The Role of External Action-Effects in the Execution of a Soccer Kick: A Comparison across Skill Level

European Union – Common Foreign and Security Policy – Changes with the abolition of the pillar structure by the Lisbon Treaty – Common Security and Defence Policy – Executive order of the EU – Between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism – The role of the High Representative – Joint political leadership – The European External Action Service as an administrative infrastructure – Constitutionalisation of foreign affairs

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The role of ‘action-effects’ and agency in toddlers’ imitation

Cognitive Development ◽

10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.08.001 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 22 (1) ◽

pp. 69-76 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Dalia Danish ◽

James Russell

Keyword(s):

Action Effects

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La CEE e i paesi in via di sviluppo: le contraddizioni emerse dalla politica agricola (1957-1992)

MEMORIA E RICERCA ◽

10.3280/mer2009-030004 ◽

2009 ◽

pp. 37-46

Author(s):

Giuliana Laschi

Keyword(s):

Foreign Policy ◽

Historical Perspective ◽

External Action ◽

Development Cooperation ◽

National Interests ◽

Positive Effects ◽

Political Choices ◽

European Policies ◽

International Role

- The EEC doesn't have a proper foreign policy, so the international dimension of the Community has grown on a sui generis foreign policy, in which doesn't always coexist community and national interests. Given the intergovernmental nature of the external issues of the EEC, on international policy of the Community has been relevant the member states and their individual action in foreign policy. The international role of the EEC was not produced by overall political choices, but rather from external action of internal policies. Action that often produces and has produced incoherent results between the European policies of agriculture, trade and development cooperation, which are often in conflict with each other and thus threaten to undermine their potential positive effects. The policies analysed in historical perspective are able to outline not only the inside action of the Community as expression of the composition of national positions, but also the international aims of the EEC, even in the absence of a proper foreign policy.Parole chiave: Politiche della CEE, Studi storici sulla CEE, Politica agricola comune, Politica estera della CEE, Cooperazione allo sviluppo della CEE, Politiche incoerenti EEC Policies, EEC Historical Perspective, Common Agricultural Policy, EEC Foreign Policy, EEC Development Policy, EEC Incoherent Policies

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Human Rights in EU Development Policy

The European Union and Human Rights ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198814177.003.0011 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 682-706

Author(s):

Jan Wouters ◽

Michal Ovádek

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Development Policy ◽

External Action ◽

Development Cooperation ◽

Development Programs ◽

Member States ◽

Missed Opportunities ◽

Constitutional Level ◽

The Eu

This chapter studies the role of human rights in EU development policy. The place of human rights in development policy was solidified at the constitutional level with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which made the promotion of human rights in all EU external action a legal obligation. As a result, different institutional mechanisms, thematic guidelines, and dedicated instruments and strategies have been put in place to consolidate a comprehensive operational framework aimed at ensuring that EU development programs advance human rights worldwide coherently and consistently. EU development policy is a shared competence, which means that both the EU and its Member States are entitled to act within this domain, as long as national actions do not undermine EU laws and positions. The sharing of competences, however, makes it more difficult for the EU to live up to the commitment of coherent and consistent promotion of human rights. In any case, substantial amount of coordination between the EU and the Member States is required in order to deliver coherence in development policy. However, the role of the EU as a normative leader in development cooperation remains subject to a multitude of long-standing criticisms and various evaluations of EU human rights policy point to a series of mixed results and missed opportunities.

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Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency

Review of Philosophy and Psychology ◽

10.1007/s13164-020-00486-6 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 11 (4) ◽

pp. 955-975

Author(s):

Oliver Lukitsch

Keyword(s):

Prediction Error ◽

Perceptual Experience ◽

Accurate Prediction ◽

Sense Of Agency ◽

Action Effects ◽

Sense Of Effort ◽

Sense Of Efficacy

AbstractOrthodox neurocognitive accounts of the bodily sense of agency suggest that the experience of agency arises when action-effects are anticipated accurately. In this paper, I argue that while successful anticipation is crucial for the sense of agency, the role of unsuccessful prediction has been neglected, and that inefficacy and uncertainty are no less central to the sense of agency. I will argue that this is reflected in the phenomenology of agency, which can be characterized both as the experience of (1) efficacy and (2) effort. Specifically, the “sense of efficacy” refers to the perceptual experience of an action unfolding as anticipated. The “sense of effort”, in contrast, arises when an action has an uncertain trajectory, feels difficult, and demands the exertion of control. In this case, actions do not unfold as anticipated and require continuing adaptation if they are to be efficacious. I propose that, taken individually, the experience of efficacy and effort are insufficient for the sense of agency and that these experiences can even disrupt the sense of agency when they occur in isolation from each other. I further argue that a fully-fledged sense of agency depends on the temporally extensive process of prediction error-cancelation. This way, a comparator account can accommodate both the role of accurate prediction and prediction error and thus efficacy and effort.

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Analysing the Power of the European Union’s Diplomatic Service: Do the eu Member States Control the European External Action Service?

