Canada labels extremist groups as terrorist entities

Headline CANADA: Terrorist designations for extremist groups

Significance Since late August both governments have been challenged by a wave of demonstrations protesting endemic corruption and deteriorating standards of living -- partly as a result of a blockade of oil exports since January by eastern authorities. Some rallies have been met with violence. Impacts Protests and violent attempts to quash them are likely to shake what little faith ordinary Libyans retain in existing governance structures. Protesters may target key infrastructure -- including oil -- hoping to make their voices heard, risking another shock to the economy. Extremist groups, including Islamic State, could seek to exploit grievances underpinning the protests, recruiting vulnerable youth.


Significance With the ending of ISAF's mission, a new mission named 'Resolute Support' comes into force, with about 13,000 troops providing support and training to Afghanistan's 350,000 security personnel. However, despite this continuing support, fear continues to rise that 2015 will see a significant resurgence of extremist groups inside Afghanistan, with the prospect of a spill-over of fighting into Central Asia. Members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) held their largest counter-terrorism drills in August 2014, and it is likely that 2015 will see further significant SCO military drills in Central Asia. Impacts Increased security clampdown in Central Asia in 2015 will come at the expense of democratic freedoms. Despite Chinese and Russian military capabilities, the SCO will lack the capacity to replace NATO in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's instability will provide an avenue for renewed limited security cooperation between Russia and the West.


Subject Examination of online radicalisation processes. Significance The threat of terrorist attacks and violence from both foreign and domestic groups presents one of the greatest public policy challenges to date. The internet may be a pivotal source in propelling individuals to engage in violence because they can access ideological belief systems confirming their own from anywhere at any time. Impacts The internet will facilitate remote 'enculturation' into extremist groups. The use of violence is still relatively rare compared to the large number of people who may be exposed to radical messaging. More research is needed to understand what drives the small proportion of individuals to actually engage in violence.


Significance Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya benefit from the security vacuum emanating from the political crisis. IS has been regrouping after losing its headquarters in Sirte in 2016, even as it faces serious setbacks in Iraq and Syria. Al-Qaida-affiliated groups also exploit the neglected south. Impacts A stalled political dialogue will give salafi-jihadi groups like IS the space to regroup, even amid airstrikes. Salafi-jihadi groups will engage in high-profile attacks, targeting government officials and foreigners. Persistent insecurity will inhibit Libyan efforts to reverse economic decline, especially if groups attack oil and gas sites. The spread of extremist groups raises business costs and compels neighbours to close borders, contributing to Libya’s economic isolation.


Significance Syria’s civil war is fought not just with bombs and bullets, but with salaries and services. The government has been able to win this aspect of the war by denying services to targeted opposition-held areas, and depopulating districts by constraining residents’ access to basic necessities such as food, water, fuel and electricity. Impacts The Syrian state will be deeply fragmented for the foreseeable future. Rival local fiefdoms will complicate efforts to direct international aid funds for reconstruction. Islamic extremist groups will find ‘havens’ to wage a long-lasting insurgency against the state, despite reduced access to funds.


Significance Islamic State group (ISG) claimed responsibility for the attacks. Nearly two years since its June 2014 offensive in Syria and Iraq, ISG still controls and governs significant territory. The organisation is preparing for a prolonged fight within those countries and has also scaled its efforts globally, gaining regional affiliates and launching increasingly sophisticated international attacks. Impacts ISG will use its territory in Iraq and Syria to support jihadists abroad, helping them to launch more frequent and sophisticated attacks. ISG efforts to provoke conflict will create opportunities for it and other extremist groups, particularly al-Qaida, to gain support. Uncoordinated Western military support to anti-ISG groups in Libya will likely prolong its civil war, enabling ISG's continued growth.


Subject Islamic State group's expansion prospects Significance Over the past sixteen months, the international community has focused its campaign to counter the Islamic State group (ISG) primarily on Iraq and Syria. This approach overlooks ISG's accelerating regional affiliate programme, which gives ISG strategic resiliency outside of its "caliphate" within the two main countries. A strategy to defeat ISG cannot succeed without addressing its formal affiliates in Libya, Egypt, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Impacts ISG's affiliate in Egypt will rekindle ties with extremist groups on mainland Egypt in order to launch more attacks. ISG will encourage new supporters globally to launch spectacular terrorist attacks. Russia's escalation in Syria will aid ISG's expansion by degrading the Syrian opposition and ensuring the continuation of the civil war.


Subject Prospects for Syria in 2019. Significance The country is de facto partitioned into territories controlled by the Russian-backed Damascus government, Turkey and the United States. The opposition no longer has meaningful agency and poses little threat. President Bashar al-Assad is internationally isolated, the economy destroyed and reconstruction funds unavailable. Geopolitical rivalries loom large over the future of Turkish and US-held territory, the fate of extremist groups and the Iranian-backed presence in government-held areas.


Author(s):  
Jeeyun Oh ◽  
Mun-Young Chung ◽  
Sangyong Han

Despite of the popularity of interactive movie trailers, rigorous research on one of the most apparent features of these interfaces – the level of user control – has been scarce. This study explored the effects of user control on users’ immersion and enjoyment of the movie trailers, moderated by the content type. We conducted a 2 (high user control versus low user control) × 2 (drama film trailer versus documentary film trailer) mixed-design factorial experiment. The results showed that the level of user control over movie trailer interfaces decreased users’ immersion when the trailer had an element of traditional story structure, such as a drama film trailer. Participants in the high user control condition answered that they were less fascinated with, absorbed in, focused on, mentally involved with, and emotionally affected by the movie trailer than participants in the low user control condition only with the drama movie trailer. The negative effects of user control on the level of immersion for the drama trailer translated into users’ enjoyment. The impact of user control over interfaces on immersion and enjoyment varies depending on the nature of the media content, which suggests a possible trade-off between the level of user control and entertainment outcomes.


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