Safety Assessment of Fuel Storage Ponds Following Cooling Faults

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Webb ◽  
Charles Bridgford
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Safety ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Cooling Systems ◽  
External Cooling ◽  
Safety Case

For spent nuclear fuel stored within a cooling pond, the essential nuclear safety functions of control, cooling and containment are fulfilled by maintaining an appropriate depth of water above the fuel. External cooling systems remove the decay heat generated by the spent fuel stored within the pond, in order to maintain the temperature of the water at a constant level. In the event of a fault within these external cooling systems, there is the potential for a temperature excursion within the pond. Historically the UK nuclear industry has considered that such faults would pose no threat to the structural integrity of the pond containment and hence the only loss of water would be due to evaporation following a loss of cooling. However, more recently, it has been recognised that such temperature excursions may result in through-wall cracking leading to a loss of water and undermining of these essential safety functions. This paper outlines the safety case implications of these realisations and the way in which they are being addressed within the UK’s nuclear power stations. The paper considers the effects of thermal transient faults on the concrete pond structure and the potential nuclear safety issues which may occur as a result of this. In response to potential pond cooling faults, consideration is given to the requirement for engineered protection systems along with the safety role of the operator in identifying and responding to faults of this kind. Operators provide a versatile mechanism for identifying fault conditions and taking remedial actions, however, the benefit which can be formally claimed for their role within a safety case is generally limited by the availability or reliability of instrumentation to reveal a fault condition. Post fault operator actions may also be limited by the timescales available following a fault, or by other demands on the operators, which may occur in the event of an external hazard which affects multiple site systems. To quantify the timescales available for post fault remedial action, it is necessary to quantify the rate of water loss from the pond, along with the relationship between pond water depth and the radiological consequences both on-site and off-site. This paper investigates the difficulties which may be encountered in quantifying the role of post fault operator actions within such a safety case, and in demonstrating that the overall nuclear safety risk is acceptably low and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

Simulation and Analysis: The Dose Distribution of KBS-3 Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister by MCNP

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yang ◽  
He-xi Wu ◽  
Yi-bao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Cast Iron ◽  
Radioactive Waste ◽  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Ductile Cast Iron ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
High Level

With the sustained and rapid development of the nuclear power plants, the spent fuel which is produced by the nuclear power plants will be rapidly rising. Spent fuel is High-level radioactive waste and should be disposed safely, which is important for the environment of land, public safety and health of the nuclear industry, the major issues of sustainable development and it is also necessary part for the nuclear industry activities. It is important to study and resolve the high-level radioactive waste repository problem. Spent nuclear fuel is an important component in the radioactive waste, The KBS-3 canister for geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Sweden consists of a ductile cast iron insert and a copper shielding. The ductile cast iron insert provides the mechanical strength whereas the copper protects the canister from corrosion. The canister inserts material were referred to as I24, I25 and I26, Spent nuclear fuel make the repository in high radiant intensity. The radiation analysis of canister insert is important in canister transport, the dose analysis of repository and groundwater radiolysis. Groundwater radiolysis, which produces oxidants (H2O2 and O2), will break the deep repository for spent nuclear fuel. The dose distribution of canister surface with different kinds of canister inserts (I24, I25 and I26) is calculated by MCNP (Ref. 1). Analysing the calculation results, we offer a reference for selecting canister inserts material.

Transport of MOX Fuel: A Continuous Challenge

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Je´roˆme Galtier
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Fuel Cycle ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Mox Fuel ◽  
Increasing Demand

For 45 years TN International has been involved in the radioactive materials transportation field. Since the beginning the spent nuclear fuel transportation has been its core business. During all these years TN International, now part of AREVA, has been able to anticipate and fulfill the needs for new transport or storage casks designed to fit the nuclear industry evolutions. A whole fleet of casks able to transport all the materials of the nuclear fuel cycle has been developed. In this presentation we will focus on the casks used to transport the fresh and used MOX fuel. To transport the fresh MOX BWR and PWR fuel, TN International has developed two designs of casks: the MX 6 and the MX 8. These casks are and have been used to transport MOX fuel for French, German, Swiss and in a near future Japanese nuclear power plants. A complete set of baskets have been developed to optimize the loading in terms of integrated dose and also of course capacity. MOX used fuel has now its dedicated cask: the TN112 which certificate of approval has been obtained in July 2008. This cask is able to transport 12 MOX spent fuel elements with a short cooling time. The first loading of the cask has been performed in September 2008 in the EDF nuclear power plant of Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux. By its continuous involvement in the nuclear transportation field, TN International has been able to face the many challenges linked to the radioactive materials transportation especially talking of MOX fuel. TN International will also have to face the increasing demand linked to the nuclear renaissance.

