Arms treaty deal will help broader Russian-US dialogue

Significance Soon after Biden's inauguration as president tomorrow, US and Russian diplomats are expected to discuss an extension to New START, the only remaining major agreement regulating their nuclear forces. This can be done quickly; the main outstanding question is whether to prolong it for the maximum five years permitted or settle on a shorter extension. Impacts With New START renewed, Washington and Moscow will seek clarity on next steps in nuclear threat reduction and arms control. This could be a lengthy process, requiring internal reviews of nuclear policy, force posture, arms control and bilateral relations. The alternative is an increase in mutual suspicions of force plans, further erosion of trust and pressure to enlarge nuclear budgets. COVID-19 management will consume government attention to and budgets for defence and diplomacy.

Subject China's pledge to 'no first use' of nuclear weapons. Significance The recent introduction of more offensive capabilities into China's nuclear forces, such as multiple warheads, together with Chinese military writings that toy with a future launch-on-warning capability, all seem to complicate China's long-standing pledge of 'no first use' (NFU). China is the only nuclear weapons state to maintain an unconditional and continuous NFU pledge ever since it developed nuclear weapons. Impacts China will not become more transparent in its nuclear policy: Beijing sees opacity as tied to survivability. China will focus on conventional military modernisation (including space and cyber), where NFU does not restrict use of force. China's adherence to NFU stabilises the non-proliferation regime only in upholding continuity amid uncertainty in Moscow and Washington. US-China dialogue on strategic relations will not progress while Washington presses Beijing for details on operational conditions of NFU.


Significance China has also announced changes to its nuclear weapons posture, including a rebranding of its nuclear forces. Since becoming a nuclear weapons state in 1964, China has consistently presented its nuclear arsenal as defensive and limited, in both quantity and quality. The recent developments call this into question. Impacts US allies in Asia will seek further reassurance from Washington, including ballistic missile defence cooperation. There will be a quiet 'nuclearisation' of the South China Sea. China is bolder with Obama leaving office; it may be less so once a new US administration is in place. Xi may control the narrative around China's nuclear policy more closely, curtailing Chinese nuclear analysts' freedom of speech.


Significance The likely end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty will be an important marker in the decline of international stability and a particular blow to long-held assumptions about European security. It comes at a time when US-Russian dialogue has stalled and uncertainties about intentions and evolving technologies abound. Impacts The INF issue will feed Moscow's narrative about encirclement by hostile forces. Despite delays to arms programmes, Russia has proved adept at developing and adapting smaller missile types. President Donald Trump is unlikely to engage meaningfully with Russia on the detail of arms control.


Subject Prospects for nuclear arms control in 2019-23. Significance Russia and the United States have reached an apparent impasse on nuclear weapons. Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin warn of the dangers of a new nuclear arms race, but neither appears ready to make the concessions necessary to salvage the current arms control and non-proliferation regime. Attending a NATO foreign ministers' meeting yesterday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo set a 60-day deadline for Russia to comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.


Significance Russia and China have several hypersonic weapons in service or near readiness. This class of weapon is raising concerns in the conventional and strategic realms, where security tensions are already high. A Chinese weapon tested this year created new concerns by reportedly spending time in near-earth orbit. Impacts Governments will review the survivability of their nuclear forces as a hypersonic arms race develops. The reported Chinese test of an orbital system will increased US call to bring hypersonic technologies into arms control discussions. Chinese advances will spur Washington and some of its regional allies to develop defensive and offensive options to counter such systems.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-459
Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
T. V. Paul ◽  
Anders Wivel

The rise of “the rest,” especially China, has triggered an inevitable transformation of the so-called liberal international order. Rising powers have started to both challenge and push for the reform of existing multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to create new ones, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The United States under the Trump administration, on the other hand, has retreated from the international institutions that the country once led or helped to create, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the Paris Agreement; the Iran nuclear deal; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The United States has also paralyzed the ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle trade disputes by blocking the appointment of judges to its appellate body. Moreover, in May 2020, President Trump announced his decision to quit the Open Skies Treaty, an arms control regime designed to promote transparency among its members regarding military activities. During the past decade or so, both Russia and the United States have been dismantling multilateral arms control treaties one by one while engaging in new nuclear buildups at home.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-58
Author(s):  
GLEB TOROPCHIN ◽  

The given article is dedicated to scrutinising the role of nuclear factor in the U.S. policy in the Asia Pacific region lately. The work is written based on the analysis of the official doctrinal documents defining U.S. foreign policy. The aim of the paper is defining the significance of the nuclear dimension in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy and trends in its evolution in late 2010s and early 2020s. The author dwells upon the features of conceptualising the term “Indo-Pacific” in the U.S. foreign policy strategy taking into account its transition from the expert discourse to the official one. Three layers of analysis are singled out: doctrinal, operational and institutional. Special attention is paid to the relations between the U.S. and its allies in the macroregion, including parties to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (i.e. India, Japan and Australia), as well as other countries, such as South Korea. The influence of China’s growing power and its claims for regional and global leadership on the shift in Washington’s foreign policy is also unveiled. The author discovers a direct correlation between the role of the maritime constituent in the “Indo-Pacific security” and the intention of the U.S. to develop the sea and air components in its nuclear triad. Various directions of the U.S. advancing its nuclear forces in the Asia Pacific are shown, as well as the role of adjacent projects in the field of security (such as “Global ABM”). Apart from this, the article demonstrates the factors that might have an impact on the U.S. nuclear policy in the region during J. Biden’s presidency. An attempt is made to predict possible scenarios in the near future.


