Political costs and earnings management: evidence from Tunisia

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 388-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mouna Ben Rejeb Attia ◽  
Naima Lassoued ◽  
Anis Attia
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
State Control ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Political Cost

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to test the political costs hypothesis in emerging economies characterized by interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights. The paper uses executives’ political connection and state control to measure firms’ political costs. Design/methodology/approach Based on a sample of Tunisian firms, univariate and multivariate analyses are used to test whether firms’ political costs have any impact on earnings management. Findings The empirical analysis indicates that the executives’ political connection is not directly related to earnings management. However, the interaction between executives’ political connection and the state control affects the firm’s sensitivity to political pressure and its earnings management practices. More specifically, this study provides evidence that non-connected firms and state-controlled firms attempt to use accounting policies to decrease their earnings especially during periods of the former government when they had to face high political costs. This finding is robust to comparing means of political cost indicators between different groups. Indeed, private firms with political connection enjoy a significantly lower insurance right, tax and donations and grants compared to other firms. Research limitations/implications This study provides empirical evidence for the specific application of accounting theory in emerging economies. Practical implications Political influence may be an important criterion that will be used by auditors and investors to appreciate and detect specific manipulations of accounting earnings. Similarly, regulators should be aware of the political factors effect on discretionary behavior of managers to provide appropriate rules and standards. Originality/value The study is a pioneer in proving that a firm’s size is not always a suitable measure of its political cost. It extends the accounting literature on the role of political economy in the application of the political costs hypothesis. This hypothesis is confirmed in emerging economies by providing new and significantly measure of firms’ political costs

scholarly journals Political and financial background in board interlocking and earnings management in Brazil

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristian Baú Dal Magro ◽  
Roberto Carlos Klann
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
The Political ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Quality Of Accounting Information

Purpose Although board interlocking underlying forces are largely hidden, the purpose of this paper is to provide managers, auditors, analysts, regulators and other stakeholders with sociological board interlocking information considering the different backgrounds of their members. Design/methodology/approach The research sample gathered 1,606 observations from 2010 to 2017. For data analysis, the direct and indirect board interlocking linkages, considering the different backgrounds of board members, established the centrality indicators. Subsequently, the authors used these indicators according to each measured background in the regression models. Findings The results indicate that the political background of board interlocking members is positively related to real earnings management practices, while the financial background has a mitigating effect on such practices. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that individual skills and interests conveyed across the corporate social network have shaped corporate governance, with distinct impacts on the quality of accounting information. Practical implications The authors conclude that both backgrounds could have implications on agency conflicts, increasing (policy) or reducing (financial) information asymmetry between the company and its various stakeholders, which indicates that the authors must consider sociological and not just economic aspects within corporate governance. Social implications The sociological background of individuals is necessary for the congruence of monitoring mechanisms, and consequently, the quality of accounting information. Originality/value This study examines the influence of the political and financial background of board interlocking members on real earnings management practices in Brazilian publicly traded companies in the International Financial Reporting Standards post-adoption period.

Earnings management and equity incentives: evidence from the European banking industry

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Alhadab ◽  
Bassam Al-Own
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions. Findings The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation. Practical implications The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.). Originality/value This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.

Do corporate diversification and earnings management practices affect capital structure?

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 360-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ranjitha Ajay ◽  
R Madhumathi
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Diversification Strategies ◽  
Market Product ◽  
Diversified Firms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of earnings management on capital structure across firm diversification strategies. Design/methodology/approach – The study focuses on firms operating in the manufacturing sector (diversified and focused). Panel data methodology compares diversification strategies and identifies the impact of diversification strategy with earnings management practices on capital structure decision. Findings – International and product diversified firms have lower levels of leverage than focused firms in their capital structure. Asset-based earnings management is positive for diversified (market/product) firms. Earnings management using discretionary expenditure (project based) is found to be higher for market diversified but product-focused firms. Earning smoothing method is found to be significant for focused firms and shows a negative relationship with capital structure. Originality/value – This study offers an insight into the relationship between corporate diversification, earnings management and capital structure decisions of manufacturing firms. The results provide an important contribution to accounting and strategy literature. A distinction is made between market- and product-diversified firms and influence of earnings management practices (asset-based, project-based and earnings smoothing (ESM)) on capital structure decisions. Diversified firms (market/product) tend to have lower levels of leverage than focused firms and earnings management practices within firm groups significantly influence the capital structure decisions.

Political connection, family ownership and corporate risk disclosure: empirical evidence from Jordan

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malek Hamed Alshirah ◽  
Ahmad Farhan Alshira’h ◽  
Abdalwali Lutfi
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
The Political ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Risk Disclosure ◽  
Moderator Effect ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Corporate Risk ◽  
Level Of Risk

Purpose This study aims to empirically examine whether the political connection is related to risk disclosure practices. The study also seeks to contribute to the existent risk disclosure literature by investigating the moderator effect of family ownership on this relationship. Design/methodology/approach The content analysis approach was used to collect data and determine the level of risk disclosure over the non-financial Jordanian firms listed on 1Amman Stock Exchange. The sample of this study contains 376 annual reports over four years from 2014 to 2017. It used the random effect regressions to examine the hypothesis of the study. Findings The results show that politically connected companies disclose less risk information than the unconnected ones in Jordan. The results also refer that family ownership contributes in mitigating the negative effect of the political connection on the level of corporate risk. Practical implications The results have implications for regulatory institutions such as the Jordan Securities Commission to take the negative effect of political connection in their consideration and impose further regulations to monitor this board’s attribute and control politicians’ domination on the board decisions. Originality/value The current study also contributes to the body of literature by investigating the effects of the political connections on the level of risk disclosure in the financial reports. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the current study is the first to examine the effect of the political connection on the risk disclosure practices. Moreover, the study is among the first studies that examine the moderating role of family ownership on such relationship.