scholarly journals Temperature conditions in the RBMK spent fuel pool in the event of disturbances in its cooling mode

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
David A. Hakobyan ◽  
Victor I. Slobodchuk
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Maximum Temperature ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Cooling Mode ◽  
Temperature Conditions ◽  
Fuel Assemblies ◽  
Spent Fuel Pool

The problems of reprocessing and long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at nuclear power plants with RBMK reactors have not been fully resolved so far. For this reason, nuclear power plants are forced to search for new options for the disposal of spent fuel, which can provide at least temporary SNF storage. One of the possible solutions to this problem is to switch to compacted SNF storage in reactor spent fuel pools (SFPs). As the number of spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) in SFPs increases, a greater amount of heat is released. In addition, no less important is the fact that a place for emergency FA discharging should be provided in SFPs. The paper presents the results of a numerical simulation of the temperature conditions in SFPs both for compacted SNF storage and for emergency FA discharging. Several types of disturbances in normal SFP cooling mode are considered, including partial loss of cooling water and exposure of SFAs. The simulation was performed using the ANSYS CFX software tool. Estimates were made of the time for heating water to the boiling point, as well as the time for heating the cladding of the fuel elements to a temperature of 650 °С. The most critical conditions are observed in the emergency FA discharging compartment. The results obtained make it possible to estimate the time that the personnel have to restore normal cooling mode of the spent fuel pool until the maximum temperature for water and spent fuel assemblies is reached.

Operational Experience of TN 24 Dual Purpose Spent Fuel Storage Casks at the DOEL Nuclear Power Plants in Belgium

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Baroux ◽  
M. Detrilleaux ◽  
G. Demazy
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
High Capacity ◽  
Radiation Shielding ◽  
Ring Closure ◽  
Operational Experience ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Dual Purpose ◽  
New Members

Abstract Spent nuclear fuel has been stored at the DOEL power station in Belgium in dual-purpose metal casks since 1995. The casks were procured from TRANSNUCLEAIRE by SYNATOM to meet the operational demands for on-site dry storage solutions for fuel arising from the four PWR reactors at DOEL. The TN 24 type of cask was chosen and a range of different cask types were developed. The initial requirement was for dual purpose cask to contain fuel from the DOEL units 3 and 4, these having similar fuel types but different lengths, and thus two new members of the TN 24 family were developed; the TN 24 D and TN 24 XL with capacities of 28 and 24 SFA’s. These casks were licensed as B(U) fissile packagings with approval certificates granted by the French and validated by the Belgium competent authorities for the transport configurations. Both cask designs were also analyzed by TRANSNUCLEAIRE in their storage configurations to ensure that the criteria for safe interim storage could be met. Since 1995, a total of 18 TN 24 D and TN 24 XL casks have been loaded with spent fuel assemblies with an average burn-up of 40,000 MWd/tU. SYNATOM subsequently decided to purchase further casks for DOEL 3 and 4 fuels with higher enrichments, higher burn-ups and shorter cooling times. TRANSNUCLEAIRE developed the TN 24 DH and TN 24 XLH casks within the similar envelope size and weight limits. The increase in performance was achieved by an in-depth optimization of each design in terms of radiation shielding, heat transfer and criticality safety. This paper shows how this optimization process was undertaken for the TN 24 DH and TN 24 XLH casks, 16 of which have been ordered by SYNATOM. DOEL 1 and 2 units use much shorter PWR fuel and it was decided to ship the fuel to unit 3 with an internal transfer cask because the handling limitations in the DOEL 1 and 2 pool prohibited the loading of a high capacity dual purpose transport/storage cask. The TN 24 SH cask was subsequently designed for DOEL 1 and 2 PWR fuel with a capacity of 37 assemblies and nine of there casks have been ordered by SYNATOM. The casks are fitted with monitoring devices to detect any change in the performance of the double metal O ring closure system and none of the casks has shown any deterioration in leaktightness. This paper examines the operation experience of loading and storing more than 30 TN 24 dual purpose casks and compares the performance with design expectations.

Centralization of Canada’s Spent Nuclear Fuel

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista Nicholson ◽  
John McDonald ◽  
Shona Draper ◽  
Brian M. Ikeda ◽  
Igor Pioro
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Site Selection ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Geologic Repository ◽  
Candu Reactors ◽  
High Level

Currently in Canada, spent fuel produced from Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is in the interim storage all across the country. It is Canada’s long-term strategy to have a national geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel for CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. The initial problem is to identify a means to centralize Canada’s spent nuclear fuel. The objective of this paper is to present a solution for the transportation issues that surround centralizing the waste. This paper reviews three major components of managing and the transporting of high-level nuclear waste: 1) site selection, 2) containment and 3) the proposed transportation method. The site has been selected based upon several factors including proximity to railways and highways. These factors play an important role in the site-selection process since the location must be accessible and ideally to be far from communities. For the containment of the spent fuel during transportation, a copper-shell container with a steel structural infrastructure was selected based on good thermal, structural, and corrosion resistance properties has been designed. Rail has been selected as the method of transporting the container due to both the potential to accommodate several containers at once and the extensive railway system in Canada.

