Inspection and Repair Techniques and Strategies for Alloy 600 PWSCC in Reactor Vessel Head CRD Nozzles and Welds

Author(s):  
S. W. Glass ◽  
D. M. Schlader

As a result of the Alloy 600 PWSCC CRD nozzle leaks discovered in the fall of 2000 and spring of 2001 in several US plants, the NRC has recommended a more pro-active effort by U.S. utilities to inspect similarly susceptible nozzles in all US plants. The primary safety concern is circumferential cracks that can permit the nozzle to separate from the head at high velocity and produce a large-break leak in the reactor vessel. A secondary concern is head leakage from any through-wall cracks in the nozzle or J-groove weld area. Although the fundamental weld and seal design are similar for all US PWR plants, the various surrounding geometry and repair probability considerations require multiple inspection and repair alternatives. Geometry issues include the head insulation design that influences the ability to perform visual examinations from above the head, and the presence or absence of thermal sleeves and funnels governing the type of NDE probes than can be used. Repair probability considerations primarily include the likelihood for repair of a small or large number of nozzles and the length of time the repair must last before a head replacement. This paper discusses the various inspection and repair alternatives offered by one service vendor and discusses a decision process for planning the inspection and repair effort.

Author(s):  
Itaru Muroya ◽  
Youichi Iwamoto ◽  
Naoki Ogawa ◽  
Kiminobu Hojo ◽  
Kazuo Ogawa

In recent years, the occurrence of primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in Alloy 600 weld regions of PWR plants has increased. In order to evaluate the crack propagation of PWSCC, it is required to estimate stress distribution including residual stress and operational stress through the wall thickness of the Alloy 600 weld region. In a national project in Japan for the purpose of establishing residual stress evaluation method, two test models were produced based on a reactor vessel outlet nozzle of Japanese PWR plants. One (Test model A) was produced using the same welding process applied in Japanese PWR plants in order to measure residual stress distribution of the Alloy 132 weld region. The other (Test model B) was produced using the same fabrication process in Japanese PWR plants in order to measure stress distribution change of the Alloy 132 weld region during fabrication process such as a hydrostatic test, welding a main coolant pipe to the stainless steel safe end. For Test model A, residual stress distribution was obtained using FE analysis, and was compared with the measured stress distribution. By comparing results, it was confirmed that the FE analysis result was in good agreement with the measurement result. For mock up test model B, the stress distribution of selected fabrication processes were measured using the Deep Hole Drilling (DHD) method. From these measurement results, it was found that the stress distribution in thickness direction at the center of the Alloy 132 weld line was changed largely during welding process of the safe end to the main coolant pipe.


Author(s):  
Warren Bamford ◽  
John Hall

Service induced cracking in Alloy 600 has been known for a long time, having been first observed in the 1980’s in steam generator tubing and small bore piping, and later, in 1991, in reactor vessel control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) head penetrations. Other than steam generator tubing, which cracked within a few years of operation, the first Alloy 600 cracking was in base metal of Combustion Engineering small bore piping, followed closely by CE pressurizer heater sleeves. The first reactor vessel CRDM penetrations (base metal) to crack were in France, US plants found CRDM cracking several years later. Three plants have discovered weld metal cracking at the outlet nozzle to pipe weld region. This was the first known weld metal cracking. This paper will chronicle the development of service-induced cracking in these components, and compare the behavior of welds as opposed to base metal, from the standpoint of time to crack initiation, growth rate of cracks, and their impact on structural integrity. In addition, a discussion of potential future trends will be provided.


