The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract

Dialogue ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Braybrooke
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Traditional Problem ◽  
The Social

The traditional problem of the social contract defies solution. Agents with the motivations traditionally assumed would not in the circumstances traditionally assumed voluntarily arrive at a contract or voluntarily keep it up, as we can now understand, more clearly than our illustrious predecessors, by treating the problem in terms not available to them: the terms of Prisoner's Dilemma and of the theory of public goods.

The Social Contract in Leviathan and the Prisoner's Dilemma Supergame

1981 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Game Theory

The familiar problem of whether Hobbesian men in the state of nature would ever abide by an agreement to obey a Sovereign is a version of the puzzle now known as ‘Prisoner's Dilemma’. The present paper has the following aims: (1) To establish that the game-theory approach is a legitimate way to study Hobbes. (2) To see whether a proposed ‘solution’ to the paradox of Prisoner's Dilemma applies to this example. The paradox is that individually rational self-interested calculations sum to an outcome that is suboptimal not only for society but also for every single member of it. The solution is the Supergame which consists of indefinitely repeated plays of the simple Prisoner's Dilemma game. (3) To compare the results of the above with the similar conclusions reached by a different route by recent arguments in sociobiology.

How punishment and memory mechanism affect cooperative emergence in prisoner’s dilemma game

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150139
Author(s):  
Jie Lu ◽  
Peipei Zhang ◽  
Dandan Li
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Memory Factor ◽  
Penalty Cost ◽  
Memory Mechanism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Punishment Intensity ◽  
Final Fraction

To remember or forget our acquaintances’ strategies can influence our decision-making significantly. In this paper, we explore the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model with punishment and memory mechanism in the time-varying network. Our results show that a larger temptation gain [Formula: see text] or a larger the number of connected edges of activated individuals [Formula: see text] would result in the decrease of the final fraction of cooperators. However, with the increase of the maximum penalty cost, the maximum punishment intensity or the value of individual’s “memory factor”, players are more inclined to choose cooperative strategy. In addition, an effective way to promote the cooperation is to improve the social subsidy. Remarkably, only when the social subsidy is greater than the temptation gain, the density of cooperators could increase significantly. Interestingly, there is a linear relationship between the threshold of social subsidy and the temptation gain. The final results show that ones’ activity rates have no significant correlation with their strategies.

Hobbes, Conatus and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

1998 ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Juhani Pietarinen
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Sovereign Power ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Made In

I want to show the importance of the notion of conatus (endeavor) for Hobbes' political philosophy. According to Hobbes, all motion of bodies consists of elementary motions he called 'endeavors.' They are motions 'made in less space and time than can be given,' and they obey the law of persistence or inertia. A body strives to preserve its state and resist the causal power of other bodies. I call this the conatus-principle. Hobbes' argument for social contract and sovereign is based essentially on this model. He proves that the natural conatus makes people (i) strive to preserve their lives and therefore to get out of the destructive state of nature; (ii) commit to mutual contracts; (iii) keep the contracts unless some external cause otherwise determines; and (iv) establish a permanent sovereign power that Hobbes calls 'an artificial eternity of life.' All this is determined by the fundamental laws of nature, essentially, by the conatus-principle. I also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature does not represent all of the essential features of Hobbes' argument.

Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Dalibor Roháč
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Weakest Link ◽  
Game Of Chicken ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
The Difference

Abstract In this paper, we discuss several issues related to public goods provision. Unlike many Austrians, we do not think that the concept of public goods - or of collective action - is an inherently flawed idea, even though we reject the alleged welfare implications of public goods theory, as proposed by orthodox public finance literature. We then argue that the structure of a generic public goods problem is more a game of chicken or an assurance game than a prisoner's dilemma and that this has important implications with regard to the plausibility of cooperative outcomes. Namely, when the public goods problem has the weakest-link structure and can be represented as an assurance game, then the cooperative outcome will be self-enforcing. In many cases, the public goods problems can be transformed into weakest-link games or different mechanisms can be found to ensure cooperation. We also discuss the difference between a public goods problem and collusion. We assert that, unlike public goods problems, collusive agreements have the structure of a prisoner's dilemma. Overall, our paper suggests that there are reasons to be optimistic about stability and efficiency of stateless societal orders.

scholarly journals The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Conceptual Framework for Understanding Value-Related and Behavioral Changes in Western Societies in the Second Decade of the 21st Century: The Case of Israel

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. p39
Author(s):  
Leehu Zysberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Popular Media ◽  
Behavioral Changes ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Social Disintegration ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Science Literature

In the popular media and from time to time in the social science literature, voices are heard describing a process of social disintegration and the deterioration of common values in western societies. What may account for this fragmentation? This article uses the theoretical framework of the prisoner’s dilemma to conceptualize the phenomenon, analyze its causes and processes, and to try and outline directions for dealing with it, using processes and data regarding the Israeli society in recent years.

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