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission: Readiness to Regulate SMRs in Canada

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Herstead ◽  
M. de Vos ◽  
S. Cook
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Safety Analysis ◽  
Reactor Power ◽  
Nuclear Safety ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Plant Design ◽  
Regulatory Documents

The success of any new build project is reliant upon all stakeholders — applicants, vendors, contractors and regulatory agencies — being ready to do their part. Over the past several years, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has been working to ensure that it has the appropriate regulatory framework and internal processes in place for the timely and efficient licensing of all types of reactor, regardless of size. This effort has resulted in several new regulatory documents and internal processes including pre-project vendor design reviews. The CNSC’s general nuclear safety objective requires that nuclear facilities be designed and operated in a manner that will protect the health, safety and security of persons and the environment from unreasonable risk, and to implement Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To achieve this objective, the regulatory approach strikes a balance between pure performance-based regulation and prescriptive-based regulation. By utilizing this approach, CNSC seeks to ensure a regulatory environment exists that encourages innovation within the nuclear industry without compromising the high standards necessary for safety. The CNSC is applying a technology neutral approach as part of its continuing work to update its regulatory framework and achieve clarity of its requirements. A reactor power threshold of approximately 200 MW(th) has been chosen to distinguish between large and small reactors. It is recognized that some Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) will be larger than 200 MW(th), so a graded approach to achieving safety is still possible even though Nuclear Power Plant design and safety requirements will apply. Design requirements for large reactors are established through two main regulatory documents. These are RD-337 Design for New Nuclear Power Plants, and RD-310 Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. For reactors below 200 MW(th), the CNSC allows additional flexibility in the use of a graded approach to achieving safety in two new regulatory documents: RD-367 Design of Small Reactors and RD-308 Deterministic Safety Analysis for Small Reactors. The CNSC offers a pre-licensing vendor design review as an optional service for reactor facility designs. This review process is intended to provide early identification and resolution of potential regulatory or technical issues in the design process, particularly those that could result in significant changes to the design or analysis. The process aims to increase regulatory certainty and ultimately contribute to public safety. This paper outlines the CNSC’s expectations for applicant and vendor readiness and discusses the process for pre-licensing reviews which allows vendors and applicants to understand their readiness for licensing.

REPRO: Through Diffusion Experiment (TDE) - Diffusion and Porosity Properties of Rock Matrix in Stress Field of Repository Level

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalle Rahkola ◽  
Antti Poteri ◽  
Lasse Koskinen ◽  
Peter Andersson ◽  
Kersti Nilsson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Stress Field ◽  
Performance Assessment ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Diffusion Experiment ◽  
Spent Fuel ◽  
Tracer Transport ◽  
Rock Matrix ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Through Diffusion

<p>Radionuclides usually migrate slower than the flowing water due to sorption and matrix diffusion. The performance assessment assumes that retention takes place mostly in the vicinity of the deposition holes. REPRO (<em>REtention Properties of ROck matrix</em>) experiments analyzed the matrix retention properties of the rock matrix under realistic conditions deep in the bedrock in ONKALO underground characterization facility at Olkiluoto, Finland. The objective was to investigate tracer transport in the rock matrix, which was representative to the near-field of the final disposal repository of the spent nuclear fuel, and to demonstrate that the assumptions made in the safety case of the deep geological spent fuel repository were in line with site evidence.</p><p>REPRO is composed of several supporting laboratory and <em>in-situ</em> experiments which investigate the retention properties under different experimental configurations. The first <em>in-situ</em> experiments were water phase diffusion experiments performed 2012-2013. Through Diffusion Experiment (TDE) studies diffusion and porosity properties of rock matrix in stress field of repository level and sorption properties of nuclides in intact rock circumstances.</p><p>The TDE experiment has been performed in three parallel drillholes drilled near to each other. Breakthrough of the radioactive tracer is monitored with on-line measurements and samplings along and perpendicular to the foliation. The non-sorbing radioactive isotope traces of HTO and <sup>36</sup>Cl, as well as slightly sorbing <sup>22</sup>Na and strongly sorbing <sup>133</sup>Ba and <sup>134</sup>Cs were used. TDE was designed to control advective flow, as it had caused problems in previous <em>in-situ</em> tests.</p><p>Supporting laboratory studies were performed for drillcore samples sampled from the experimental drillholes. In these laboratory experiments, i.e. porosity, permeability and diffusion coefficients of the drillcores were determined using different methods.</p><p>The TDE experiment was carried out from 2016 to 2019. A breakthrough was seen in the timeframe predicted by scoping calculations carried out. REPRO has produced data and knowledge to the safety case and the performance assessment. According to the preliminary results, values measured in the laboratory are applicable also in larger scale and <em>in-situ</em> conditions.</p>

