Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions may grow with time

Subject The goals of North Korea's nuclear programme. Significance The pace of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme has accelerated significantly under its third and current supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, but Pyongyang provides little clarity about its ultimate purpose and what level of capability it considers adequate. Impacts Nuclear blackmail has a poor record of success, but that may not prevent Pyongyang from trying. Pyongyang may continue developing its nuclear capabilities even after it has demonstrated the ability to hit the US mainland. The risk of conflict will rise if Seoul and Washington decide that Pyongyang's aim is not defensive.

Significance His government is in an impasse with the conservative parliament over the draft budget for the new fiscal year beginning on March 21. Rouhani needs the US sanctions to be lifted fast and a COVID-19 vaccination campaign to allow for an exit from the pandemic in order to meet his economic promises. Impacts The supreme leader will become even more closely involved in shaping economic policy, with the autarkic ‘resistance’ narrative dominant. Khamenei may seek a new ‘jihadi manager’ president, linked to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), who follows his economic vision. Progress with vaccinations, which began on February 8, will likely be slow, as supplies have become highly politicised.


Significance Tokyo had prepared for a Hillary Clinton victory, and is alarmed by comments during Trump's election campaign that raise doubts over the US-Japan defence alliance and raise fears that economic cooperation will give way to conflict. Impacts As Abe diverts resources into stabilising US ties, other policy areas may receive less attention. Exchange rate policy could re-emerge as a point of tension in Japan-US relations. With the Trans-Pacific Partnership likely to collapse, Japan may inject fresh energy into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. US 'abandonment' would force Japan to strengthen its independent defence capabilities, sparking a destabilising arms race with China. The idea of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons is a non-starter.


Significance The United States has stationed 600 paratroopers in the Baltic countries and will defend their airspace for the duration of the Zapad-2017 exercise in a bid to reassure NATO allies of Washington’s commitment to their security. Longer term, Washington's European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is paying for a forward presence of additional US forces in Europe, construction of additional infrastructure and upgrades to existing facilities. Impacts The US military will seek to conclude detailed hosting agreements with Eastern European NATO countries. Poland and South Korea are likely candidates for an expanded permanent US forward presence. Repeated US congressional budget standoffs will worry allies awaiting longer-term infrastructure projects. Stationing US tactical nuclear weapons on NATO’s eastern borders would be more provocative to Moscow than EDI-funded rotations. Replacing incompatible cross-border railway gauges between the Baltic states and Poland will take over a decade.


Significance Although North Korea’s nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are still rudimentary by international standards, Pyongyang’s threats of striking targets in the continental United States have more credible technological underpinnings than before. The development of North Korean ICBMs threatens to ‘decouple’ Washington from Seoul and Tokyo, whereby US security commitments to allies become less credible because Pyongyang could attack the US homeland. Impacts Budget battles in Washington preclude extensive investment in mainland US ballistic missile defence systems. However, further integration of Japan and South Korea into the US regional missile defence network is likely. State Department vacancies for ambassadorships and Washington-based Asia policy officials will hinder US reassurance efforts. US interception of North Korean smuggling vessels or overflying missiles risk military-to-military armed clashes.


Subject Potential US adoption of a 'no first use' nuclear weapons policy. Significance The administration of US President Barack Obama is reportedly considering the adoption of a 'no first use' nuclear weapons posture in his final months in office. A no first use policy would involve the United States declaring that it would only use its nuclear arsenal in response to a nuclear attack, never as a preliminary move in escalating tensions. This shift would be a significant departure from Washington's earlier posture, which maintained ambiguity as to whether nuclear weapons would be used in a hypothetical conventional attack on the United States or its allies. Impacts Arsenal upgrades and shifts in doctrine favouring tactical nuclear weapons would counteract the benefits of a restrained declaratory policy. Technological breakthroughs with hypersonic missiles are likely to undermine existing legal and diplomatic arms control arrangements. Obama may take up the pursuit of nuclear arms reductions with an ex-president's public profile. Eastern NATO allies will react strongly against any hint that their security does not fall under the US nuclear umbrella.


Significance Uncertainties surround Trump's willingness to uphold past US foreign policy commitments; nuclear weapons policy is no exception. The next administration will take power with political squabbles deadlocking arms control institutions, fraying international consensus on shared priorities for reducing nuclear dangers, and Washington standing opposite nuclear-armed states in several simmering disputes. Impacts North Korean technological advances will render the US goal of Pyongyang's eventual denuclearisation untenable. Trump will scrutinise Iran for nuclear deal backsliding; Tehran may nevertheless see benefits in strict adherence. Washington questioning its post-1979 'One China' policy towards Taiwan could lead Beijing to adopt a more provocative nuclear posture. US allies in Asia and NATO will view nuclear policy shifts as clues to Washington's relative commitment to their security. Trump's overtures may lead to greater cooperation with Russia on sanctions and counterterrorism, but probably not arms reductions.


Subject China's nuclear weapons capabilities. Significance China has strengthened its nuclear weapons capabilities over the past year, but the issue has not featured prominently in international relations and the US administration has not made nuclear weapons a priority in dealings with Beijing. Unlike other nuclear weapons states, China maintains a strict 'no first use' policy, but its nuclear policies are considerably more opaque than what is seen in US or even Russian government documents. Impacts New submarine-launched ballistic missiles will provide more reliable second-strike capacity than the more vulnerable land-based missiles. China's space and cyber capabilities could amplify the effects of a nuclear strike by paralysing the adversary's response capabilities. Chinese nuclear advances will increase the danger involved in US military intervention in conflicts between China and Taiwan or Japan. China's nuclear build-up may affect its security negatively overall, prompting neighbours to develop missile defence and other capabilities.


Significance South Korea's defence ministry said today that a sixth test is possible at any time, with one tunnel at the North's Punggye-ri test site still unused. Yesterday, Seoul's semi-official news agency Yonhap quoted a military source in Seoul as threatening to "raze" Pyongyang pre-emptively, should the North show any sign of planning a nuclear attack. Impacts In the immediate future the US presidential election creates a policy vacuum. In Seoul calls will grow for South Korea to have its own nuclear weapons, or host US ones. If the North keeps testing, it will grow harder for Washington to head off such demands. Beijing, which has always insisted that sanctions must be backed up by diplomacy, is now pressed to produce concrete proposals. Violent Southern language reflects the humiliation of Park Geun-hye's administration, whose time is running out -- another risk factor.


Significance Representing a victory for international diplomacy, the deal promises to resolve a 13-year stand-off between Iran and the West, and pave the way to Iran's reintegration into the international community and economy. However, it must first receive Iranian government approval, and pass review in the US Congress, where Republicans are gearing up to oppose it. Impacts Iranian hardliners are unlikely to scuttle the settlement as long as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei maintains his support for it. President Hassan Rouhani and his centrist-reformist allies will be strengthened politically against the hardliners. The deal will exacerbate tensions between the United States and key regional allies, Israel and the Gulf Arab states. Detente with Washington will be limited by hardliners on both sides, and by Iran's unstinting support for its regional proxies.


Subject Prospects for North Korea in 2018. Significance 2018 will be Kim Jong-un’s seventh year as supreme leader, a role he inherited on the death of his father Kim Jong-il in December 2011. Turning 34 in January, he has consolidated power and has no known rivals, but he faces grave challenges of his own making: how far and fast to push ahead with nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing in the face of US threats.


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