Advertising cooperation of dual-channel low-carbon supply chain based on cost-sharing

Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1169-1195
Author(s):  
Chao Yu ◽  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Suyong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Influence Coefficient ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Product ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Advertising Effort

Purpose This paper aims to analyze the impact of the cost coefficient of product emission reduction, coefficient of low-carbon product advertising effort cost, and sharing ratio of low-carbon product advertising effort cost on the profit of a dual-channel supply chain. After determining the best model and relevant influencing factors, the paper puts forward corresponding management inspirations and suggestions. Design/methodology/approach The paper opts for an exploratory study using Stackelberg game theory to construct a centralized decision-making (MC mode), a low carbon product advertising effort cost free sharing decentralized decision-making (SD model) and a low carbon product advertising effort cost sharing decentralized decision-making (JD model) game model. Through using optimization methods to get the equilibrium solution, the relevant management suggestions are obtained by comparison analysis. Findings The paper shows that the JD model is better than the SD model in terms of the profits of the manufacturer, retailer and supply chain, and the improvement of Pareto is realized. The proportion of cost sharing of low carbon product advertising effort is positively related to the wholesale price and direct influence coefficient of low carbon product advertising effort on channel, while negatively related to the retail price and the cross influence coefficient of low carbon product advertising effort on alternative channels. Under the JD model, the manufacturer can reduce advertising costs through improving the efficiency and pertinence of direct channel advertising and urging the retailer to do a better job in sales management to improve gross margin and require the retailer to increase advertising efficiency and pertinence of retail channel to reduce advertising costs of retail channel and other ways to increase their profits. The retailer can make use of its advantages closer with consumers to improve the efficiency and pertinence of advertising in the retail channel to raise the influence coefficient of advertising and reduce the advertising cost in the retail channel. Originality/value The innovations of this paper are listed as follows: First, it has considered advertising investment from both the manufacturer and the retailer simultaneously. Second, it has considered a low-carbon background to investigate cooperative advertising decision for low-carbon products. Third, it has considered the decision on the level of product emission reduction and the level of low-carbon product advertising effort investment simultaneously.

scholarly journals Supply chain contracting coordination for fresh products with fresh-keeping effort

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (3) ◽  
pp. 538-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Zheng ◽  
Petros Ieromonachou ◽  
Tijun Fan ◽  
Li Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Decision Variable ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

Purpose Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. The purpose of this paper is to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived. Design/methodology/approach To address this issue, the authors consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e. wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision making. The authors start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at the end. Findings The results show that the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; a fresh product supply chain (FPSC) can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; and the profit of a FPSC is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price. Research limitations/implications This research is based on the assumption that demand is relatively stable. It has not addressed when demand is stochastic. Practical implications The findings would be useful for managers in fresh food sector in terms of how to deal with suppliers in order to maximize total profit while also provide freshest food to the customers. Originality/value Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem.

scholarly journals The Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers’ low-carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer’s order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non-emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision-making, the centralized decision-making and the retailer providing a cost-sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost-sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost-sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost-sharing ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision-making. The results show that in the higher low-carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost-sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.

A collaborative scenario-based decision model for a disrupted dual-channel supply chain

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 933-957 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jafar Heydari ◽  
Amin Aslani ◽  
Ali Sabbaghnia
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Distribution Systems ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Collaboration Model ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Purpose Distribution systems usually utilize both traditional retailing channels in conjunction with e-channels. The purpose of this paper is to investigate a dual-channel supply chain, comprising a traditional retailing channel and an e-channel under disruption. By benchmarking against the centralized decision structure, the authors intend to propose a collaboration model to achieve channel coordination as well as more reliable decisions. Design/methodology/approach Four different channel disruption scenarios, with customers’ reaction toward disruptions, are examined, and then, optimal pricing decisions for both centralized and decentralized decision-making structures are extracted. Next, a collaboration mechanism based on the dominancy power of channel members is developed to entice all channel members to participate in channel coordination. By benchmarking the proposed collaboration model against both the decentralized/centralized structures a win–win solution is guaranteed for all channel members. In addition, the proposed model ensures more reliable decisions than the centralized structure, as it guarantees less fluctuated income levels. Findings This study shows, as the disruption probability grows, the channel profit decreases while the channel-retailing price increases. Furthermore, the exact alignment of the centralized decision-making approach and the proposed collaboration model is not achievable due to the problem infeasibility. Numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses benchmark the performance of the proposed collaboration mechanism against the centralized structure for the full alignment with centralized decision-making approach. Originality/value This study contributes to the channel conflict literature as jointly considers pricing decisions, disruptions and coordination. Further, consumers’ reaction toward disruption is analyzed through a transshipment agreement.