Decommissioning of Nuclear Reactor Systems

1992 ◽  
Vol 206 (4) ◽  
pp. 273-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
J H Large
Keyword(s):  
Waste Disposal ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
First Generation ◽  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Radioactive Waste Disposal ◽  
Lost Generation ◽  
Power Stations ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Generation Capacity

The decision-making process involving the decommissioning of the British graphite-moderated, gas-cooled Magnox power stations is complex. There are timing, engineering, waste disposal, cost and lost generation capacity factors and the ultimate uptake of radiation dose to consider and, bearing on all of these, the overall decision of when and how to proceed with decommissioning may be heavily weighed by political and public tolerance dimensions. These factors and dimensions are briefly reviewed with reference to the ageing Magnox nuclear power stations, of which Berkeley and Hunterston A are now closed down and undergoing the first stages of decommissioning and Trawsfynydd, although still considered as available capacity, has had both reactors closed down since February 1991 and is awaiting substantiation and acceptance of a revised reactor pressure vessel safety case. Although the other first-generation Magnox power stations at Hinkley Point, Bradwell, Dungeness and Sizewell are operational, it is most doubtful that these stations will be. able to eke out a generating function for much longer. It is concluded that the British nuclear industry has adopted a policy of deferred decommissioning, that is delaying the process of complete dismantlement of the radioactive components and assemblies for at least one hundred years following close-down of the plant. In following this option the nuclear industry has expressed considerable confidence that the decommissioning technology required will he developed with passing time, that acceptable radioactive waste disposal methods and facilities will be available and that the eventual costs of decommissioning will not escalate without restraint.

Developments in Structural Integrity Safety Cases for Highest Reliability Components in the UK

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Jelfs ◽  
M. Hayashi ◽  
A. Toft
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Structural Reliability ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Advisory Group ◽  
Design Assessment ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
The Uk

Gross failure of certain components in nuclear power plant has the potential to lead to intolerable radiological consequences. For these components, UK regulatory expectations require that the probability of gross failure must be shown to be so low that it can be discounted, i.e. that it is incredible. For prospective vendors of nuclear power plant in the UK, with established designs, the demonstration of “incredibility of failure” can be an onerous requirement carrying a high burden of proof. Requesting parties may need to commit to supplementary manufacturing inspection, augmented material testing requirements, enhanced defect tolerance assessment, enhanced material specifications or even changes to design and manufacturing processes. A key part of this demonstration is the presentation of the structural integrity safety case argument. UK practice is to develop a safety case that incorporates the notion of ‘conceptual defence-in-depth’ to demonstrate the highest structural reliability. In support of recent Generic Design Assessment (GDA) submissions, significant experience has been gained in the development of so called “incredibility of failure” arguments. This paper presents an overview of some of the lessons learned relating to the identification of the highest reliability components, the development of the structural integrity safety arguments in the context of current GDA projects, and considers how the UK Technical Advisory Group on Structural Integrity (TAGSI) recommendations continue to be applied almost 15 years after their work was first published. The paper also reports the approach adopted by Horizon Nuclear Power and their partners to develop the structural integrity safety case in support of the GDA process to build the UK’s first commercial Boiling Water Reactor design.

Structural Integrity Assessment of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 RPVs Affected by Hydrogen Flakes: Refined X-FEM Analyses

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Dulieu ◽  
Valéry Lacroix
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Extended Finite Element Method ◽  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Pressure Vessels ◽  
Extended Finite Element ◽  
Integrity Assessment ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Component Manufacturing ◽  
Reactor Pressure

During the 2012 outage at Doel 3 and Tihange 2 Nuclear Power Plants, specific ultrasonic in-service inspections revealed a large number of quasi-laminar indications in the base metal of the reactor pressure vessels, mainly in the lower and upper core shells. The observed indications could subsequently be attributed to hydrogen flaking induced during the component manufacturing process. As a consequence, a Flaw Acceptability Assessment had to be performed as a part of the Safety Case demonstrating the fitness-for-service of these units. In that framework, detailed analyses using eXtended Finite Element Method were conducted to model the specific character of hydrogen flakes. Their quasi-laminar orientation as well as their high density required setting up 3D multi-flaws model accounting for flaw interaction. These calculations highlighted that even the most penalizing flaw configurations are harmless in terms of structural integrity despite the consideration of higher degradation of irradiated material toughness.

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