scholarly journals A three-degree horizon of peace in the military alliance network

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. e1601895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Li ◽  
Aisha E. Bradshaw ◽  
Caitlin B. Clary ◽  
Skyler J. Cranmer
Acta Comitas ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 475
Author(s):  
I Made Hengki Permadi

The process or procedure for establishing a firm is regulated in Article 22 and Article 23 of the Commercial Law Code (hereinafter referred to as KUHD). In this provision, it is stipulated that the firm must be established with an authentic deed and registered with the Registrar of the District Court where the firm was established. The regulations in the KUHD are not in line with the Minister of Law and Human Rights Regulation Number 17 Year 2018 regarding the Registration of the Military Alliance, the Fima Alliance and the Civil Alliance which indicates that the registration of the firm is carried out in the Legal Entity Administration System (hereinafter referred to as SABU). it appears that there is a norm conflict between the two rules. This study aims to determine the arrangements in registering the Firm and the legal consequences of not registering the Firm in the Business Entity Administration System (SABU). This research is a normative legal research. In research using a statutory and conceptual approach. Using primary and secondary legal materials. The results showed that based on the principle of Lex Superiori derogate Legi Inferiori, based on the hierarchy of statutory regulations, the KUHD which is equivalent to the Law is stronger than the Regulation of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Number 17 of 2018 concerning Registration of Komanditer Alliance, Firm Alliance and Civil Alliance whose position is under Government Regulations and Presidential Regulations, because the Acts are higher than Government Regulations and Presidential Regulations. The legal consequence of not registering a firm with SABU is that the name of the firm can be used first by other firms so it must change the name of the firm concerned with another name because in the SABU system there is a registration of the firm's alliance name. If there is a partnership with another firm that registers the name of the firm first, then the name of the same firm cannot be registered again and the firm is deemed invalid. Proses atau tata cara pendirian firma diatur dalam Pasal 22 dan Pasal 23 Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Dagang (yang selanjutnya disebut KUHD). Dalam ketentuan tersebuti menentukan bahwa firma harus didirikan dengan akta otentik dan didaftarkan pada Kepaniteraan Pengadilan Negeri dimana firma tersebut didirikan. Peraturan dalam KUHD tersebut tidak sejalan dengan Peraturan Menteri Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Nomor 17 Tahun 2018 tentang Pendaftaran Persekutuan Komanditer, Persekutuan Fima dan Persekutuan Perdata yang mengisyaratkan bahwa pendaftaran firma dilakukan pada Sistem Administrasi Badan Hukum (yang selanjutnya disebut SABU). terlihat bahwa adanya konflik norma diantara kedua aturan itu. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui   pengaturan dalam pendaftaran Firma  dan akibat hukum apabila tidak mendaftarkan Firma pada Sistem Administrasi Badan Usaha (SABU). Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum normatif. Dalam penelitian menggunakan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan konseptual. Menggunakan bahan hukum primer dan sekunder.   Hasil penelitian  menunjukkan  bahwa  berdasarkan asas Lex Superiori derogate Legi Inferiori maka berdasarkan hirarki peraturan perundang-undangan, KUHD yang setara dengan Undang-Undang lebih kuat dibanding Peraturan Menteri Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Nomor 17 Tahun 2018 tentang Pendaftaran Persekutuan Komanditer, Persekutuan Firma dan Persekutuan Perdata yang kedudukannya dibawah Peraturan Pemerintah dan Peraturan Presiden, karena Undang-Undang kedudukannya lebih tinggi dari Peraturan Pemerintah dan Peraturan Presiden. Akibat hukum dari tidak didaftarkannya firma pada SABU, yaitu nama firma dapat dipakai terlebih dahulu oleh firma lainnya sehingga harus mengganti nama firma yang bersangkutan dengan nama yang lain karena di dalam sistem SABU terdapat pendaftaran nama persekutuan firma. Jika ada persekutuan firma lain yang mendaftarkan nama firmanya terlebih dahulu maka nama firma yang sama tidak akan bisa didaftarkan kembali dan firma tersebut dianggap tidak sah pendiriannya.