Low carbon supply chain: a state-of-the-art literature review

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 398-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiranjit Das ◽  
Sanjay Jharkharia
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
English Language ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Location Selection ◽  
Carbon Supply

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to review the relevant literature on low carbon supply chain management (LCSCM) and classify it on contextual base. It also aims at identifying key decision-making issues in LCSCM. This paper also highlights some of the future challenges and scope of research in this domain. Design/methodology/approach A content analysis is carried out by systematically collecting the literature from major academic sources over a period of 18 years (2000-2017), identifying structural dimensions and classifying it on contextual base. Findings There is an increasing trend of research on LCSCM, but this research is still in a nascent stage. All supply chain functions such as supplier selection, inventory planning, network design and logistic decisions have been redefined by integrating emissions-related issues. Research limitations/implications Limitation of this study is inherent in its unit of analysis. Only peer-reviewed journal articles published in English language have been considered in this study. Practical implications Findings of prior studies on low carbon inventory control, transportation planning, facility allocation, location selection and supply chain coordination have been highlighted in this study. This will help supply chain practitioners in decision making. Originality/value Though there are an increasing number of studies about carbon emission-related issues in supply chain management, the present literature lacks to provide a review of the overarching publications. This paper addresses this gap by providing a comprehensive review of literature on emissions-related issues in supply chain management.

Price premium effect, supply contracts and strategic decision making under environmental considerations

2019 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinay Ramani ◽  
Sanjeev Swami ◽  
Debabrata Ghosh
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Price Premium ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Technological Adoption ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and technology adoption effort leading to a price premium effect for the supply chain players. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses game theoretic approach to analyze the model of inter-firm interaction in a vertical channel setting consisting of a retailer and manufacturer. The paper studies strategic decisions of the channel members in a decentralized and centralized structure and extends this to decision making under contractual settings. Findings A two-part tariff completely coordinates the green supply chain, while a cost sharing and revenue sharing contract only achieve partial coordination. Nevertheless, a cost sharing, as well as a revenue sharing contract, increases the greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer while yielding the supply chain members a strictly larger profit. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract in comparison to a cost sharing contract, leads to a larger greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer, lower wholesale and retail prices and a strictly larger profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Originality/value This paper contributes to the green supply chain pricing, technology and contract literature considering strategic interactions between a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain under price premium effects of greening activities and technological advancements.

scholarly journals Optimal pricing and complex analysis with carbon emission reduction preference in an apparel supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Zongxian Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Complex Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Global Bifurcation ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Better Than

Abstract In this paper, we study the supply chain competition models that consider consumers' low-carbon consumption preferences. By constructing the supply chain of manufacturers and retailers with different market positions, two game types, decentralized decision making and centralized decision making are proposed, and the static and dynamic game methods are combined respectively for research. Although research has found that centralized decision making is always better than decentralized decision making under the static game mode, when considering the long-term dynamic evolutionary game, the average profit of decentralized decision making may be better than the average profit of centralized decision making. Moreover, there are complex dynamic characteristics under dynamic games. In order to fully understand the nature of the dynamic game systems, we discussed the stability, local bifurcation, and global bifurcation of these dynamic systems. It is found that although dynamic game systems may lose stability with changes in parameters, they are better than static game results in some cases, this is beneficial to decision-makers and has practical management significance.

scholarly journals Research on Coordination of Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain considering Fresh-Keeping Effort Level under Retailer Risk Avoidance

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yangang Feng ◽  
Yi Hu ◽  
Lin He
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Benefit Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

