The Formal Adoption of a Process Safety Management Methodology Within an International Oil and Gas Pipeline Company

Author(s):  
Susan Urra

Process Safety Management (PSM) is an integrated approach to managing loss prevention. At Enbridge, as with many organizations, several PSM elements of practice have been implemented with different levels of rigor, maturity and/or alignment with best practices. This paper presents Enbridge Liquid Pipelines’ approach to assess a strategy to adopt a formal PSM system. A description of the current regulation framework for PSM and the drivers for adoption are presented to explain the considerations during the scoping and design of a PSM system for an international oil and gas pipeline system that operates across numerous state and provincial boundaries, and one international border. The paper also discusses the requirements for organizational governance to ensure accountability for and ownership of individual elements of a PSM program throughout a large, geographically diverse organization such as Enbridge. Finally, a strategy to develop and potentially implement and manage PSM in a large organization such as Enbridge is proposed.

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 48-55
Author(s):  
Кирилл Мельников ◽  
Kirill Melnikov

In this paper an integrated approach to a problem related to minimization of gas supplier’s reputation losses connected with accidents on a gas pipeline and disruption of gas delivery to a consumer with the help of smart contracts is stated. Nowadays analysts and methodologists of pipeline companies perform assessment of expected and actual material expenses at an accident on GTS objects. Account and analytics of reputation losses either isn’t conducted in all, or is implemented in the frame of separate business processes which aren’t integrated into processes of enterprise budget’s management and planning. Such situation is disconcertingly. In the era of globalization the cost of a company and its business reputation depends significantly on the attitude towards it in society. In Europe and USA the major oil and gas companies invest huge money in increasing of their positive image in the eyes of population. Any significant accident which has happened in unforeseen time and unsuccessful place can completely destroy reputation of any company. Modern corporate IT-decisions allow unite a number of data flows in the uniform analytical module now. Information collected in such modules in Gazprom PJSC helps to solve optimizing problems both within planning of material inputs, and within accounting of reputation expenses. In this work a theoretical model for assessment of reputation losses at an accident on a linear part of a gas transmission system (GTS) of Gazprom PJSC is given. Modern theoretical models for definition of function of supplier’s reputation losses have been used. The review of possible application for SAP decisions and Blockchain technology in current business processes of Gazprom JSC in the frame of the problem solution is given. For a clear understanding how to integrate this decision into existing business processes the graphic description of the decision work scheme is given. The principles of this approach can be applied not only in working processes of Gazprom PJSC, but also adapted according to other pipeline companies’ needs. Possible fast introduction of cryptoruble in Russia can offer new prospects for mass introduction of this tool in the context of smart contracts.


Author(s):  
Mohadese Jahanian ◽  
Amin Ramezani ◽  
Ali Moarefianpour ◽  
Mahdi Aliari Shouredeli

One of the most significant systems that can be expressed by partial differential equations (PDEs) is the transmission pipeline system. To avoid the accidents that originated from oil and gas pipeline leakage, the exact location and quantity of leakage are required to be recognized. The designed goal is a leakage diagnosis based on the system model and the use of real data provided by transmission line systems. Nonlinear equations of the system have been extracted employing continuity and momentum equations. In this paper, the extended Kalman filter (EKF) is used to detect and locate the leakage and to attenuate the negative effects of measurement and process noises. Besides, a robust extended Kalman filter (REKF) is applied to compensate for the effect of parameter uncertainty. The quantity and the location of the occurred leakage are estimated along the pipeline. Simulation results show that REKF has better estimations of the leak and its location as compared with that of EKF. This filter is robust against process noise, measurement noise, parameter uncertainties, and guarantees a higher limit for the covariance of state estimation error as well. It is remarkable that simulation results are evaluated by OLGA software.


2009 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 570
Author(s):  
Ron Reinten

Safety is a core value at Esso Australia. We strive to observe the highest standards of safety to ensure that nobody gets hurt in our operations. We believe this goal can be achieved through a broadly shared commitment to personal and process safety—both of which are managed using our operations integrity management system (OIMS). In the Gippsland region of Victoria, Esso Australia operates oil and gas production facilities ranging from sub-sea completions to substantial staffed offshore facilities, an onshore crude stabilisation, three gas processing plants and a natural gas liquids fractionation plant, all interconnected by a network of offshore and onshore pipelines. Every day Esso’s Gippsland operations produce millions of litres of crude oil and millions of cubic meters of natural gas. Having all this fuel energy flowing through these plants each day at high pressures, and widely ranging temperatures, it is imperative that it is safely controlled and contained by the process equipment. How do we do this? With process safety systems. Process safety is a crucial component of OIMS that ensures Esso’s assets are operated and maintained in keeping with corporate and industry safety standards. In this presentation we show how process safety is managed within OIMS and how the people within Esso individually and collectively contribute to it. Our work in this area has recently been captured in a training package that includes a DVD shown at the conference. It was created to raise the awareness and understanding of all Esso employees about the principles that underpin Esso’s approach to process safety. This abstract outlines how we approach process safety across the life-cycle of our facilities and the role people play in managing this very important aspect of our work. Our training reinforces the message that responsibility for effective management of process safety lies with every employee and how OIMS is designed to assist people to achieve the desired results where all risks are appropriately managed. We have sought to connect the concepts used to manage personal safety, which are well understood by the workforce, with those that are needed to understand how to manage process safety.


