Game between Mobile Operators and Financial Institutions in Mobile Payment Market: An Evolutionary Game Approach

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qianfan Zhang ◽  
Cuicui Cao
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Mobile Payment

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Cooperation Motives of Mobile Operators and Financial Institutions in the Near Field Communication Mobile Payment Industry

2014 ◽  
Vol 496-500 ◽  
pp. 2784-2787
Author(s):  
Mu Hua Wei ◽  
Shou Lian Tang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Service Industry ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Near Field ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Operating Mode ◽  
Mobile Payment ◽  
Near Field Communication ◽  
Mobile Operator ◽  
Leading Mode

Mobile operators and financial institutions are the two major participants in the near field communication (NFC) payment service industry. They provide this service in four different operation modes: mobile operator-financial institution cooperation mode, mobile operators leading mode, financial institutions leading mode, and independent operating mode. The relationship between these two groups is complex because it includes both competition and cooperation. This paper sets up an evolutionary game model to study this special relationship and analyzes the cooperation motives of mobile operators and financial institutions in the NFC mobile payment industry.

Mobile Payment Issues and Policy Implications

2011 ◽  
pp. 88-101
Author(s):  
Y. Kwon
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Mobile Network ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Mobile Payment ◽  
Mobile Payments ◽  
Korean Economy ◽  
Banking Service ◽  
Payment Instruments ◽  
The Government ◽  
Mobile Network Operators

This chapter introduces three mobile payment plans that have been launched in Korea: mobile banking service, mobile prepaid electronic cash service and mobile phone bill service. Based on the recent experiences of the Korean economy, this chapter discusses the regulatory and monetary policy issues associated with mobile payments. Mobile payments are superior to existing means of payments because of their efficiency and convenience and mobile network operators (MNOs) are on the verge of turning into non-bank financial institutions in their nature. The government needs to facilitate the crossbreed between banks and MNOs to accelerate the development of efficient payment instruments rather than hindering innovation in banking industry.

The Adoption of E-Wallets

2021 ◽  
pp. 242-262
Author(s):  
Adel Ismail Al-Alawi ◽  
Ali H. Al-Hammam ◽  
S. Sadiq Al-Alawi ◽  
Ebtesam Ismaeel AlAlawi
Keyword(s):  
Technology Acceptance ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Diffusion Of Innovations ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Mobile Payment ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Mobile Banking ◽  
Use Of Technology ◽  
Acceptance Model ◽  
High Level

This chapter measures the attitudes of people residing in the Kingdom of Bahrain toward adopting mobile banking technology, also known as e-Wallets. The Technology Acceptance Model, the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology, and the Diffusion of Innovations model were used to construct a questionnaire with the added focus on the promotional aspects. A total of 1,740 responses obtained from individuals in Bahrain revealed a high level of adoption rates. All dimensions measured were confirmed to have a significant impact on the adoption of e-Wallets, particularly those related to promotional benefits, which reveals a need for future studies to focus on the marketing approaches of mobile payment technologies. Studied factors were confirmed to have a significant impact on the usage and adoption of e-Wallets in the Kingdom of Bahrain. More focus is required from a benefits perspective rather than the technical perspective. Financial institutions need to pay more considerable attention to the changing mindsets of people toward making payments and the shift to new technologies.

Mobile Payment Development in China

2013 ◽  
Vol 464 ◽  
pp. 416-419
Author(s):  
Li Zhao ◽  
Hua Ying Shu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
High Speed ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Near Field ◽  
Mobile Internet ◽  
Mobile Payment ◽  
Industry Chain ◽  
3G Network ◽  
Internet Economy

The thesis first analyzes the concept of mobile payment, and then it makes a distinction between remote payment and near field payment. In addition to that, it infers the development of global mobile payment, which involves the users and the market size. Secondly it probes into Chinas rapid development of mobile internet economy, whose 3G network and smart phones provides high-speed mobile Internet and visual, convenient interface for mobile payment. Thirdly, harmonization of standards of mobile payment will help create industry chain parties openness, cooperation and win-win situation and promote mobile payment intensive and large-scale development process. In the end, it probes into the win-win business model for the telecom operators and financial institutions: Telecom operators will lease SIM card space to obtain revenue and financial institutions will get more fee income.

scholarly journals Cooperation or Competition: An Evolutionary Game Study between Commercial Banks and Big Data-Based E-Commerce Financial Institutions in China

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Zhao ◽  
Dong Li ◽  
Liqiang Pan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Business Case ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Supply Chain Financing

On the premise of participants’ bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper focuses on the cooperation or competition relationship between Chinese e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks from the perspective of dynamic game. Theoretical mathematical model is built to analyze an evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions. We adopt real-life data set collected in Alibaba’s network credit loan business case and Jingdong’s supply chain financing business case to verify the evolution process of cooperation and competition relationship. The results show that (cooperation, cooperation) is bound to be the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and cooperation tends to be increasingly in-depth and expansive for commercial banks as well as e-commerce financial institutions in China. The complementarity of participants’ core competitiveness is explored as the root of cooperation. Finally, strategic suggestions are put forward on cooperation between e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Blockchain Technology Preventing Supply Chain Financial Risks

