COST AND COMPLEXITY OF HARNESSING GAMES WITH PAYMENTS

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (01) ◽  
pp. 13-44
Author(s):  
RAPHAEL EIDENBENZ ◽  
YVONNE ANNE PIGNOLET ◽  
STEFAN SCHMID ◽  
ROGER WATTENHOFER

This article studies how a mechanism designer can influence games by promising payments to the players depending on their mutual choice of strategies. First, we investigate the cost of implementing a desirable behavior and present algorithms to compute this cost. Whereas a mechanism designer can decide efficiently whether strategy profiles can be implemented at no cost at all our complexity analysis indicates that computing an optimal implementation is generally NP-hard. Second, we introduce and analyze the concept of leverage in a game. The leverage captures the benefits that a benevolent or a malicious mechanism designer can achieve by implementing a certain strategy profile region within economic reason, i.e., by taking the implementation cost into account. Mechanism designers can often manipulate games and change the social welfare by a larger extent than the amount of money invested. Unfortunately, computing the leverage turns out to be intractable as well in the general case.

2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 1126-1140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cathrine Madziva ◽  
Martha Chinouya

This qualitative study explored how volunteers delivering social welfare to orphans and vulnerable children through a community initiative supported by donors made sense of volunteering during a period of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. Findings confirm that volunteering in Africa is influenced by a normative value system embedded in Ubuntu. Volunteering emerged as contradictory given the contextual prevalence of the social obligation discourse rather than individual choice as embedded in the European sense of voluntarism. Volunteering masked the cost of participation, thereby potentially making poverty worse for the poor in a context without a formal welfare system.


Author(s):  
Christian Gollier

This chapter shows that the cost-benefit analysis can be used only if the actions under scrutiny are marginal, that is, if implementing them has no macroeconomic effects. Otherwise, one needs to go back to the basics of public economics to evaluate these actions. The chapter examines the error that one makes by following the classical discounting approach when evaluating non-marginal projects. The evaluation of non-marginal projects must be done by measuring their impact on the social welfare function. A non-marginal investment project with positive future cash flows will have an impact on welfare that is smaller than when estimated by using the standard discounting method.


Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow

This chapter presents a framework for assessing competition rules. An economic approach to limiting coordinated oligopolistic price elevation seeks to determine liability and apply sanctions based primarily on the deterrence benefits that result as well as any chilling of desirable behavior that may ensue, while also considering the expense of operating the regime. In assessing the cost of false positives, attention focuses on incidental negative behavioral effects, not on mistakes that are defined by reference to proxy legal standards and then given arbitrary weight. An example that will prove important involves imposing sanctions on firms that actually charged elevated oligopoly prices, the prospect of which deters such behavior. This outcome is favorable in terms of social welfare but under some legal standards would be deemed to be an undesirable error in cases in which the firms did not employ forbidden modes of communication.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 191
Author(s):  
Yoelanda Ananta Dhevi Wardani ◽  
Muhammad Rusli ◽  
Ambo Upe

The research aims to determine the impact of hazardous and toxic waste substances (B3) disposal toward the social welfare in Lakardowo village Mojokerto. The type of this research is descriptive qualitative. The data collection that used is by observation, interview and documentation with 10 people in Lakardowo village. The result of this research is the impact of hazardous and toxic waste substances (B3) disposal toward social welfarestarting from material, social and spiritual, such as reducing the income that hit the majority society as a farmer in Lakardowo village which feel the damage in their agricultural land and increasing the cost of living for clean water. The emerge of Dermatitis or itchy disease that mostly attacks children body as a result of using well water or water sources in Lakardowo village. The rise of conflict between two camps in the society that causing the reduce of spiritual activities and also customs, which make the social welfare in Lakardowo village unfulfilled.


2004 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREAS ECKERT

This essay discusses British discourses and efforts to regulate social policy in both urban and rural areas in late colonial Tanzania. It focuses mainly on questions of social security and especially on the vague concept of social welfare and development, which after the Second World War became a favoured means of expressing a new imperial commitment to colonial people. The British were very reluctant about implementing international standards of social security in Tanganyika, mainly due to the insight that the cost of providing European-scale benefits could not be borne by the colonial regime in such a poor territory. They were far more enthusiastic in pursuing a policy of social development, embodied in social welfare centres and various other schemes. It is argued that in Tanzania, this policy remained focused on peasantization rather than on proletarianization and was characterized by a disconnection between Colonial Office mandarins in London, attempting to create bourgeois, respectable African middle classes, and colonial officials in Tanganyika, seeking to maintain the political legitimacy of the chiefs and headmen. Most Africans ignored rather than challenged many of these state efforts. However, the nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) under Julius Nyerere believed in these programmes and continued such dirigiste and poorly financed improvement schemes after independence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1513-1528
Author(s):  
Daniel Morais dos Reis ◽  
Natã Goulart ◽  
Thiago F. Noronha ◽  
Sérgio Ricardo de Souza

The Fiber Installation Problem (FIP) in Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) optical networks consists in routing a set of lightpaths (all-optical connections) such that the cost of the optical devices necessary to operate the network is minimized. Each of these devices is worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. In consequence, any improvement in the lightpath routing may save millions of dollars for the network operator. All the works in the literature for solving this problem are based on greedy heuristics and genetic algorithms. No information is known on how good are the solutions provided by these heuristics compared to the optimal solution. Besides, no proof that the problem is NP-Hard can be found. In this paper, we prove that FIP is NP-Hard and also present an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation for the problem. In addition, we propose an implementation of the Iterated Local Search (ILS) metaheuristic to solve large instances of the problem. Computational experiments carried out on 21 realistic instances showed that the CPLEX solver running with our ILP formulation was able to solve 11 out of the 21 instances to optimality in less than two minutes. These results also showed that the ILS heuristic has an average optimality gap of 1% on the instances for which the optimal solution is known. For the other instances, the results showed that the proposed heuristic outperforms the best heuristic in the literature by 7%.


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