Author(s):  
Glenn Pettitt ◽  
Philip Pennicott

Bowtie diagrams have become a widely-used method for demonstrating the relationship between the causes and consequences of hazardous events following the identification of Major Accident Hazards (MAHs). They are particularly useful for illustrating how safeguarding measures protect against particular threats or mitigate the various consequences of an incident. Bowtie diagrams have been widely used in a range of industries for over twenty years and are widespread in the upstream oil and gas industry, as well as other high hazard industries such as mining and nuclear. Bowtie diagrams are used for a range of purposes. At their simplest, they provide an overview of the measures in place to prevent and mitigate hazardous events, and as such are valuable additions to training programmes. A bowtie diagram provides an excellent platform to show regulatory authorities, trainees and new employees the various threats to a pipeline system, and what barriers are in place to prevent and control major accidents, such that the risks are as low as reasonably practicable. The bowtie process may be used during design, construction, operations and decommissioning. The bowtie for construction is different to that for design and operations, being more to do with occupational safety rather that loss of containment. However, the construction bowtie diagram still plays a vital role in minimising risk. Whilst the typical failure mechanisms for pipelines are generally well-established during operations, bowties have a key role in informing senior management of the measures in place to reduce risk. Furthermore, a large proportion of major accidents may occur at above ground installations (AGIs), and bowtie diagrams provide a mechanism to help management in the protection of personnel and potentially of nearby populations. For both cross-country pipelines and AGIs, the effectiveness of each barrier can be established to ensure that the risk of loss of containment is minimised. More detailed bowties may be used to assist in identifying safety critical elements (SCEs) or safety critical tasks; developing performance standards and defining process safety performance indicators. Often, the hardware shown by the barriers may be considered as SCEs, particularly in the case of effective barriers, such as vibration detection along the right-of-way (RoW) (prevention) or gas detection at AGIs (recovery). Where such barriers are defined as key to a major threat, the bowtie diagram illustrates the importance of good maintenance systems to ensure that the barriers have a high reliability. Thus, by defining the SCEs in a logical manner, bowties may be a key element in managing the risk from a pipeline system.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3.26) ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Noor Diana Abdul Majid ◽  
Dzulkarnain Zaini ◽  
Azmi Mohd Shariff

A report published on 25 April 2016 stated that OSHA has issued 14 serious violations after an investigation conducted in a variety of industries including manufacturing, water treatment and oil and gas that violated OSHA's Process Safety Management (PSM) standard. One of the violations is related to the 29 CFR 1910.119(c)(2) which is employers did not consult with employees and their representatives on the conduct and development of the OSHA’s PSM elements which are process safety information (PSI), process hazard analyses (PHA), training (TNG), mechanical integrity (MI), management of change (MOC), pre-start up safety review (PSSR), contractors (CON), incident investigations (II), emergency planning and response (EPR), compliance audit (CA) and trade secret (TS). 29 CFR1910.119(c)(2) is one of the requirements in the OSHA’s PSM employee participation element. However, companies are still struggling to comply with this regulation due to unclear coverage and the implementation method for achieving compliance. Thus, this paper presents a framework and work-aid tool developed based on OSHA’s PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(c) which are helpful to the industries as they provide structured technique to plan and implement an employee's participation management system to achieve compliance in implementing the OSHA PSM employee participation element.  


Author(s):  
Kuok Ho Daniel Tang

Asset integrity is closely intertwined with process safety where the latter is often perceived to be equivalent or a subset of the former. In Malaysia, the requirements for offshore process safety are set by Petronas assuming exclusive rights to petroleum in the nation. It imposes and enforces these requirements on oil and gas companies entering into its production sharing contracts via the common law. Process safety management in Malaysia is strongly influenced by the US OSHA 3132 with elements comprising process safety information, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, employee participation, training, contractors, pre-startup safety review, mechanical integrity, hot work permit, management of change, incident investigation, emergency planning and response as well as compliance audits. These elements are largely included in the Mandatory Control Framework of Petronas and the trio of design, technical and operating integrity adopted in the process safety management of other oil and gas companies. These management practices align with the reiterative plan-do-check-act model. Process safety performance is also gauged with indicators suggested by international institutions such as the American Petroleum Institute. On top of the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1996 for onshore processes, this study deems that establishing statutory law for offshore installations will be beneficial to propel offshore safety in Malaysia to a greater height.


2013 ◽  
Vol 827 ◽  
pp. 112-117
Author(s):  
Deng Feng Zheng

For long distance oil and gas pipeline system has the characteristics of high accident rate tending to happen in personnel job activity, this paper expounds the necessity and application steps of HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Analysis) analysis for long-distance pipeline system key operation procedure (SOP). The HAZAOP analysis of deviation, causes of deviation, consequences, existing control measures and recommending measures, make the key operating procedure safer, and also contributes to the improvement of the oil and gas pipeline system safety and fitness between operating procedures and hardware facilities. The results of application examples show that HAZOP is able to identify key operating procedure loopholes, helps enterprises optimize key operating procedures, improves the hardware facilities, and has an important role to improve the security of the key operation of oil and gas pipelines.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document