Author(s):  
Kyung-Cho Kim ◽  
Sung-bu Choi ◽  
Koo-Kab Chung ◽  
Hae-Dong Chung

The degradation of alloy 600 and its weld material (alloy 82/182) has been reported in many nuclear power plants. In Korea, the crack induced by PWSCC was discovered in the drain nozzle of Yongkwang units 3 & 4 in 2006∼2008 and SG plug weld of Yongkwang unit 3 in 2007. In July 2007, during visual inspections of SG tube plugs at Yonggwang unit 4, boric acid deposits were observed around five Alloy 600 welded plugs. The root cause of the cracking in alloy 600 plugs was revealed to be due to the fact that the cracks were mainly caused by residual stress induced from the welding, expanding and tight-fitting. Younggwang unit 3 found the white small deposits on the drain nozzle on the 10th RFO in 2007. The root cause of the cracking in drain nozzle was revealed to be due to the initiation of a crack on the inside surface of drain nozzle and propagated to through wall cracks in the axial and circumferential direction. Younggwang unit 3 found the white widespread deposits on the upper head of a reactor vessel on the 12th RFO in 2010. Utility is trying to reveal the root cause of the cracking in the vent line of the reactor head according the KINS requirement. In this article, Korean regulatory experiences for PWSCC are introduced. After these PWSCC experiences, all SG tubes welded by Alloy 600 were replaced and all SG drain and instrumentation nozzles with Alloy 600 have been replaced into Alloy 690 material.


Author(s):  
Tama´s R. Liszkai

A comprehensive work scope including the engineering safety assessments, Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) and repair design, is developed by AREVA NP Inc. for the Reactor Vessel (RV) Incore Monitoring Instrument (IMI) nozzles. The joint Bottom Mounted Nozzle (BMN) Assessment Plan is coordinated under the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Materials Reliability Program (MRP). The purpose of such coordination is to produce a safety assessment of consistent scope and methodology to address the different IMI nozzle designs in all U.S. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). The IMI nozzles, which are also referred to as the BMNs are installed in the bottom of the reactor vessel RV. For the Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) designed plants the nozzles consist of the original Alloy 600 nozzle material attached to the reactor vessel by a partial penetration Alloy 182 weld. To increase the resistance of the nozzles against flow induced vibration (FIV), the nozzles were modified, which consisted of a thicker, more rigid Alloy 600 nozzle welded to the RV inside radius surface. Recent industry experience indicates that the Alloy 600 BMNs and their Alloy 82/182 weld metal may be more susceptible to primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) than previously thought. Although the BMNs have been ranked low in susceptibility to PWSCC, they are ranked as having the most severe consequences of failure. Failure of BMNs represents a scenario that would result in a leak or loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Failure of a BMN was not included in the original design basis for the B&W designed plants. This paper describes the mechanical collateral damage analysis of the BMN engineering safety assessment project performed under the sponsorship of PWR Owner’s Group (PWROG) for the seven operating B&W 177-FA PWR units. Failure of a BMN could potentially lead to pipe whip that could impact other IMI pipes. The goal of the mechanical collateral damage assessment is to determine the potential loads on adjacent IMI pipes. First, the IMI piping configurations for all B&W plants were determined. Based on the piping configurations, potential pipe whip pairs were identified and several representative finite element models of the IMI piping were developed. Using the results of the nonlinear transient dynamic pipe whip analyses, response surfaces were developed, which provided the basis for determining loads due to pipe whip at several different locations. The conservative ultimate capacity analysis corresponding to 50% ultimate strain of the materials showed that the maximum ultimate stress ratio of the intact nozzle cross section at the RV outside radius was acceptable. In addition, the fracture mechanics evaluation of the flawed nozzles, at the RV inside radius, showed that the maximum critical half flaw angle was large enough that early detection of leaking BMNs is possible. For other possible failure modes of the piping, such as the jet impingement, asymmetric cavity pressure effects and insulation frame movement, it was shown that the loads obtained from the pipe whip analyses envelop those loads. The description of this work has been divided into two papers. Part II detailed in this paper presents illustrative examples of the pipe whip analyses and application of response surfaces. Part I [1], to be also presented at PVP-2011, describes the development of the comprehensive collateral damage assessment methodology.


