Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: the Social Dilemmas of Cybersecurity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Richard Schoenherr ◽  
Robert Thomson
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Social

How punishment and memory mechanism affect cooperative emergence in prisoner’s dilemma game

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150139
Author(s):  
Jie Lu ◽  
Peipei Zhang ◽  
Dandan Li
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Memory Factor ◽  
Penalty Cost ◽  
Memory Mechanism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Final Fraction

To remember or forget our acquaintances’ strategies can influence our decision-making significantly. In this paper, we explore the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model with punishment and memory mechanism in the time-varying network. Our results show that a larger temptation gain [Formula: see text] or a larger the number of connected edges of activated individuals [Formula: see text] would result in the decrease of the final fraction of cooperators. However, with the increase of the maximum penalty cost, the maximum punishment intensity or the value of individual’s “memory factor”, players are more inclined to choose cooperative strategy. In addition, an effective way to promote the cooperation is to improve the social subsidy. Remarkably, only when the social subsidy is greater than the temptation gain, the density of cooperators could increase significantly. Interestingly, there is a linear relationship between the threshold of social subsidy and the temptation gain. The final results show that ones’ activity rates have no significant correlation with their strategies.

scholarly journals The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Conceptual Framework for Understanding Value-Related and Behavioral Changes in Western Societies in the Second Decade of the 21st Century: The Case of Israel

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. p39
Author(s):  
Leehu Zysberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Popular Media ◽  
Behavioral Changes ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Social Disintegration ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Science Literature

In the popular media and from time to time in the social science literature, voices are heard describing a process of social disintegration and the deterioration of common values in western societies. What may account for this fragmentation? This article uses the theoretical framework of the prisoner’s dilemma to conceptualize the phenomenon, analyze its causes and processes, and to try and outline directions for dealing with it, using processes and data regarding the Israeli society in recent years.

scholarly journals Effects of Empty Sites on Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Based on Social Diversity

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Wang Liming ◽  
Feng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Social Diversity ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Rank Distributions

We study the effects of empty sites in the prisoner’s dilemma game based on social diversity by introducing some empty sites into a square lattice. The results reveal that the empty sites dramatically enhance the cooperation level for a wide range of temptation to defection values if two types of players coexist. By calculating the chances of different type-combinations of the players located on the square lattice, we find that there is an intermediate region where five social ranks are induced to satisfy the certain rank distributions and the cooperation level is significantly enhanced. Moreover, simulation results also show that the moderate gaps among the social ranks can favor cooperation for a larger occupation density.

The Social Contract in Leviathan and the Prisoner's Dilemma Supergame

1981 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Game Theory

The familiar problem of whether Hobbesian men in the state of nature would ever abide by an agreement to obey a Sovereign is a version of the puzzle now known as ‘Prisoner's Dilemma’. The present paper has the following aims: (1) To establish that the game-theory approach is a legitimate way to study Hobbes. (2) To see whether a proposed ‘solution’ to the paradox of Prisoner's Dilemma applies to this example. The paradox is that individually rational self-interested calculations sum to an outcome that is suboptimal not only for society but also for every single member of it. The solution is the Supergame which consists of indefinitely repeated plays of the simple Prisoner's Dilemma game. (3) To compare the results of the above with the similar conclusions reached by a different route by recent arguments in sociobiology.

scholarly journals Human cooperation in social dilemmas: comparing the Snowdrift game with the Prisoner's Dilemma

2007 ◽  
Vol 274 (1628) ◽  
pp. 2965-2970 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolf Kümmerli ◽  
Caroline Colliard ◽  
Nicolas Fiechter ◽  
Blaise Petitpierre ◽  
Flavien Russier ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Snowdrift Game

Evolution of extortion in the social-influenced prisoner’s dilemma

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650029 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhipeng Wang ◽  
Miao Li ◽  
Dan Wang ◽  
Qinghe Chen
Keyword(s):  
Social Influence ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Complete Knowledge ◽  
Best Response ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mixed Populations ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Response Rule

The introduction of extortion strategy has attracted much attention since it dominates any evolutionary opponent in iterated prisoner’s dilemma games. Despite several studies argue that extortion is difficult to survive under strategy imitation and birth–death updating rules in well-mixed populations, it has recently been proven that a myopic best response rule facilitate the evolution of cooperation and extortion. However, such updating rules require a strong assumption of complete knowledge of all players, which is unlikely to hold in social networks in reality. To solve this problem, we introduce the concept of social influence into the model to limit players’ knowledge within their neighborhood. It turns out that this myopia initiated by social influence prevents players from observing superior strategies and therefore enables cooperators and extortioners to be evolutionarily stable. We also suggest that heterogeneous networks contribute to the evolution of cooperation and extortion under such social influence.

scholarly journals Process R&D investment and social dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Ramsza ◽  
Adam Karbowski ◽  
Tadeusz Platkowski
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Entry Cost ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
D Investment

AbstractWe consider a coopetitive game model of firms’ behavior in process R&D with entry cost. We compare the competitive behavior of firms in R&D with the R&D coopetition scenario. In R&D coopetition, firms engage in a bargaining process to reach a binding R&D agreement. We find that R&D competition can lead to a prisoner’s dilemma or a chicken game between market rivals. The possibility of entering a binding R&D agreement resolves the above social dilemmas associated with the firms’ competitive behavior. In turn, under R&D coopetition, for a medium level of R&D entry cost, firms may enter a trust dilemma, but it is a beneficial scenario in comparison with the corresponding R&D competition outcome.

The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract

Dialogue ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Braybrooke
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Traditional Problem ◽  
The Social

The traditional problem of the social contract defies solution. Agents with the motivations traditionally assumed would not in the circumstances traditionally assumed voluntarily arrive at a contract or voluntarily keep it up, as we can now understand, more clearly than our illustrious predecessors, by treating the problem in terms not available to them: the terms of Prisoner's Dilemma and of the theory of public goods.

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