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 2824-2842
Author(s):  
Rui Sun ◽  
Dayi He ◽  
Huilin Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Credit Risk ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Financial Risks ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Supply Chain Finance ◽  
Before And After

Because of the risks existing in supply chain finance, taking accounts receivable factoring business as the research object, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to analyzes the factors affecting the decision-making of the participants in supply chain finance, constructs an evolutionary game model between small and medium-sized enterprises and financial institutions, and analyzes the mechanism of blockchain to solve the financial risks of the supply chain by comparing the changes of evolutionary stability strategies before and after the introduction of blockchain technology. This paper aims to reduce financing risks by analyzing the mechanism of blockchain technology in supply chain finance. It is found that, firstly, blockchain technology can reduce the credit risk of financial institutions and solve financing problem. Credit risk plays a decisive role in whether financial institutions accept financing business decisions. Blockchain technology can reduce the operational risk of financial institutions and improve the business income of financial institutions. Secondly, the strict regulatory environment formed by blockchain technology makes the default behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises and core enterprises in a high-risk state at all times. No matter the profit distribution proportion that small and medium-sized enterprises can obtain through collusion, they will not choose to default, which effectively solves the paradox that small and medium-sized enterprises cannot obtain loans from financial institutions despite the increased probability of compliance. Then, the evolutionary game between financial institutions and small and medium-sized enterprises is balanced in that financial institutions accept business applications, small and medium-sized enterprises abide by the contract, and the convergence effect is better. Therefore, blockchain technology not only reduces the financing risk of financial institutions but also helps to solve the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Partners’ Behavior in the Rural E-Payment Market of China

Risks ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 220
Author(s):  
Jerzy Witold Wiśniewski ◽  
Ewelina Sokołowska ◽  
Jinghua Wu ◽  
Anna Dziadkiewicz
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Rural Economy ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Research Field ◽  
Fund Flows ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Mobile Payments ◽  
Market Dynamic ◽  
Further Development

The rural e-payment market in China is becoming one of the important topics in the research field because of its contribution to the efficiency of fund flows in the economy. Further development of the rural e-payment market mainly depends on its partners’ acceptance. In March 2020, 776.08 million people were using mobile payments in China. After the COVID-19 pandemic in China, the Payment and Clearing Association of China launched an action to encourage citizens to use mobile payments. In this article evolutionary game theory is presented. The benefits of e-payments between financial institutions and users are studied. Based on the analysis of the partners’ selection of costs and profits as well as other factors, important conclusions were drawn. The growth of the rural economy is beneficial to the change of the partners’ behavior in the rural e-payment market. Dynamic evolution of the partners’ behavior makes the supply and demand for rural e-payment services consistent. In order to create more benefits, financial institutions will lead the move to merge the rural e-payment market with the China National Advanced Payment System. These research results are beneficial for its growth by developing strategies to encourage more partners to take part in the rural e-payment market in China.

Mobile Payment Issues and Policy Implications

2009 ◽  
pp. 1699-1712
Author(s):  
Youngsun Kwon ◽  
Changi Nam
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Mobile Network ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Mobile Payment ◽  
Mobile Payments ◽  
Korean Economy ◽  
Banking Service ◽  
Payment Instruments ◽  
The Government ◽  
Mobile Network Operators

This chapter introduces three mobile payment plans that have been launched in Korea: mobile banking service, mobile prepaid electronic cash service and mobile phone bill service. Based on the recent experiences of the Korean economy, this chapter discusses the regulatory and monetary policy issues associated with mobile payments. Mobile payments are superior to existing means of payments because of their efficiency and convenience and mobile network operators (MNOs) are on the verge of turning into non-bank financial institutions in their nature. The government needs to facilitate the crossbreed between banks and MNOs to accelerate the development of efficient payment instruments rather than hindering innovation in banking industry.

scholarly journals Complex Dynamic Analysis for Game Model under Different Regulatory Levels in China’s Housing Rental Market

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Lingling Mu ◽  
Xiangyu Qin ◽  
Yuan Li ◽  
Ping Liu
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Rental Market ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Cost

In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model of government and real estate operators (long-term apartment rental companies) in the housing rental market in the context of financial institutions and public participation in regulation and analyze the effects of different regulatory levels of financial institutions and the public on the evolutionary results through model solving and numerical simulation. The results show that, under five different levels of supervision, financial institutions and the public have different evolutionary and stable strategies; financial institutions’ participation in supervision can effectively reduce the cost of government supervision and promote the government’s evolution towards strict supervision. It is difficult for real estate operators to evolve naturally towards keeping their promises when the probability of the social public or financial institutions participating in regulation is low. Only when the probability of social public and financial institutions participating in regulation reaches a certain level will real estate operators be inclined to keep their promises.

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