The Hague Journal of Diplomacy ◽

10.1163/1871191x-12341326 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 26-48 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Hrant Kostanyan

Keyword(s):

External Action ◽

Principal Agent ◽

The European Union ◽

Member States ◽

Agent Model ◽

Eu Member States ◽

Principal Agent Model ◽

European Union Member States ◽

The Eu

By applying the rational choice principal–agent model, this article examines the European Union member states’ principal control of the European External Action Service (eeas) agent. More specifically, the article applies mechanisms of agency monitoring, control and sanctions that are inherent in the principal–agent model to analyse the establishment and functioning of the eeas. These mechanisms aim to ensure the eeas’s compliance with its mandate, thereby curtailing its ability to pursue own objectives that are independent from the principal. The findings reveal that the eeas is tightly controlled by the eu member states. Moreover the European Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the eeas. The application of the principal–agent model to control the eeas is not without its limits. The model falls short of conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to this model.

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The European Council: The Fascination and Frustration of Studying a Key Institution

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics ◽

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.180 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Wolfgang Wessels ◽

Linda Dieke

Keyword(s):

Security Policy ◽

Legal Status ◽

Migration Policy ◽

External Action ◽

Lisbon Treaty ◽

European Council ◽

Democratic Legitimacy ◽

Late Night ◽

The Eu

The observer´s first impression of the European Council is one of tired European Union (EU) leaders who, after dramatic late-night sessions, try to explain ambiguous compromises on key issues of European policies to their media audiences. From a researcher’s perspective, however, there are still many blank areas—a matter resulting from the various obstacles of analyzing this EU institution. The relevance of the European Council’s decisions has driven research on its agenda formation, decision-making and internal dynamics, its legal status and democratic legitimacy. Yet research on the European Council can be cumbersome and methodologically demanding due to the lack of confirmed empirical evidence: meetings of the European Council are consultations behind closed doors and the dense network of mutual information difficult to access. The conclusions are only a concentrate of the discussions held within. It is furthermore a challenge to explain the causal links between the diplomatic language of the conclusions and the real impact these measures have on EU politics. Nevertheless, the European Council is a vivid object of investigation. Since its creation in 1974, the European Council has undergone structural and formal changes: from the increase to up to 28 heads of state or government, to the establishment of a permanent president and the formal inclusion in the institutional setup of the EU in the Lisbon Treaty. From the first “summits” onwards, the Lisbon Treaty had a crucial role in the development of the EU system and the formulation of the underlying treaties. In crisis, it was often the only constellation able to provide consensual and thus effective proposals. Meanwhile, the scope of its activities has been enlarged toward a state-like agenda. It now covers topics at the very heart of national sovereignty. To these issues dealing with core state powers belong economic governance, migration policy, justice and home affairs, and external action, including security policy. Academic controversies about this cornerstone of the Union derive from intergovernmental or quasi-federalist assessments of the institution or from the powers and limitations of “summits” in general and in relation to other EU institutions. Some argue that the European Council shifts the institutional balance toward intergovernmentalist structures. Others stress the European Council’s role in transferring competences to supranationalist institutions. Further debates focus on whether the European Council has (successfully) overtaken the role of a “crisis manager,” or how its embeddedness in the EU institutional architecture could be enhanced, especially vis-à-vis the Council and toward a constructive and balanced relationship with the EP, in future treaty revisions. Analyses of power and of the role of institutions—especially of a key institution as the European Council—are crucial issues of social sciences. Research projects on this highly interesting EU institution will have to assess which methods are adequate: from studying the treaty provisions, formalized agreements and conclusions, to observing its activities as well as tracing external contexts and the internal constellations of the European Council, to evaluating information considered as “anecdotal evidence” from interviews, biographies, and speeches from the few members of this institution.

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The role of deliberate practice in expert performance: revisiting Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer (1993)

Royal Society Open Science ◽

10.1098/rsos.190327 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 6 (8) ◽

pp. 190327 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Brooke N. Macnamara ◽

Megha Maitra

Keyword(s):

Individual Differences ◽

Effect Size ◽

Deliberate Practice ◽

Skill Level ◽

Expert Performance ◽

Double Blind ◽

The Core ◽

Definition Of ◽

Practice Teacher

We sought to replicate Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer's (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer 1993 Psychol. Rev. 100 , 363–406) seminal study on deliberate practice. Ericsson et al . found that differences in retrospective estimates of accumulated amounts of deliberate practice corresponded to each skill level of student violinists. They concluded, ‘individual differences in ultimate performance can largely be accounted for by differential amounts of past and current levels of practice’ (p. 392). We reproduced the methodology with notable exceptions, namely (i) employing a double-blind procedure, (ii) conducting analyses better suited to the study design, and (iii) testing previously unanswered questions about teacher-designed practice—that is, we examined the way Ericsson et al . operationalized deliberate practice (practice alone), and their theoretical but previously unmeasured definition of deliberate practice (teacher-designed practice), and compared them. We did not replicate the core finding that accumulated amounts of deliberate practice corresponded to each skill level. Overall, the size of the effect was substantial, but considerably smaller than the original study's effect size. Teacher-designed practice was perceived as less relevant to improving performance on the violin than practice alone. Further, amount of teacher-designed practice did not account for more variance in performance than amount of practice alone. Implications for the deliberate practice theory are discussed.

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