Significance The previous day, France's President Emmanuel Macron announced that Niger would be the new headquarters of French-led counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. This will give Bazoum a chance to assume a greater leadership role among the G5 Sahel countries -- Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger -- in the fight against jihadist groups in the region. Impacts Niger's bilateral relations with Mali and Chad will be less cordial because of Bazoum's stance against military involvement in politics. Opposition leaders and civil society activists will continue to be subject to heavy-handed treatment. More frequent extreme weather events will increase the numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees.


mSphere ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
David W. Cobb ◽  
Anat Florentin ◽  
Manuel A. Fierro ◽  
Michelle Krakowiak ◽  
Julie M. Moore ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Half of the world’s population lives at risk for malaria. The intraerythrocytic life cycle of Plasmodium spp. is responsible for clinical manifestations of malaria; therefore, knowledge of the parasite’s ability to survive within the erythrocyte is needed to combat the deadliest agent of malaria, P. falciparum. An outstanding question in the field is how P. falciparum undertakes the essential process of trafficking its proteins within the host cell. In most organisms, chaperones such as Hsp70 are employed in protein trafficking. Of the Plasmodium species causing human disease, the chaperone PfHsp70x is unique to P. falciparum, and it is the only parasite protein of its kind exported to the host (S. Külzer et al., Cell Microbiol 14:1784–1795, 2012). This has placed PfHsp70x as an ideal target to inhibit protein trafficking and kill the parasite. However, we show that PfHsp70x is not required for export of parasite effectors and it is not essential for parasite survival inside the RBC. Export of parasite proteins into the host erythrocyte is essential for survival of Plasmodium falciparum during its asexual life cycle. While several studies described key factors within the parasite that are involved in protein export, the mechanisms employed to traffic exported proteins within the host cell are currently unknown. Members of the Hsp70 family of chaperones, together with their Hsp40 cochaperones, facilitate protein trafficking in other organisms, and are thus likely used by P. falciparum in the trafficking of its exported proteins. A large group of Hsp40 proteins is encoded by the parasite and exported to the host cell, but only one Hsp70, P. falciparum Hsp70x (PfHsp70x), is exported with them. PfHsp70x is absent in most Plasmodium species and is found only in P. falciparum and closely related species that infect apes. Herein, we have utilized clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeat (CRISPR)/Cas9 genome editing in P. falciparum to investigate the essentiality of PfHsp70x. We show that parasitic growth was unaffected by knockdown of PfHsp70x using both the dihydrofolate reductase (DHFR)-based destabilization domain and the glmS ribozyme system. Similarly, a complete gene knockout of PfHsp70x did not affect the ability of P. falciparum to proceed through its intraerythrocytic life cycle. The effect of PfHsp70x knockdown/knockout on the export of proteins to the host red blood cell (RBC), including the critical virulence factor P. falciparum erythrocyte membrane protein 1 (PfEMP1), was tested, and we found that this process was unaffected. These data show that although PfHsp70x is the sole exported Hsp70, it is not essential for the asexual development of P. falciparum. IMPORTANCE Half of the world’s population lives at risk for malaria. The intraerythrocytic life cycle of Plasmodium spp. is responsible for clinical manifestations of malaria; therefore, knowledge of the parasite’s ability to survive within the erythrocyte is needed to combat the deadliest agent of malaria, P. falciparum. An outstanding question in the field is how P. falciparum undertakes the essential process of trafficking its proteins within the host cell. In most organisms, chaperones such as Hsp70 are employed in protein trafficking. Of the Plasmodium species causing human disease, the chaperone PfHsp70x is unique to P. falciparum, and it is the only parasite protein of its kind exported to the host (S. Külzer et al., Cell Microbiol 14:1784–1795, 2012). This has placed PfHsp70x as an ideal target to inhibit protein trafficking and kill the parasite. However, we show that PfHsp70x is not required for export of parasite effectors and it is not essential for parasite survival inside the RBC.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 115-117
Author(s):  
Herbert Scoville

In speaking about arms control negotiations in a multipolar world, it is necessary to bear in mind that we are not really in a multipolar world right now. But perhaps we are starting toward one, at least as far as nuclear power is concerned. Britain, France, and China possess only relatively small nuclear forces at present but they will grow in time and eventually will have to be taken into consideration at least in arms control negotiations involving nuclear weapons. France and Britain at the present do have a nuclear deterrent force which would deter an attack as far as the Soviets are concerned. The status of the Chinese nuclear force is very much more uncertain. It is possible that they now possess a very limited deterrent to an attack by the Soviet Union. Certainly there is no question that at the present time they do not have any means by which they can threaten, even in retaliation, a nuclear attack against the United States. As a consequence, the Chinese do not provide any direct threat to us and we can go ahead and negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union without any real consideration of Chinese participation. One need not conclude from the growing Chinese nuclear power that they must necessarily be brought into the SALT negotiations in the near future.


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