Purpose
– This paper aims to analyse sanctions regimes of multilateral development banks and to examine some of the topical issues surrounding sanctioning practices of these institutions. Under the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (the “Mutual Enforcement Agreement”), sanctions covering the sanctionable practices that are imposed and made publicly available by any participating MDB may be enforced by other participating MDBs. This dramatically amplifies the impact of debarment decisions taken by any one of the participating MDBs, while affirming the MDBs’ commitment to combating the sanctionable practices. Consequently, companies will need to invigorate their procedures with a view to managing their risks not only in relation to national legislation, but also in relation to the MDBs’ sanctioning frameworks, which have much broader geographic scope than that of national legislation. This paper first provides an overview of the tenets established by the Mutual Enforcement Agreement. Further, as all MDBs maintain their own sanctions mechanisms, the paper analyses individual sanctions regimes of the WBG, EBRD and ADB. The paper then describes the types of sanctions that may be imposed by MDBs and examines some of the challenging issues surrounding the banks’ sanctions practices.
Design/methodology/approach
– This paper draws on the experience of senior lawyers who were intimately involved in the set-up of the sanctions regimes at the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the EBRD and the ADB and are currently involved in the work of sanctions boards at their respective institutions.
Findings
– Companies and individuals dealing with MDBs should be aware of the fact that, as a result of the Mutual Enforcement Agreement, the profile of MDBs’ fraud and corruption cases has been raised significantly and could result in global sanctions for prohibited practices in a single country. Consequently, a company engaging in a prohibited practice in its business dealings with one MDB might find itself unable to obtain financing from the four other MDBs participating in the Mutual Enforcement Agreement, and furthermore its debarment would be published by all five participating MDBs (subject to the above-described limitations of ADB’s publication regime). As MDBs continue to develop their sanctions regimes, greater harmonisation among sanctions processes is to be expected and companies doing business with MDBs should, at the very minimum, ensure that their compliance and ethics programmes are up to date, both as a preventative measure or, if wrongful actions have already taken place, as a means of mitigating the severity of possible sanctions.
Originality/value
– A lot has been written about the consequences of criminal convictions for bribery and other corrupt practices. However, much less attention has been paid to the evolution of anti-corruption policies and procedures which have been developed by a group of leading MDBs. In fact, for many corporates, sanctions regimes of MDBs remain unchartered territory, even though these sanctions proceedings can have far-reaching business consequences. This paper will, therefore, be of interest to all companies directly or indirectly involved with MDB-financed projects, as they need to be alert to the scope of MDB sanctions proceedings and the wide-ranging adverse business consequences that may result from any enforcement action.