Considering that the demand for fresh agricultural products is affected by product freshness and price, a two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain decision model consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer is constructed. In order to increase consumer demand for fresh agricultural products, the supplier will make appropriate efforts to preserve the freshness of agricultural products. The optimal fresh-keeping effort level of the supplier and the optimal pricing decision of the retailer under the centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making modes were studied, respectively; through the design of traditional cost-sharing contracts, traditional cost and revenue-sharing contracts, and cost-sharing and compensation strategies, the supplier was encouraged to improve their fresh-keeping effort. The research shows that the traditional cost-sharing contract and the traditional cost-benefit sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. Under the strategy of cost sharing and compensation, when the amount of compensation meets certain conditions, the coordination of supply chain can be realized. Finally, the important parameters of the model are analyzed by numerical simulation.

scholarly journals Government Low-Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Bingquan Liu ◽  
Xuran Chang ◽  
Boyang Nie ◽  
Yue Wang ◽  
Lingqi Meng
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

As carbon emissions are increasing due to the development of economy, low-carbon supply chain plays an important role in carbon emissions reduction and the dual-channel supply chain has become a hit because online shopping is developing rapidly. Therefore, this paper builds a Stackelberg game model led by the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain to examine the reaction of the government under centralized or decentralized decisions-making structures with different low-carbon strategies. The result shows that the government can achieve higher profits by taking incentive or punitive measures for centralized decision-making supply chain no matter they invest in emissions reduction or not. Moreover, for decentralized decision-making mode, increasing low-carbon subsidies for retailers can achieve a win-win result between the supply chain and the government; and, finally, channel competition is good for improving the supply chain and social benefits. Therefore, the government is responsible for taking reasonable subsidy policies, formulate industry’s low-carbon standards, and properly guide competition between supply chain members to achieve higher profits.

scholarly journals Supply-Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers’ Low Carbon Preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bengang Gong ◽  
Xuan Xia ◽  
Jinshi Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Green Consumers ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

Given consumers’ willingness to pay different prices for new energy vehicles (NEVs) and traditional vehicles, we construct a utility model of ordinary and green consumers. We establish pricing game models for centralized and decentralized decisions in an NEV’s supply chain in order to study the impact of changes in consumers’ low carbon preference heterogeneity on supply chain pricing and member profit. The results show that consumers’ low carbon preferences and the ratio of green consumers increases with the ex-factory and selling prices of NEVs. An increase in the percentage of green consumers under centralized decision-making will reduce the total profit of the supply chain. Manufacturers’ profits under decentralized decision-making are greater than the dealers’ profits, and the sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision-making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision-making. We design a revenue-sharing contract to eliminate the double marginal effect.

Investment strategy analysis of emission-reduction technology under cost subsidy policy in the carbon trading market

Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 252-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Hou ◽  
Jiayi Sun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Technology Investment

Purpose The authors consider a dynamic emission-reduction technology investment decision-making problem for an emission-dependent dyadic supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer under subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction. The consumers are assumed to prefer to low-carbon products and formulate a supply chain optimal control problem. Design/methodology/approach The authors adopt differential game to analyze investment strategies of cost subsidy coefficient with respect to vertical incentive of a manufacturer and a retailer. A comparison analysis under four different decision-making situations, including decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, maximizing social welfare, is obtained. Findings The results show that the economic benefit and environmental pressure have a win–win performance in centralized decision-making. In four different game models, equilibrium strategies, profits and social welfare show changing diversity and have a consistent development trend as time goes on. Research limitations/implications The authors estimate the demand function is a linear function in this paper. According to the consumers’ preference to low-carbon products, consumer’s awareness meets the law of diminishing marginal utility like advertising goodwill accumulation. The carbon-sensitive coefficient might be a quadratic expression, which will complicate the problem and be consistent with reality. Practical implications It captures that there is a necessity to strengthen cooperation and exchange of carbon emission technology among the enterprises by simulation of different decision-makings when government granted cost subsidy. Social implications The results provide significant guidelines for the supply chain to make decision-makings of emission-reduction technology investment and relevant government departments to determine emission subsidies costs. Originality/value An endogenous subsidies coefficient is produced by the social welfare function. Distinguished from previous study, it also considered the influences of carbon emission trade policy and consumer preference.

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