Cienfuegos affair threatens Mexico-US security ties

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The Political ◽  
Security Cooperation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Military ◽  
Trump Administration

Significance The situation has highlighted several issues of concern around the influence of the Mexican military, the government’s reliance on it and the challenges Mexico and its security agencies face in trying to meet US demands while addressing domestic threats. Impacts Mexican militarisation was facilitated by Trump administration apathy on human rights; this will change under President Joe Biden. Increased US-bound migration, encouraged by Biden’s more humane rhetoric, will heighten the need for bilateral security cooperation. Future Mexican administrations will struggle to reverse the political influence the military has obtained.

Earnings management and audit quality at Damascus securities exchange: Does managerial ownership matter?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zukaa Mardnly ◽  
Zinab Badran ◽  
Sulaiman Mouselli
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018. Findings The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management. Research limitations/implications DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management. Practical implications First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management. Originality/value It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.

Economic role of politics and corporate governance: reforms captured in Malaysia’s setting

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 839-853 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
The Political ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Economic Role ◽  
Corporate Governance Reforms ◽  
Governance Reforms

Purpose This study aims to examine the economic role of politics on corporate governance reforms in one of emerging market, namely, Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach The paper is based upon a literature review analysis. Findings The Malaysian economic, political and social settings have resulted in undue state and detrimental political influence on business, and yet the corporate governance reforms undertaken seemed not be able to resolve the matter. It is suggesting that it would be beneficial for Malaysia to have more independent regulatory bodies representing a wide variety of stakeholders to improve the transparency and accountability to ensure that the reforms are effectively enforced without conflicting with the political agenda. Legal institutional reforms also may be needed to improve the structure, capacity and performance of judicial system, as it is capable to capture reliance of economic role of politics and promoting accountability in Malaysia. Research limitations/implications The economic role of politics on corporate governance reforms is merely to broaden the political strategy in the corporate sector as the change in politics can improve the effectiveness of corporate governance reforms. Moreover, the economic role of politics raises the tone of the corporate governance reforms, and it implies that policymakers need to have effective corporate governance strategy in dealing with the reforms initiatives in areas that have strong political interventions. Originality/value Regulatory and judicial implications are offered as a means to improve corporate governance in Malaysia.

Accounting conservatism, corporate governance and political connections

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 288-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nor Farizal Mohammed ◽  
Kamran Ahmed ◽  
Xu-Dong Ji
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between accounting conservatism, corporate governance and political connection in listed firms in Malaysia where political influence plays a significant role in the capital market and in many business dealings. Design/methodology/approach By utilizing 824 firm-year observations comprising large listed companies over a period of four years from 2004, this study uses ordinary least squares regression models to investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism, corporate governance and political connections in Malaysia. Multiple measures of conservatism developed by Basu (1997) and Khan and Watts (2009) are employed. Findings The results show evidence of accounting conservatism (bad news being recognized earlier than good news) in Malaysia. Further, the results reveal that better corporate governance structure in terms of board independence is positively associated with accounting conservatism while management ownership is negatively associated with it. However, political connection has a negative moderating effect on the positive relationship between accounting conservatism and board independence. The results also suggest political connections have a positive association with firm’s future performance. Originality/value This study is the first in investigating the effect of political connections on accounting conservatism in Malaysian context and how political connections negatively affect the monitoring role of the corporate boards. By directly measuring political connection and controlling for various corporate governance mechanisms and firm-specific attributes, this study contributes to enhance the authors’ understanding of the political influence in financial reporting quality and firm performance in an emerging market setting.

scholarly journals POLITICAL CONNECTION, FAMILY OWNERSHIP, AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN MANUFACTURING COMPANIES IN INDONESIA

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-593
Author(s):  
Enni Savitri ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Political Relationship ◽  
The Government

Political connections have an essential role in the earnings management strategy. Political connections can influence earnings management practices. The research aimed to analyze the effect of politics and family ownership on earnings management practices. The sample is 92 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2016-2019. Methods of data using a purposive sampling method. Multiple linear regression is an analytical tool used to test the hypothesis. The results show that political connections influence profits. The company pays more attention to the company’s reputation and maintains the privileges of the political relationship that has existed between the company and the government. Family ownership affects earnings management. Family ownership has control rights that can be used to influence management in company profits. The novelty of this research is that political connections can influence earnings management.

scholarly journals Proposing a model for limiting earning management practices: The case of Jordanian listed firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 81-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dea’a Al-Deen Omar Al-Sraheen ◽  
Khalid Alkhatib
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Do So

The key objective of this paper is to propose a model for limiting earning management practices among manufacturing firms in Jordan. In order to do so, two independent variables are examined in this paper, namely, political influence and CEO Duality. Discretionary total accruals according to the modified Jones model (1991) was used in order to estimate the level of earnings management, which is the dependent variable. The sample comprised 64 companies for the financial year 2013. The results suggest that a positive and significant association existed among both political influence and CEO duality and earning management. This means that both independent variables exacerbated earnings management. Further research is required to determine what urgent legislation should be developed to restrict the presence of members who have political connections on the board of directors. Also, the need exists for the separation of roles of Chairman and CEO to ensure the independence and complying with the requirements of corporate governance.

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