Author(s):  
Виктор Анатольевич Кардашов

Целью статьи является рассмотрение общей тенденции отношений двух стран в контексте противостояния Китая давлению Запада. Используются методы общенаучной группы (анализ, синтез, дедукция, индукция); а также специальные методы: контентанализ научной литературы; фактографический анализ, метод ретроспективного анализа. Автор приходит к выводу, что китайская военная философия реализуется в стратегии «мягкой силы» Китая. В отношениях с Россией Китай не делает исключения из общих философских принципов взаимодействия с западной цивилизацией. Принципы военной философии Китая противоречат прогнозам о возможности военного союза с Россией. Теоретическая значимость исследования заключается в том, что отношения между Россией и Китаем рассматриваются с позиции основных принципов военной философии КНР. Aim. The aim is the considering of the general trend in relations between the two countries in the context of China’s opposition to Western pressure. Methodology. General scientific group methods (analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction); as well as special methods: content analysis of scientific literature; factual analysis, retrospective analysis method. Results. Chinese military philosophy is implemented in China’s «soft power» strategy. In relations with Russia, China makes no exceptions from the general philosophical principles of interaction with Western civilization. The principles of China’s military philosophy contradict forecasts of the possibility of a military alliance with Russia. The theoretical significance of the study lies in the fact that relations between Russia and China are viewed from the standpoint of the basic principles of the military philosophy of the PRC.


Author(s):  
Carlos Pérez Pineda

The 1969 conflict between Honduras and El Salvador signaled the weakening of the Central American economic integration process; marked an end to an era of economic growth, industrialization, and political openness; and inaugurated a new chapter, characterized by growing political polarization and violence. There is a prevailing consensus about the significance that this conflict had as a breaking point and historical turnaround. The roots of the crisis between both states, commercial partners and members of a regional political-military alliance, lie in the drastic changes introduced by the Honduran government in its migratory and agrarian policies. These changes sought to contain the massive migration from El Salvador and to reduce by all means necessary, including by violent dispossession, the Salvadoran presence in Honduras. A ferocious anti-Salvadoran media campaign preceded and accompanied the massive expulsion of Salvadorans. Alarmed by the destabilizing effect that a return en masse of poor Salvadoran peasants could bring to the country, and facing an intransigent Honduran government, the leadership in El Salvador decided to resolve the conflict through war. Once this began, both countries mobilized their military forces for over one hundred hours of bloody fighting in July 1969. Although neither country won a decisive victory on the battlefield, at the moment the ceasefire was imposed the military situation amply favored El Salvador. The political, economic, military, and diplomatic consequences of the war had a profound impact during the 1970s and beyond the signing of the peace agreement early in the 1980s. On the one hand, the recounting of the war, full of falsifications and half-truths, continues to play an important role in Honduran nationalism. On the other hand, for Salvadorans the war is an almost forgotten memory.


1958 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold Wolfers

Pressures to extend the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into fields other than the military, or actually to shift the emphasis to political, economic, and cultural objectives, have been so strong in recent years that one wonders whether there has not been a growing tendency, particularly in Europe, to lose sight of the purpose for which NATO was established and which makes it vital to the United States. Essentially, NATO is a multilateral military alliance for the protection of western and southern Europe against Soviet conquest, a means of denying these areas and their resources to the Soviets. If the members of the alliance, on one side or the other of the Atlantic, were ever to reach the conclusion that the threat of military attack from the east had vanished or that it could not be countered effectively by common military effort, NATO would have lost its original raison d'être, though it might be continued for the sake of what today are secondary non-military functions, such as political conciliation and economic collaboration. It should be added that the primacy of the military purpose of NATO, as it exists today, does not preclude the desirability or even the necessity of extending its scope beyond purely military matters. As Ruth C. Lawson has pointed out, there is little hope for reliable military collaboration among countries ohat do not succeed in attaining a reasonable degree of harmony between their political aims and policies. Cyprus, Suez, and Algeria are symptomatic of the problems NATO faces in the political field.