Author(s):  
Stephen Marlette ◽  
Stan Bovid

Abstract For several decades pressurized water reactors have experienced Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) within Alloy 600 components and welds. The nuclear industry has developed several methods for mitigation of PWSCC to prevent costly repairs to pressurized water reactor (PWR) components including surface stress improvement by peening. Laser shock peening (LSP) is one method to effectively place the surface of a PWSCC susceptible component into compression and significantly reduce the potential for crack initiation during future operation. The Material Reliability Program (MRP) has issued MRP-335, which provides guidelines for effective mitigation of reactor vessel heads and nozzles constructed of Alloy 600 material. In addition, ASME Code Case N-729-6 provides performance requirements for peening processes applied to reactor vessel head penetrations in order to prevent degradation and take advantage of inspection relief, which will reduce operating costs for nuclear plants. LSP Technologies, Inc. (LSPT) has developed and utilized a proprietary LSP system called the Procudo® 200 Laser Peening System. System specifications are laser energy of 10 J, pulse width of 20 ns, and repetition rate of 20 Hz. Scalable processing intensity is provided through automated focusing optics control. For the presented work, power densities of 4 to 9.5 GW/cm2 and spot sizes of nominally 2 mm were selected. This system has been used effectively in many non-nuclear industries including aerospace, power generation, automotive, and oil and gas. The Procudo® 200 Laser Peening System will be used to process reactor vessel heads in the United States for mitigation of PWSCC. The Procudo® 200 Laser Peening System is a versatile and portable system that can be deployed in many variations. This paper presents test results used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Procudo® 200 Laser Peening System on Alloy 600 material and welds. As a part of the qualification process, testing was performed to demonstrate compliance with industry requirements. The test results include surface stress measurements on laser peened Alloy 600, and Alloy 182 coupons using x-ray diffraction (XRD) and crack compliance (slitting) stress measurement techniques. The test results are compared to stress criteria developed based on the performance requirements documented in MRP-335 and Code Case N-729-6. Other test results include surface roughness measurements and percent of cold work induced by the peening process. The test results demonstrate the ability of the LSP process to induce the level and depth of compression required for mitigation of PWSCC and that the process does not result in adverse conditions within the material.


2021 ◽  
Vol 144 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Seung-Jae Kim ◽  
Eui-Kyun Park ◽  
Hong-Yeol Bae ◽  
Ju-Hee Kim ◽  
Nam-Su Huh ◽  
...  

Abstract This article investigates numerically welding residual stress distributions of a tube with J-groove weld in control rod drive mechanisms of a pressurized nuclear reactor vessel. Parametric study is performed for the effect of the tube location, tube dimensions, and material's yield strength. It is found that residual stresses increase with increasing the inclination angle of the tube, and the up-hill side is the most critical. For thicker tube, residual stresses decrease. For material's yield strength, both axial and hoop residual stresses tend to increase with increasing the yield strength of Alloy 600. Furthermore, axial stresses tend to increase with increasing yield strength of Alloys 82/182.


Author(s):  
Naoki Chigusa ◽  
Shinro Hirano ◽  
Takehiko Sera ◽  
Hitoshi Kaguchi ◽  
Masayuki Mukai ◽  
...  

Several Japanese PWR power plants have experienced Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) on dissimilar weld joints since 2004. J weld of 3 Reactor Vessel Head Penetration in Ohi unit 3 is one of the PWSCC incidents occurred in 2004 and has been studied by sampling and opening the fracture surface after its repair. Including Ohi unit 3 Reactor Vessel Head Penetration repair, Japanese PWR utilities and MHI have been developing the preventive maintenance and repair technologies applicable to alloy 600 welds and base metal, following PWSCC events on the Bugey-3 and V.C. Summer. This paper describes recent Japanese PWSCC incidents and repair technologies developed in Japan.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-42
Author(s):  
Misao TAKAMATSU ◽  
Hirotaka KAWAHARA ◽  
Hiromichi ITO ◽  
Hiroshi USHIKI ◽  
Nobuhiro SUZUKI ◽  
...  

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