two different perspectives: theoretical and empirical. In the first part the author focused on theoretical fundaments of management, particularly of the public strategic management. The second part presented the characteristics of the process of strategic management based on empirical data: two strategic documents adopted in Katowice over the last number of years were analysed. One of these documents is a currently binding one and the other is of an archival character. Referring to both the systematics and the means of preparation of these documents, as well as to their content, the author showed their common elements and the transformation which have occurred over the last number of years concerning the manner and approach to strategic management in the city. Based on documents analysis, the author answered the question asked in the introduction, which is whether in relation to the long-term policy of Katowice can one talk about change or continuation.

scholarly journals PENGUNGKAPAN ANTI KORUPSI DAN KINERJA KEUANGAN PERUSAHAAN: STUDI KASUS PERUSAHAAN TERDAFTAR DI INDEKS SRI KEHATI

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Nina Karina Karim ◽  
A Animah ◽  
Elin Erlina Sasanti
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Whistle Blowing ◽  
The Public ◽  
Short And Long Term ◽  
Market Distortion ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Corporate Customers ◽  
Disclosure Practice

Corruption within the corporation has become an important issue in the academic and public debate. The negative consequences caused by companies that engage in corruption are enormous, such as market distortion and incentives, resource allocation inefficiencies, as well as the increased of poverty and social inequality. Companies have the opportunity through a corporate responsibility (CSR) to prevent the problem of corruption. As important as labor, human and environmental rights, corruption mitigation is an important aspect in promoting CSR. CSR can be profitable in sales revenue and market share by improving the perception of ethical corporate customers. However, with the involvement of corruption, it can reduce the confidence of investors and the public against the company which may result in reduced financial performance. The purpose of this study is to determine empirically the correlation of anti-corruption disclosure reported by the companies listed in the Sri Kehati Index and FTSEGoods Bursa Malaysia Index on their financial performance, both the short and long term. The results showed that only the whistle blowing policies were fully disclosed by all companies in the sample of this study. The results also show that the disclosure of anti-corruption has significant influence on the company's profitability only in the long term for companies registered in Sri Kehati Indonesia index. As for the sample of companies registered in Malaysia FTSEGoods Index, the results showed that the disclosure of anti-corruption affect the company's financial performance both in the short term and in the long term. This implies that investors were responding to the anti corruption issues disclosed by the companies and companies should keep the disclosure practice in the future. Keywords: anti-corruption, corporate social responsibility, disclosure, financial performance.

scholarly journals Potential Autoimmunity of SARS CoV-2 Nucleic Acid-based Vaccination: What Should We Know?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mina Kelleni
Keyword(s):  
Nucleic Acid ◽  
The Other ◽  
Spike Protein ◽  
Vulnerable Groups ◽  
Right To Know ◽  
Benefit Ratio ◽  
The Public ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Personalized Risk

mRNA based and adenovirus vectored vaccines, types of nucleic acid-based vaccination, were first ever or first commercially ever approved for the public, respectively. However, these new types possess a potential risk to induce auto-immune diseases more possibly in the short yet potentially the long term as well. On the other hand, all SARS CoV-2 types of vaccines, depending on the spike protein immunogenicity, including the conventional ones might increase the likelihood of COVID-19 severity upon re-infection through antibody dependent enhancement. Thus, a moral, legal, and constitutional public right to know and decide basing on a personalized risk benefit ratio must be secured. In this manuscript, we analyze the theoretical autoimmunity potential of SARS CoV-2 adenovirus vectored vaccines, after we have previously discussed the same potential for mRNA-based ones. Further, we explore the vulnerable groups of vaccines recipients who are generally more liable to develop autoimmune diseases and how might these groups modify the risk if decided to receive the vaccines.

A Bank with a Divided Mandate

2020 ◽  
pp. 30-45
Author(s):  
Einar Lie
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Money Supply ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Road ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Value Of Money

This chapter examines the two mandates of Norges Bank. In autumn of 1818, Norges Bank began providing ordinary services to the public, discounting bills and lending directly against real estate. The institution was now both the nation’s bank of issue and its sole bank. Expectations of what the bank was to achieve pulled in two diametrically opposed directions. On the one hand, the bank was to take control of the inflated monetary system and bring the value of money back to par, namely the silver value guarantee issued when the Storting established the bank in 1816. Based on both contemporary and modern wisdom, this would speak in favour of tightening the money supply. On the other hand, the bank was to meet the country’s considerable need for credit, which would speak in favour of adding liquidity. However, a desire to supply more credit to farmers, merchants, timber traders, and others competed with the long-term goal of returning money to par. Indeed, the reason why the road to par became so long and winding has to do with the desire to supply the nation with credit: both the money supply and credit volumes were expanded repeatedly to meet the country’s borrowing needs.

scholarly journals Cooperation evolves by the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward

2021 ◽  
Vol 94 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tetsushi Ohdaira
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract In the previous studies, the author proposes the payoff-difference-based probabilistic peer-punishment that the probability of punishing a defector increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a defector increases and shows that the proposed peer-punishment effectively increases the number of cooperators and the average payoff of all players. On the other hand, reward as well as punishment is considered to be a mechanism promoting cooperation, and many studies have discussed the effect of reward in the public goods game, a multiplayer version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Based on the discussion of those existing studies, this study introduces the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward that the probability of rewarding a cooperator increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a cooperator increases. The author utilizes the framework of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game of the previous study and shows that the reward of this study realizes the evolution of cooperation except some cases. Graphic abstract

Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin E. Hilbig ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Timo Heydasch
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Longitudinal Design ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Openness To Experience ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders

Contributions in the public goods game—a classical social dilemma situation—have been shown to depend strongly on the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions for free riders. Also, there appear to be noteworthy individual differences in the degree to which decision makers cooperate. Herein, we aimed to bring these two lines of research together. Firstly, we predicted that both presence of punishment and high dispositional Honesty–Humility (as conceptualized in the Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience model of personality) should yield higher contributions. Secondly, and more importantly, we expected an interaction, such that only those low in Honesty–Humility would condition their behaviour on the presence versus absence of punishment, thus employing cooperation strategically. In line with the hypothesis, the results of two experiments (one of which comprised a longitudinal design) corroborated that the degree to which decision makers shift towards higher contributions when punishment is introduced depends on their dispositional level of Honesty–Humility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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