Author(s):  
Patricio N. Abinales

An enduring resilience characterizes Philippine–American relationship for several reasons. For one, there is an unusual colonial relationship wherein the United States took control of the Philippines from the Spanish and then shared power with an emergent Filipino elite, introduced suffrage, implemented public education, and promised eventual national independence. A shared experience fighting the Japanese in World War II and defeating a postwar communist rebellion further cemented the “special relationship” between the two countries. The United States took advantage of this partnership to compel the Philippines to sign an economic and military treaty that favored American businesses and the military, respectively. Filipino leaders not only accepted the realities of this strategic game and exploited every opening to assert national interests but also benefitted from American largesse. Under the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos, this mutual cadging was at its most brazen. As a result, the military alliance suffered when the Philippines terminated the agreement, and the United States considerably reduced its support to the country. But the estrangement did not last long, and both countries rekindled the “special relationship” in response to the U.S. “Global War on Terror” and, of late, Chinese military aggression in the West Philippine Sea.


Significance This is the first state visit extended to a Japanese prime minister since Junichiro Koizumi's in 2006 under the George W Bush administration. Abe was awarded the honour on April 29 of being the first Japanese prime minister to address together both houses of the US Congress. Impacts Abe has strengthened the military alliance, but fulfilling his promises to Washington will cost him political capital at home. History issues are increasingly able to cause Abe problems in the United States as well as East Asia. The economic alliance is shakier than the military one; the US Congress may still delay the TPP. Tokyo and Washington look isolated as the TPP stalls and regional governments sign up to China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.


Author(s):  
Erdağ Göknar

In 2008 the Turkish Constitutional Court was one vote shy of banning the ruling AKP for “anti-secular activity.” In response, the AKP began articulating a series of political conspiracy narratives, amplified through the media. Blurring the line between representation and reality, these political melodramas set the stage for the exercise of state power through the weaponization of investigations and judicial retaliation against the military and the opposition. From 2008 to 2013, the “Ergenekon” conspiracy depicted an anti-Islamist deep state organization and its involvement in illegal activities including military coups and assassinations—as if it actually existed. The Ergenekon conspiracy (and attendant trials) initiated a profound change in Turkish politics by breaking the power of the traditional secular-military alliance. In 2014, Ergenekon led to a spin-off called “Mastermind”, which targeted the AKP’s erstwhile ally and political rival the Gülen Hizmet (or “Service”) Movement, a transnational Islamic educational and media network led by imam Fetullah Gülen. Gülenists, with their strong presence in the police and judiciary, had been instrumental in the Ergenekon prosecutions. Mastermind was later credited with the anti-AKP Gezi protests and a corruption investigation into then Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2013 as well as for the 2016 failed coup. Relying on a literary-cultural analysis of the political field, this chapter argues that conspiracism in Turkey has functioned to prefigure and legitimate authoritarian governance, whether secular or Islamist. I redefine conspiracy theories as popular fictions indexed to political movements that can instrumentalize legal and electoral processes for the accumulation of state power and the undermining of democratic pluralism.


2018 ◽  
pp. 79-109
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

Many scholars would hold that a robust military alliance as well as strong anti-nuclear norms in domestic society would make any nuclear proliferation-related behaviour unlikely on the part of Japan. This chapter challenges such arguments, showing that the alliance with the United States did not fully inhibit Japan’s nuclear ambitions since Japan ratcheted up its interest in enrichment and reprocessing technologies in the late 1960. Indeed, Japan’s nuclear interest piqued amid concerns that the military alliance was weakening. Moreover, although the alliance did discourage some level of interest in nuclear weapons, the United States was reluctant to coerce Japan directly on this issue. Domestic politics and—to a lesser extent—prestige considerations were arguably a greater influence on Japan’s nuclear decision-making in the 1970s than alliance-related ones.


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